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**EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
(2002) IN COMBATING TERRORISM IN UGANDA: A CASE STUDY OF
KAMPALA METROPOLITAN AREA (KMP)**

BY

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
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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
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THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
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SEPTEMBER, 2025

DECLARATION

I, Tumugumye Godwin, do hereby declare that this dissertation titled “**Examining the effectiveness of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) in Combating Terrorism in Uganda: A case study of Kampala Metropolitan Area (KMP)**” is my original work, and to the best of my knowledge, it has not been submitted to any other higher education institution or university for any academic award whatsoever.


Signature

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APPROVAL

This dissertation titled “**Examining the effectiveness of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) in Combating Terrorism in Uganda: A case study of Kampala Metropolitan Area (KMP)**” has been submitted for examination with the approval of my supervisor.

Signed.....

Dr. Anne Abaho
Supervisor

Date..... 20/09/2025

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my dear wife and children.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the various people who assisted me in various ways to make this research run smoothly.

I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Abaho Anne, for her time spent advising, scrutinizing, and correcting my work, which inspired me to do my best.

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ABSTRACT

The effectiveness of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) in combating terrorism in Uganda has been a critical concern amid persistent attacks. As of 2023, Uganda Police reported a rise in terrorism cases from 10 in 2019 to 26, characterized by bombings of public spaces and transit systems (Police Annual Crime Report, 2023). Despite Uganda's alignment with international counter-terrorism conventions and domestication of the Anti-Terrorism Act (amended in 2015, 2016, and 2017), groups like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continue to exploit socio-economic vulnerabilities and ideological extremism. This study examined the Act's efficacy in suppressing terrorism, analyzing its key provisions, implementation challenges, and relationship with Uganda's evolving terrorism landscape.

Guided by Orthodox Terrorism Theory (Franks, 2006), a mixed-methods approach was adopted, combining quantitative surveys (n=45 police/CID staff) and qualitative key informant interviews (n=23 officials from security, judiciary, and prosecution units). Descriptive analysis via SPSS 26 and thematic coding revealed that punitive measures under the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) —such as the death penalty (supported by 72.1% of respondents) and fines for terrorism financing (65.5% agreement) deterred overt activities. However, challenges included definitional overlaps with other crimes (64.6% agreement), weak safeguards for extradition, and delays in proscribing new terrorist groups (63.2% agreement). Critically, 69.1% of respondents identified unaddressed socio-economic inequalities as key drivers of recruitment, limiting the Act's reach.

Findings confirm the Act's partial effectiveness in enforcement but highlight significant gaps: accountability concerns over police immunity (57.3% agreement), inadequate victim protections, and insufficient attention to root causes like poverty and ideological radicalization. The study recommends a multi-faceted strategy beyond legal measures, including streamlined terrorist designation processes, community-based deradicalization programs, socio-economic reforms in marginalized regions, and enhanced inter-agency coordination to strengthen Uganda's counter-terrorism framework.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

This study examined the efficacy of Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) in suppressing terrorism, analyzing its key provisions, implementation challenges, and relationship with Uganda's evolving terrorism landscape. This introductory chapter presents the background of the study, the problem statement, and the purpose of the study. It also states the objectives of the study, as well as the scope of the study. To give meaning to the study, the chapter also highlights the justification and significance of this study.

1.1 Background to the Study

1.1.1 Conceptual Background

Terrorism is a difficult concept to define because it is constantly evolving and partly because its definition may be subjectively interpreted. Terrorism as argued by Wilkinson (2006) has a political aspect and involves acts of violence, which intends to bring about political change by influencing the political behavior of governments, communities, or specific groups. Carlile and Alexander (2007) & Ben (2006) affirm that while terrorism is one of the most widely used terms in adversarial political discourse, there is still no international consensus about its exact meaning. Loadenthal (2018) states that terrorism is considered a means of avenging a popular wrong, inspiring fear in the enemy, and also calling attention to the evil against which the act of terror was directed. Monty and Gurr (2005) point out that terrorism, as a political act, stands at once at the nexus between individual and collective action, the emotional and the rational, the conventional and the unconventional. It can be the strongest form of protest, the weakest form of rebellion, or a specialized tactic in a broader process of tyranny or warfare.

Schmid and Jongman (1988) consider the following basic elements of terrorism to provide this comprehensive definition: Terrorism is the deliberate employment of violence or the threat to use violence by sub-national groups and sovereign states to attain strategic and political objectives. Terrorists seek to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened. Acts of individual and collective terrorism committed in modern times have introduced a new breed of extralegal 'warfare' in terms of threats, technology, targets, and impact (Alexander, 1994). Schmid (2011) first describes terror as a state of mind, characterized by intensive fear of a threatening danger on an individual level and by a climate of fear on the collective level. He then describes terrorism as an activity,

method, or tactic which, as a psychological outcome, aims to produce terror.

Kofi Annan (2005) affirms that terrorism is a global threat with global effects; its methods are murder and mayhem, but its consequences affect every aspect from development to peace to human rights and the rule of law. No part of the United Nation's mission is safe from the effects of terrorism, and no part of the world is immune from the terrorism scourge. There is thus a need for counter-terrorism strategies that involve both physical and non-physical measures that government applies to prevent or stop group violence, that targets innocent citizens or government officials (OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999/2002)).

The Anti-terrorism Act refers to a legal framework concerned with penal law, the listing of terrorist entities, terrorism offences, investigative hearings, surveillance and identification, financing of terrorism, security of information and security intelligence. Anti-terrorism legislation are laws with the purpose of fighting terrorism. Thus it is the law that criminalizes perpetration, planning, and participation in any terrorist activities (Namasinga, 2022). In Uganda, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 was assented to by the President on 21st May 2002 and came into force on 7th June 2002. This Act brought Uganda into line with many other countries which have passed similar legislation since the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 is therefore aimed at suppressing acts of terrorism and generally to provide for the punishment of persons who plan, instigate, support, finance or execute acts of terrorism; to prescribe terrorist organizations and to provide for the punishment of persons who are members of, or who profess in public to be members of, or who convene or associate with or facilitate the activities of terrorist organizations. The Act also provides for the investigation of acts of terrorism and the surveillance of persons suspected to be planning or involved in acts of terrorism.

1.1.2 Theoretical Background

The proposed theory to guide this study was the Orthodox Terrorism Theory, which was proposed in 2006 by Jason Franks. Orthodox terrorism theory explains terrorism as a doctrine and strategy for political action and change. While discussing political objectives of terrorism, this theory focuses on the established authority and state as the main target of terrorist act. Franks (2006) considers orthodox terrorism theory to be the predominant discourse that is used to explain, understand and deal with terrorism. It can be recognised by an orthodox definition

that is characterised by a state-centric and positivist understanding of terrorism as illegitimate and unlawful violence. This theory therefore is based on the assumption that the terrorist is a rational actor and suggests that terrorism is a carefully planned and calculated strategy directed against the state in order to influence decision-making and effect political change by the use of functional, symbolic and tactical violence. Orthodox terrorism theory is primarily based on the legitimacy of the state, although this is a relative legitimacy, it is an understanding of terrorism that has become widely accepted as the normative definition of terrorism. It exists therefore as a pejorative term adopted by actors, predominantly state actors, to create a moral justification for their claim to legitimacy.

Major themes of orthodox terrorism theory are mainly three, that is, Functional, Symbolic, and Tactical. The functional theme believes that the act of terrorism aims to force a reaction by the government or state authority against the liberal approaches (Franks, 2006). Lanqueur (2004) affirms that this kind of terrorist action provokes the state for haphazard repression and thereby as the government cannot meet their demands so it deprives the government of its authenticity and tends the masses to make extreme changes in existing conditions and political groups as well as institutions.

The Symbolic theme is used by Orthodox terrorism theory to explain the representative acts of terrorism, which are to intimidate and frighten. Ishrat A. & Khatwani MK (2014) quote Sun Zu's saying that terrorism intends to kill one and threaten tens of thousands. They also conclude that terrorism is a psychological war, which aims to publicize and internationalize the political aim. The Tactical theme comprises two types of tactical methods; one is a short-term tactic with limited means for short-term gains for instance hijacking hosts for the release of detainees and committing bank robbery for purchasing arms. The other tactical method is for long-term objectives with vast resources for instance revolutionary movements for freedom or right of self-determination or insurgencies against repressive government.

With all the themes combined, the theory of Orthodox terrorism explains comprehensively what, why, and how terrorism aims to achieve. This theory is relevant to this study as its purpose is not to engage in the discussion of the roots of terrorism but to provide the basis for governments' anti-terror and counter-terror approaches. It is created and employed to deal with terrorism from the perspective of state security, without any form of roots debate, to legitimize governmental anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism policies and actions. It is principally a state discourse engaged for supplying a theoretical interpretation of facts and events to provide an

accepted explanation of political violence that allows the legitimization of state violence through moral and legal justifications.

Practically, the use of orthodox terrorism theory is clearly illustrated by Uganda, which employs the discourse to understand the attacks by the ADFs. The discourse explains ADF terrorism as a state security problem originating from external borders, but sometimes-recruiting agents internally to carry out the heinous acts (Barigaba, 2022). Uganda sees terrorist attacks against innocent civilians as impossible to understand and condemns them as unequivocally wrong. This allows the deployment of Uganda state machinery in the form of legal and military means to deal with the 'illegal' security problem and represents the mainstay of Uganda counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism policies and actions (Athumani, 2022). All in all, the intention of the terrorists (according to orthodox terrorism theory) is to undermine the security of the population by demonstrating that the state is unable to provide adequate protection and therefore force the population to hate the regime and cause political changes in the regime.

1.1.3 Historical Background

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in human experience. Those who chose to oppose states, kings, and princes have used violence throughout human history. This sort of violence can be differentiated from what is termed as terrorism (Wurth, 1941). Modern terrorism emerged around near the end of the 18th century following the French Revolution. The first usage of the term terror was in France in 1795; when it was used to refer to a policy systematically used to protect the fledgling French Republic to counter revolutionaries (Cronin, 2002, p.34). It was used to describe the illegitimate use of politically motivated violence by non-state actors, who by definition in a state-centric era, only had illegitimate purposes. Thus, even though the term gained prominence following the French Revolution, terrorism and terrorist activities are traceable to as far back as the first century B.C.

Rapoport (2001) explains the emergence of terrorism beginning from the late 19th century, almost a century after the idea of terrorism evolved from the French Revolution. Two critical factors influenced the growth of terrorism during this time namely; (a) the development in communication and transportation patterns opened up and united the world by reducing the time and distance required for people and information to travel (Rapoport, 2001, p. 49), and (b) the invention of the telegraph, daily mass newspapers, and transcontinental railroad transportation, all flourished during the last quarter of the 19th century and were critical to the

shaping of the new global dimension of modern terrorism. People were able to travel in more sophisticated ways at a much faster pace. News of events that took place in one country including terrorist attacks could rapidly spread beyond national borders within a day. In combination with the wider dissemination of news about terrorist deeds by the upcoming rotary press, which was producing cheap newspapers, the philosophy of the bomb, practiced by anarchists and social revolutionaries, was able to catch the attention of many more people than in the case of the direct witnesses of a beheading in a public square in 1793-1794. The non-state terrorists of the 1870s and beyond called their exploitation of mass media coverage propaganda by the deed (Laqueur, 2004).

Anti-Terrorism legislation has been on the international agenda since 1934, when the League of Nations, predecessor of the United Nations, began the elaboration of a convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorism (Sunga, 2010). In the United Kingdom, the tradition of independent review of terrorism legislation stretches back to the 1970s. Between 1978 and 1984, reviews of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts were carried out by Lord Shackleton, Earl Jellicoe and Sir George Baker. Today, there are 15 counter-terrorism international conventions in force. They were developed under the auspices of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, on 8 September 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted a "Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN, 2023)

Despite these measures, terrorist activity has persisted and can be found in Israel, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and the United States, to name a few. Of particular concern, here are the September 11 suicide attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the attempted attack that resulted in the plane crash in Pennsylvania (United States Institute of Peace, 2023). Cilliers (2003) affirm that Africa may come to play a central role in international terrorism. The motivation, means and targets all exist and these opportunities will not go unheeded for much longer. Africa presents both a facilitating environment and a target-rich environment for terrorists that seek to attack the United States, and indeed the global system. Therefore, there is need for concerted efforts amongst African countries to counter terrorist activities.

In Nigeria, Uja, Nafada and Ahimie (2011) trace the origin of terrorism to the 1970s. Since then, there have been different terrorist attempts by different groups; - but the Boko Haram group seems to stand out in their activities. The history of Boko Haram has diverse

assumptions, as different scholars have perceived it. Uja, Nafada and Ahimie (2011) speculate that the Boko Haram uprising began in 1995 as Sahaba with Mallam Abubakar Lawan. However, before 1995, there were some religious unrest in Nigeria beginning with the Al-Masifu, loyalists and followers of Alhaji Muhammed Marwa Maitasine who in the 1980s had held Kano and its environs to hostage. This led to the burning of eight Churches in October 1982. From the foregoing caveat, Boko Haram, is an offshoot of these sects as their ideologies point to the same cause. Gumi and Maitasine are both precursor groups to Boko Haram (Ottoh-Agede & Agede, 2016). Terrorism (Boko Haram Insurgence) has introduced a dangerous dimension into the crime space of Nigeria. The trademarks of the Boko Haram are wanton destruction of lives and property with reckless abandon, through bombings, abduction and slaughtering of human beings like rams, especially in Northern Nigeria. This has created palpable fear and sense of insecurity in the polity (Ekwueme, Attah, & Ekene, 2019).

Kenya has experienced quite a number of terror attacks chronologically over the years. The United States (US) Report on Terrorism (2019) affirms that the attack on Dusit D2 hotel complex in Nairobi by Al-Shabaab was the worst since 2015 after significant improvements in operations and coordination were achieved within the Kenyan security sector. Al-Shabaab attacks in Nairobi and other urban places mostly targeted civilians with notable use of suicide vests and the other attacks in remote areas of the country bordering Somalia that targeted security officials significantly relied on the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (United States Department of State, 2019).

In Uganda, the origin of terrorism can be traced to the precolonial period when different territories such as Bunyoro-Kitala Kingdom and Buganda Kingdom used terror tactics to conquer and subjugate each other. However, for the purpose of this study we will trace the nature and growth of current terrorism in Uganda to the 1960s when Milton Obote started consolidating his power at the expense of other ethnic groups, particularly those in the south. Many terrorist groups in Uganda have been formed since independence, some with clear objective and others without clear goals and objectives. Many terrorist activities that have occurred in the 20th century have not been associated with self-determination debates at all. Identified causes of terrorism have instead ranged from the entire spectrum of human discontent, including the economic, political, social, psychological, ideological, among others, with short or long-term goals, both objective and subjective, becoming the object of violence (Whittaker, 2004). Non-state actors, like the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the northern

part of Uganda and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) operating from the Uganda/Congo borders did spread considerable measures of terror in Uganda since 1987.

The first major conflict happened after Uganda's independence in 1962 when Sir Frederick Mutesa II, the Kabaka of Buganda was elected (in 1963) as the first President of Uganda but the country was effectively run by the then Prime Minister Milton Obote since he had all the executive powers. The Kabaka remained just ceremonial which prompted some of his royalists to start plotting how to dislodge Obote's leadership (Akena, 1994). In 1964 there was a referendum to decide whether the two counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi (The Lost Counties) which Buganda had annexed should be returned to Bunyoro. The referendum was won by Bunyoro but Mutesa refused to sign the transfer instrument, thereby creating a crisis for the government. From that point onwards matters deteriorated rapidly. In 1966 the conflict between Obote and Mutesa reached a head. Obote sent troops led by Idi Amin to attack Mutesa's palace eventually Mutesa was forced to leave the palace and fled to Great Britain. This 'Uganda Crisis of 1966', as it came to be known, had an immediate and enduring political impact (Britannica, 2021).

After a series of transitional governments, an election was held in 1980. The elections brought Obote back to power (Akena, 1994). Mutibwa (1992) asserts that Obote's second regime was no better than the first and was, in fact, said to have been as brutal as Amin's. Obote is held responsible for much of the political and military terrorism, which characterized Uganda in the early years after independence and did not rule peacefully as he was immediately confronted by dissatisfied political factions including a guerilla group led by the former Minister of Defence, Yoweri Museveni, who had lost the elections and protested that they had been rigged in favor of Obote.

After Museveni's NRA took over the capital city Kampala in January 1986 and proclaimed him the new leader of Uganda. However, many more anti-Museveni groups emerged, among them the Uganda People Defence Army/Movement (UPDA/M) led by Odong Latek; the Citizens Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP) led by Brigadier Smith Opon Acak; the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) led by Alice 'Lakwena' Auma; the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) led by Juma Oris; the Uganda Salvation Front/Army (USF/A); the Uganda People's Army (UPA) headed by Peter Otai; the Uganda National Rescue Front II led by Colonel Ali Bamuze; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) led by Jamil Mukulu and Taban Amin, and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) led by Jafari Salimu (Wafula, 2007). All

these groups developed the same modus operandi of terrorism, kidnapping and murdering civilians to create fear in the local population and to undermine confidence in the government.

Whitaker (2010) affirms that countries that experience international or domestic terrorism are more likely to comply with the UN international counterterrorism regime than those that are less threatened. Given the history of violence and unrest in Uganda, this observation holds true. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373 (2001) requires member states to uphold international conventions on terrorism and put in place relevant domestic legislation to implement the agreements (Whitaker, 2010). The Security Council has recognized the ratification and effective implementation of the universal anti-terrorism instruments as a top priority. On 28 September 2001, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it adopted resolution 1373 (2001), stating explicitly that every act of terrorism constitutes a ‘threat to international peace and security’ and that the ‘acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The resolution also requires all States to criminalize terrorist acts; to penalize acts of support for or in preparation of terrorist offences; to criminalize the financing of terrorism; to depoliticize terrorist offences; to freeze funds of persons who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts; and to strengthen international cooperation in criminal matters.

1.1.4 Contextual Background

The number of terrorist groups and attacks has increased in scale, intensity, and the events of 9/11 and subsequent attacks in many European capitals including London, Ankara, and Paris have shown that no country is immune to terrorism. Uganda like other countries in Africa and the world has experienced terrorist groups operating with local and international affiliations. Economic constraints, marginalization, religious extremism, and radicalization especially of the youths have given terrorist groups a fertile ground to recruit, train, and launch attacks. Equally, strong ethnic and clan bonds have made it difficult for enforcement to collect intelligence needed to overcome some terrorist group’s activities (Shinn, 2003).

Nankoma (1998) highlights that non-state actors, like the LRA in the northern part of Uganda and the ADF operating from the Uganda/Congo borders have also spread considerable measures of terror in Uganda since 1987. Besides its violent opposition to Museveni’s government, the LRA led by Joseph Kony also categorized as ‘a militant religious-cult rebel group’, slowly turned Northern Uganda into a scene of violent conflict and terrorist activities in a war that spanned over two decades. Neumann (2008) affirms that in the late 1990s, it

became obvious that terrorism had changed. Some analysts coined the term ‘new terrorism’ in order to describe what they believed were fundamentally new ways for terrorists to operate and express their violence. They also argued that the ‘new terrorism’ had resulted from the forces of late modernity and, in particular, globalisation. The mid-and late 1990s saw a rise in terrorism activities alongside those that predominately happened in northern Uganda. For instance, between 1997 and 2001 the ADF, a rebel group based in DRC also considered a terrorist group by the Uganda government, have allegedly been responsible for the bomb blasts in taxis and public buildings in urban areas of Uganda particularly, Kampala in which more than people were killed and more than injured. Some suspects were held in safe houses (Jeffery, 1999). Also in 1998, the Uganda Salvation Front (USF) attacked Tororo prison and abducted several inmates. USF was a terrorist group that operated in Eastern Uganda but failed to garner popular support and most likely rejected by the population and local leaders.

Apart from its internal history of state-led violence and conflict with non-state actors, Uganda also shares borders with countries such as Sudan and the DRC which have suffered very prolonged conflicts. This has always had a spill-over effect, coupled with poor and inadequate border control, Uganda’s vulnerabilities to terrorist intrusions are increased. For example, the terrorists’ attacks that were carried out in Kampala on 11th July, 2010 at Kyadondo Rugby grounds and Ethiopian Village in Kabalagala created lasting pain and fear in the hearts of many Ugandans. Somalia's Al-Qaeda linked terror group Al-Shabaab claimed credit for the near simultaneous twin bombings that ripped through the Ugandan capital killing 76 and injuring at least another 85 (Busher, 2014).

Kagwanja (2006) asserts that as a response to terrorism, by 2002, Uganda had ratified a few of the international conventions on terrorism and enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act. The intention for ratification was to ensure that Uganda meets its international obligations (that is, in pursuit of the objectives of the UN counter-terrorism regime) as well as to suppress acts of terrorism and provide for the punishment of persons who plan, instigate, support, finance or execute acts of terrorism.

The Anti-terrorism Act of 2002 criminalizes perpetration, planning, and participation in any terrorist activities. In so doing, anyone who engages in or carries out any act of terrorism faces death upon conviction. The law has since been amended thrice – in 2015, 2016 and 2017, bringing into being the Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Act 2017. The Anti-terrorism Act brought into force and gave discretionary powers to the Directorate of Counter Terrorism; the Counter

Terrorism Police Unit as well as the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce to enforce the law and fight terrorism. Therefore, apart from playing its part in the international 'war against terror', Uganda also seeks to curtail domestic terrorism that has plagued the country over the last 18 or so years. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 is therefore aimed at suppressing acts of terrorism and generally to provide for the punishment of persons who plan, instigate, support, finance or execute acts of terrorism; to prescribe terrorist organizations and to provide for the punishment of persons who are members of, or who profess in public to be members of, or who convene or associate with or facilitate the activities of terrorist organizations. The Act also provides for the investigation of acts of terrorism and the surveillance of persons suspected to be planning or involved in acts of terrorism.

In October and November 2021 alone, four bomb attacks were reportedly carried out in Kampala. One such attack took place a few meters away from Kampala's central police station, while the second one occurred near the Parliament, reflecting the boldness of the attackers, and at the same time raising questions regarding their real identity (Namasinga, 2022). The attacks strengthened the justification for implementing certain security measures in and outside Uganda. By the end of 2021, Uganda People's Defense Forces, the national military force, had entered the neighboring DR Congo, in a joint military operation that is intended to dislodge the rebels and put an end to their terrorist activities that potentially threaten safety in Uganda. Important to note however is that within Ugandan borders, the members of the public have been of recent been mobilized, to be vigilant and to always be on the lookout. These efforts have been successful, leading to the capture of terrorist operatives before they could carry out their evil operations. In fighting terrorists of this kind, it is believed that ultimately, there must be recourse to a robust judicial process.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Anti-terrorism Act (2002) is an act to suppress acts of terrorism with specific objectives including; providing for the punishment of persons engaged in acts of terrorism; prescribing terrorist organizations that facilitate the activities of terrorism; and providing for investigation of acts of terrorism. The government domesticated the Anti-terrorism law and has continued to amend the Anti-terrorism Act in 2015, 2016 and 2017 to criminalize perpetration, planning, and participation in any terrorist activities.

Despite the enactment and domestication of the Anti-terrorism Act 2002 and the respective amendments, there have been many reports, which indicate the prevalence of terrorism that

threaten security in Uganda. Per the Police annual crime report 2023, terrorism cases increased from 10 cases in 2019 to 26 cases in 2023. These cases are characterized by bombings on gatherings, transit buses and vital installations (Bariyo, 2010). For instance, between October and November 2021, four terrorists' attacks took place in Uganda; in Komamboga, a suburb of Kampala; the attack of a transit bus on a highway from Kampala Capital City to Mbarara City; and the twin bomb attacks at Central Police Station and Parliamentary Avenue in Kampala (Kamusiime, 2021). On 16 June 2023, terrorist attacked Lhubirira Secondary School in Mpondwe, Kasese District killing 42 people of which 37 were students and 6 injured (Kamusiime, 2023). On 17 October 2023, two tourists and a guide were killed their belongings and safari motor vehicle burnt to ashes by ADF in Queen Elizabeth National Park, Kasese District (US Department of State, 2022; Natukunda, 2023). Against this background, the study examined the effectiveness of the Anti-terrorism Act 2002 in combating Terrorism in Uganda.

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 Main Objective

To examine the effectiveness of Anti-terrorism Act on combating terrorism in Uganda.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- i. To examine the nature and contributing factors for the growth of terrorism in Uganda
- ii. To analyze the implementation of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act in combating terrorism
- iii. To analyze the challenges in relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What is the nature and contributing factors for the growth of terrorism in Uganda?
- ii. How are the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act implemented to combat terrorism?
- iii. What are the challenges in relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism?

1.5 Scope of the Study

1.5.1 Content Scope

The study assessed the effectiveness of Anti-terrorism on combating terrorism in Uganda. In doing so, the study examined the nature and contributing factors for the growth of terrorism in Uganda. The study also analyzed the implementation of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act and their relationship to combating terrorism. The study finally analyzed the challenges in relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism in Uganda.

1.5.2 Geographical Scope

The study was conducted in Uganda, particularly in the Kampala Metropolitan. This was because Kampala Metropolitan Area had experienced a troubling frequency of terrorist events due to several interrelated factors, primarily driven by the activities of militant groups and the socio-political landscape of Uganda. The combination of active militant groups, socio-economic vulnerabilities, and a complex political landscape contributes to the prevalence of terrorist events in the Kampala Metropolitan Area.

1.5.3 Time Scope

The period for the study was 2010-2024. This period marks the peak stages of terrorist groups conducting their operations (both real and attempted) in Uganda. This period also provides adequate time to evaluate the performance of the anti-terrorism law in Uganda as a measure of counter-terrorism.

1.6 Justification of the study

Part of the primary responsibilities of any State government is to ensure the security and protection of people within its territory and to preserve its norms, rules, interests, institutions, and resources, in the face of military and non-military threats. To remain politically relevant, Uganda has strategies to ensure peace and stability for its citizens irrespective of the prevalent terrorist activities and threats. One of the measures was the ratification and domestication of the Ant-terrorism law. It was therefore right to examine the effectiveness of such a law in combating terrorism in Uganda.

Furthermore, the study delved into why Uganda should enhance the social and welfare conditions of the citizens. In contemporary times, unlike in the past, Uganda ought to improve the social-economic welfare of its multi-ethnic population which if not handled carefully may lead to heightened tensions emanating from high poverty levels which may consequently breed violent criminal acts perpetrated by the creation of class inequalities, ethnic differences, radical political groups, and terrorist agents. This study emphasized the need for the government to provide basic necessities/welfare for the populace especially the educated unemployed youth who are most highly targeted by these external terrorist groups' agents and other political forces, to join partisan politics because they have been frustrated by the political system and so they are anxious to venture into new avenues of either revenge or personal aspirations.

The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) report (2022) indicates that the human rights development in Uganda remains fragile. The report affirms that the unstable human rights environment in Uganda exists not least due to the introduction of increasingly restrictive legislation, and the lack of independence in several state institutions. One of the disturbing elements has been the difficulty for the government to combat terrorism acts since they affect and have a direct impact on the human rights of individuals. There was need therefore to study how Uganda can enhance its strategies to combat terrorism and related acts that hinder the enjoyment of human rights.

1.7 Significance of the Study

The study will benefit the policy making at both national and district levels as policymakers get to know the existing implementation challenges associated with enforcement of Anti-terrorism laws. It will also benefit international governmental organizations, which are involved in advancing counter-terrorism measures in Uganda, thus enhancing their capacity to engage and collaborate with states to jointly uplift counter-terrorism efforts.

The academia will benefit from the study since the findings and recommendations shall form part of the material for further reference to future researchers undertaking similar or related areas of study.

The study will benefit the police officers and the Uganda police institution as they understand better the legal and policy framework established by the Anti-terrorism Act in Uganda. This makes them better placed to analyze the impact of the Anti-terrorism Act on Human Rights and its impact on fostering community engagement in counter-terrorism efforts, which is part of their core mandate.

1.8 Definition of Key Terms

1.8.1 Terrorism

Wilkinson (2006) asserts that terrorism has a political aspect and involves acts of violence, which intends to bring about political change by influencing the political behavior of governments, communities or specific groups. Wilkinson (2006) distinguishes terrorism from other elements of crime on the basis that it plans to propagate a climate of extreme fear amongst its audience. Thus terrorism is the deliberate employment of violence or the threat to use violence by sub-national groups and sovereign states to attain strategic and political objectives.

1.8.2 Counter Terrorism

This refers to physical and non-physical measures which government applies to prevent or stop group violence, which targets innocent citizens or government officials. (OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999/2002). Wilkinson (2006) defines counter terrorism as practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that government, militaries and other groups adopt to fight terrorism.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

This literature review discusses the diverse views and opinions of various authors, researchers, and scholars regarding the effectiveness of the Anti-terrorism Act in combating terrorism in Uganda. The review of the literature was guided by the research question of how effective is the Anti-terrorism Act on combating terrorism in Uganda.

2.1 Literature Survey

Franks (2006) states that although the emphasis of his study on 'Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism' is on identifying and explaining orthodox terrorism discourse, it is not the sole understanding of terrorism contained in terrorism studies. By viewing terrorism through the different perspectives provided by the levels of analysis, it has been possible to construct a multi-level survey of terrorism literature, demonstrating that the manifestation of terrorism can be caused by a multitude of different factors depending on which discourse or perspective is employed.

In his studies about 'The Western European Response to Terrorism', Baker (1987) earmarked a passage of laws that restrict the civil rights of terrorists, and the strengthening of intra-European cooperation. The article reviews several European treaties on terrorism and the extradition of terrorists. Baker believes all of the western European nations have carefully avoided invoking emergency laws that affect all citizens, except in extreme cases such as Northern Ireland. The author states that although it is impossible to write a universally applicable definition of terrorism, it is possible to define its salient features. Baker (1987) concludes with the prediction that terrorism cannot be legislated away. Terrorism will remain a problem in Africa as long as domestic and foreign-based dissidents are inclined to use violence to obtain publicity for their causes.

A study by Behm et al (1991) on coordinating counterterrorism found out that the existing terrorist organizations are adapting to changed circumstances, and new terrorist causes were emerging. The study looked at the national level where crime prevention and law enforcement agencies face new challenges, not only in responding to change but also in maximizing their effectiveness against increasingly difficult targets. This study argued that a national approach to combating terrorism must be strategic, comprehending both preventive and responsive

measures. The study outlined the principles that encourage interagency coordination, and a number of avenues for putting the principles into practice. Finally, the study suggested that there are two key performance indicators against which coordination arrangements can be assessed: streamlined organizational structures as the test for efficiency, and positive personnel attitudes as the test for effectiveness.

A study on Terrorism and Global security conducted by Beres (1987) looked at a strategy for countering nuclear terrorism that embraces both technological and behavioral measures. It included policies for deterrence and situation management on the national and international scale and points toward a major reshaping of world order. Beres (1987) explored the political bases of terrorism by considering the factors that might foster nuclear terrorism, the forms it could take, and the probable consequences of such acts. The study also analyzed the political, psychological, and material factors that might produce nuclear terrorism. The study concluded by highlighting practical antiterrorist measures, such as hardening targets, improving physical security, and nonproliferation. It also provides behavioral strategies aimed at potential nuclear terrorists. The final section of the study recommended that the United States redefine its fundamental national interests to lessen the danger of nuclear terrorism and worldwide nuclear war.

Blakesley (1991) conducted a study on ‘Drugs, International Law, and the Protection of Human Liberty’, and argued that the approach of the United States Government to combating terrorism has resulted in the erosion of civil liberties in matters of criminal justice. The study examined a number of pathetic over-responses to terrorism in the cases of Great Britain, South Africa, Israel, and the United States. It concluded that anti-constitutional and anti-rule of law notions are leading to an escalation of terroristic violence and a mind-set that promotes oppression, terrorism and escape from freedom.

Busby (1990) studied the U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in the 1980s and the Priorities for the 1990s, where he cited three areas of growing concern: radical Palestinian terrorist groups, Libyan-supported terrorism, and narcoterrorism in the Andean nations. He explained US counterterrorism policy and assessed its effectiveness by trend toward treating terrorists as criminals and applying the rule of law against them. The study also emphasized the importance of pressuring countries that sponsor terrorism and of refusing to make deals with terrorists. In discussing possible future trends in terrorist activity, Busby (1990) expected greater use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons, and high technology.

Erickson (1989) conducted a study on 'Legitimate Use of Military Force Against state-sponsored International Terrorism', which presented an overview of international law directed at the issue of managing international terrorism. The study looked at the nature of international terrorism and the seriousness of the threat as well as the choice of law, reviewing the pros and cons of various legal approaches to dealing with terrorism. The study concluded by showing how the international community has sought to restrain the use of force as a method for resolving international disputes.

2.2 Theoretical Review

This study adopted the Orthodox terrorism theory. The Orthodox terrorism theory explains terrorism as a doctrine and strategy for political action and change. While discussing the political objectives of terrorism, this theory focuses on established authority and state as the main target of terrorist acts.

From this perspective, the orthodox approach is inclined to presuppose that terrorism must be conducted by non-state actors, and divides the world into the legitimate state and the illegitimate terrorists since it does not question the existing social and power relations because of its epistemological presuppositions (Gunning, 2007). In this sense, the orthodox approach rejects the concept of state terrorism, since the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Laqueur (2004), for example, insisted that including state terror in the study of terrorism would have made the study of terrorism impossible, for it would have included not only US foreign policy (Blakeley, 2009). It can be argued that the orthodox approach uses actor-based analysis, focusing entirely on non-state actors. However, an exception tends to be made for state-sponsored terrorism, which is often defined as such by the major powers such as the US (Hoffman, 1998).

Some scholars (Harmonie Toros & Gunning, 2009) criticize orthodox explanations as being essentially inadequate for forming an understanding of the nature of the terrorist phenomenon. They assert that the orthodox approach tends to neglect the importance of time and place as well as socio-political contexts since it appears to believe that terrorists will exist 'out there,' no matter what the historical context may be. Harmonie & Gunning (2009) do not believe that the object exists autonomously. Rather, object and subject 'shape each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic.'

Kurki (2008) asserts that the Orthodox Terrorism theory has never produced a substantial and detailed account of how it understands causation in relation to terrorism. He says it is

problematic since it nonetheless makes a number of implicit yet strong assumptions about the causes of terrorism that are incessantly reproduced throughout its theorising. Indeed, due to its fundamental disposition towards counter-terrorist policy information, discriminatory attention is paid to particular factors (i.e. so-called “root” causes such as individuals, groups, and states) while subjugating other factors that are “merely” facilitating (i.e. societal or communal conditions, the historical context, the effects of counter-terrorist policies (Kurki 2008). Jackson (2015) adds that such hierarchy then creates an epistemological crisis whereby critical elements are systematically ignored by the epistemic community of the Orthodox terrorism theory in favor of those factors that support prevailing counter-terrorist policies (Jackson 2015). As such, it actively subjugates factors that are not observed as directly “pushing and pulling” acts of terrorism; which indeed further exacerbates its epistemological crisis (King et al. 1994).

The legalistic view on terrorism emphasizes the importance of adhering to the rule of law and human rights principles when combating terrorism. This approach sees terrorism primarily as a criminal matter to be addressed through the criminal justice system rather than military force (Schoenfeld, 2011). UNODC (2008) highlights some key aspects of the legalistic view including criminalizing terrorist acts where it states that terrorism-related conventions and protocols require countries to criminalize specific acts like hostage-taking, bombings, and financing of terrorism. This can be done by amending penal codes rather than enacting special terrorism laws.

UNODC (2008) states that human rights law constrains how states can respond to terrorism more than it governs the conduct of terrorists themselves. The legalistic view emphasizes the importance of upholding human rights principles like prohibiting torture, arbitrary detention, and discrimination, even in the face of terrorist threats. McPherson & Lionel (2018) state that the legalistic view is skeptical of the use of military force against terrorist groups, seeing it as less effective and more prone to human rights violations than a law enforcement approach. It argues that an over-reliance on legalistic violence is unlikely to succeed in counterterrorism. However, critics argue that the legalistic view is disadvantaged rhetorically and politically in the face of catastrophic terrorist attacks. They contend it risks reducing military effectiveness and tying the hands of those tasked with protecting national security (Schoenfeld, 2011).

2.3 Review of Literature

2.3.1 The nature and contributing factors for the growth of terrorism in Uganda

2.3.1.1 Indiscriminate attacks

The indiscriminate nature of terrorism refers to the tendency of terrorist acts to target civilians and non-combatants rather than specific military or political figures. This characteristic is crucial in understanding the psychological and political implications of terrorism (UNODC, 2023). IOM (2023) states that indiscriminate terrorism typically involves attacks on civilian populations, which amplifies the terror experienced by the public. The violence is not directed solely at specific adversaries but is instead aimed at creating widespread fear and panic. Oksana (2006) asserts that indiscriminate terrorism has a psychological impact. The unpredictability and randomness of terrorist attacks contribute to their effectiveness. Victims are often chosen arbitrarily, which enhances the sense of vulnerability among the general populace, leading to a heightened state of anxiety and fear.

This type of terrorism, indiscriminate terrorism, owes its development to several technological innovations, which, in the twentieth century, provided fruitful ground for the spread of modern terrorism. The acts of terror which involve suicide bombings and hostage-taking are profoundly modern phenomena and reflect global changes in the development of terrorism worldwide. Such changes challenge the old definitions of terrorism and warrant new insights which, while defining terror, should refrain from subjectivity and bias and touch upon underlying causes of modern terrorism (Ganor, 1998).

From the above literature, the indiscriminate nature of terrorism poses significant challenges for governments and societies. This means that it complicates law enforcement and counter-terrorism efforts, as the lack of specific targets makes it difficult to prevent attacks. Moreover, the societal fear generated by indiscriminate attacks can lead to increased public support for aggressive counter-terrorism measures, which may, in turn, affect civil liberties and human rights. All in all, the indiscriminate nature of terrorism is a defining characteristic that underscores its impact on society and politics. By targeting civilians, terrorists aim to create a pervasive atmosphere of fear, compelling governments to respond in ways that may have far-reaching implications for both security and individual freedoms.

2.3.1.2 Clandestine/Covert

Luis & Sánchez-Cuenca (2024) affirm that the clandestine nature of terrorism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that intertwines with various forms of violence and political

objectives. They state that understanding this nature requires a critical examination of how terrorism operates, its motivations, and its implications for society. Terrorism is often defined by its covert and clandestine characteristics, which serve to enhance its psychological impact. The element of surprise is crucial; attacks are typically unexpected, aiming to instill fear not only in direct victims but also in broader audiences. This aspect of unpredictability is a strategic choice, as it amplifies the terror experienced by the public and can lead to significant political repercussions (Luis & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2024).

Davis (2001) adds that the clandestine nature of terrorism is further complicated by its interactions with organized crime. As criminal and terrorist networks increasingly converge, they share tactics and resources, blurring the lines between political violence and organized criminal activity. This intersection raises significant challenges for law enforcement and policymakers, as the motivations and operational methods of these groups can overlap, making it difficult to address them effectively. From the legal perspective, the clandestine operations of terrorist groups pose significant challenges for national and international security. The need for intelligence and surveillance becomes paramount, as traditional military responses may be inadequate against non-state actors who thrive in secrecy. Moreover, the interaction between terrorism and organized crime necessitates a comprehensive approach to governance that addresses both issues simultaneously, recognizing their interconnectedness in the global landscape

2.3.1.3 Mass Destruction

Mullen (1978) asserts that the mass destructive nature of terrorism primarily revolves around the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The implications of such terrorism are profound, affecting not only immediate victims but also broader societal structures, human rights, and international stability. Christopher (2002) affirms that terrorist organizations may seek to employ WMD to achieve their political or ideological goals, and the likelihood of these weapons being used by terrorists is a significant concern for national and global security. Nuclear devices, for instance, require advanced technological skills and resources, which are currently beyond the capabilities of most contemporary terrorist groups. However, the potential for chemical and biological agents, which require comparatively less technical expertise, poses a more immediate threat. These agents can cause mass casualties and instill widespread fear, aligning with the terrorists' objectives to coerce governments or societies into compliance with their demands (Mullen, 1978).

Legally, terrorism fundamentally challenges the enjoyment of human rights. The right to life, liberty, and security is directly threatened by terrorist actions, which often target civilians indiscriminately. Moreover, the responses to terrorism can lead to human rights violations, as governments may implement counter-terrorism measures that infringe on individual freedoms. The United Nations (2023) has recognized that terrorism attacks the core values of human rights and democracy, destabilizing governments and civil societies, and threatening social and economic development. All in all, the mass destructive nature of terrorism, particularly through the potential use of WMD, presents a complex challenge that intertwines technical, psychological, and human rights dimensions. Addressing this threat requires not only robust security measures but also a commitment to uphold human rights and foster societal resilience against the fear and chaos that terrorism seeks to instigate.

2.3.1.4 Ideological Growth of Terrorism

Holbrook and Horgan (2019) state that the growth of terrorism has shown complex patterns globally, influenced by various factors including regional conflicts, ideological motivations, and the evolution of terrorist tactics. Bewul (2022) states that the ideological and political growth of terrorism is a complex phenomenon influenced by various factors, including historical context, evolving ideologies, and societal dynamics. Initially, terrorism was associated with grand ideological narratives such as Marxism and fascism. However, in the 21st century, there has been a transition towards ‘little narratives’ associated with new social movements, indicating a diversification in the ideological underpinnings of terrorist groups.

Savelkoul (2022) explains how ideology serves as a crucial driving force behind terrorist actions, providing both a framework for understanding the existing political order and a vision for the desired future. She asserts that ideology defines the enemy and justifies the means of achieving political goals. For instance, contemporary terrorist groups often articulate their grievances through ideological lenses, whether they are rooted in religious extremism, nationalism, or anti-establishment sentiments. Huff & Kertzer (2018) add that the ideological component is not static; it adapts to contemporary societal conditions. Factors such as globalization, technological advancements, and the atomization of society can either impede or facilitate the spread of extremist ideologies. While economic prosperity may diminish the appeal of extremist narratives in certain regions, social isolation and identity crises can drive individuals towards radicalization

Moreover, public perception plays a significant role in the legitimacy of political violence. Norman (2022) asserts that ideological alignment influences how acts of terrorism are perceived, with biases affecting the classification of violence as terrorism or legitimate political action. This underscores the importance of understanding the ideological context in which terrorism occurs, as it shapes both the motivations of perpetrators and the responses of societies. In general, the ideological and political growth of terrorism is marked by historical evolution, the adaptation of ideologies to contemporary conditions, and the impact of public perception on the legitimacy of violent actions. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective counter-terrorism strategies and addressing the root causes of radicalization.

2.3.1.5 Socio-Economic Growth of Terrorism

Michael (2019) argues that income inequality and lack of socio-economic development can contribute to the rise of terrorism. Poverty, slow economic growth, poor public health, and political instability may give rise to grievances that fuel terrorist activities. Terrorism can have devastating effects on a country's economic and social fabric, with businesses closing down, professionals fleeing affected areas, and key sectors like education and healthcare suffering.

Research (Meierrieks, 2018; Schelling, 1966) indicates that individuals facing economic hardships may be more susceptible to radicalization. When socio-economic conditions are poor, the opportunity costs associated with engaging in terrorism decrease, making such involvement more appealing. This is particularly true when individuals perceive limited prospects for legitimate economic advancement. For instance in Uganda, terrorism took a new shape of ethno phobia and marginalization of the northern region from the rest of the country. The divide between northern and southern Uganda was glaring: southerners have iron-roofed homes, northerners lived in grass thatched huts with no electricity or running water; the southern part of the country has fairly well-developed infrastructure, while the north has no tarmac roads. The northern part of Uganda remained in a state of political military strife and turmoil (Wafula, 2007). This explains why between 1986 and 2006, as one insurgent group or another (most vibrant being the LRA) rose to challenge the ruling NRM government in Kampala. The LRA is known for its brutality, routinely maiming and killing civilians, and abducting children for use as child soldiers, sex slaves and domestic workers. Important to note is that terrorism has complex social and economic roots that have evolved over time. While poverty and inequality were once thought to be major drivers of terrorism, more recent research

has found little direct connection between economic deprivation and participation in terrorist activities.

Piazza (2006) states that terrorism is often driven by social cleavages, repression by the state, and the structure of party politics. He adds that terrorist groups can emerge from populations with higher education and income levels than the general public. The economic impact of terrorism is significant. Terrorist incidents impose large direct costs in terms of lost lives, property damage, and emotional trauma. In the long run, economies bear substantial costs from the implicit taxation of anti-terrorism measures, the opportunity costs of anti-terror actions, and the methods used to finance counter-terrorism efforts. Terrorism can also have severe socioeconomic consequences for affected regions. In Kenya's northeastern region, Ahmed (2017) states that terrorist activities have caused many businesses to close, professionals to flee, and schools and hospitals to lose staff. Terrorist groups have evolved their tactics over time, from traditional methods like bombings and assassinations to more unconventional approaches like cyber-attacks and attacks on cultural heritage. All in all, while the social and economic drivers of terrorism have evolved, the phenomenon continues to have major economic costs and disruptive social impacts, requiring comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies that address both the root causes and the evolving tactics of terrorist groups.

2.3.1.6 Religious Growth of Terrorism

The growth of religiously motivated terrorism has become a significant concern in the modern world, characterized by its frequency, scale, and global reach. This phenomenon is often linked to the rise of religious extremism, which has increasingly overshadowed secular forms of political violence. Rotberg (2005) notes that religious terrorism is not a new occurrence; it has deep historical roots and has been a feature of human affairs for centuries. Various religious movements have engaged in violence to promote their belief systems, often justified by an absolute belief that such actions are sanctioned by a higher power.

Manz (2018) affirms that the current landscape of terrorism shows a marked increase in religiously motivated violence. Reports indicate that religious terrorism has become the predominant model for political violence, surpassing secular terrorism (Lake, 2022). This shift is particularly evident in regions where populations face repression and lack avenues for reform or dissent. A significant body of research (Toft, 2012; Stern, 2003) highlights that Islam is disproportionately represented in instances of religiously inspired violence. More than 80% of religious civil wars involve Islamic groups, and incidents of terrorism are frequently linked to

Islamist ideologies (Toft, 2012). This has led to a perception that Islamic terrorism is a primary driver of global terrorism trends.

Interestingly, despite the growth of religious terrorism, there has been a noted decline in social hostilities related to religion in recent years (Pew Research Center, 2024). For instance, the Global Terrorism Database (2022) reported a decrease in the number of countries experiencing religion-related terrorism, as well as a reduction in incidents leading to casualties. This decline is attributed to various factors, including the territorial defeat of groups like ISIS, which had previously been at the forefront of religiously motivated violence. Generally, while the threat of religious terrorism remains significant, particularly in relation to Islam, recent trends suggest a complex landscape where both the prevalence of violence and the societal responses to it are evolving. This duality underscores the importance of nuanced approaches to understanding and addressing the roots and manifestations of religious terrorism globally.

2.3.1.6 Demographic Factors and Growth of Terrorism

Coccia (2018) affirms that the growth rate of population is a key demographic factor associated with increased terrorism incidents in society. In their study about analyzing demographic and socioeconomic causes of terrorism, Ehrlich & Liu (2005) found that a population growth rate of around 3.6% maximizes the lethality of terrorist attacks. This high growth rate is observed in some problematic regions like Iraq, Mali, and Sudan which also experience high levels of terrorism.

Bellito (2018) states that rapid population growth can create demographic pressures that exacerbate socioeconomic challenges, such as unemployment and resource scarcity. These pressures may lead to increased frustration and vulnerability to radicalization. In addition, a growing youth population, particularly in regions with limited economic opportunities, can heighten the potential for recruitment into terrorist organizations. Young individuals may feel disenfranchised and seek meaning or purpose through extremist ideologies (Calhoun 1962).

Parsons (1991) agrees that rapid population growth combined with poverty, lack of development, and political instability are key demographic and socioeconomic factors that can contribute to the spread of terrorism in vulnerable regions. The population growth rate is a critical demographic factor that influences the severity of terrorist incidents by creating conditions that foster radicalization, enhance recruitment opportunities, and increase the potential for violent conflict. Addressing these underlying conditions is crucial for long-term prevention of radicalization and terrorism.

The nature and growth of terrorism is marked by a shifting landscape where regional conflicts, ideological motivations, and technological advancements play critical roles. While some areas, particularly in the West, have seen declines in terrorist activity, others, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are experiencing alarming increases in both the frequency and lethality of attacks. In Uganda both the ADF and the LRA are still alive and active though with less strength as before, and the country cannot still ignore the potential of these insurgent groups to build more capacity and re-launch their terrorist activities in Uganda if adequate measures are not put in place to counter them (Nwagu, 2009).

Today's terrorist groups can adapt to counterterrorism measures, the government should be concerned with the increasing connection between terrorism and organized crime. Relatedly terrorists are closely exploiting the new information and communication technology, especially the internet, for purposes of recruitment, mobilization, incitement, and execution of their missions, as well as the financing, planning, and preparation of their activities focusing on minority groups in communities. All in all, the ongoing evolution of terrorist tactics, including the use of drones, presents new challenges for global security and counter-terrorism strategies.

2.3.2 Analysis of the implementation of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act in combating terrorism

2.3.2.1 Punishment and Deterrence

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 was established to combat terrorism and includes provisions for punishment and deterrence aimed at preventing terrorist activities. The Act defines terrorism and outlines various offenses, with an emphasis on the need for strict penalties to deter potential offenders. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 was assented to by the President on 21st May 2002 and came into force on 7th June 2002. This Act brought Uganda into line with many other countries which have passed similar legislation since the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001. The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) aims at suppressing acts of terrorism and generally to provide for the punishment of persons who plan, instigate, support, finance or execute acts of terrorism; to prescribe terrorist organizations and to provide for the punishment of persons who are members of, or who profess in public to be members of, or who convene or associate with or facilitate the activities of terrorist organizations.

The Act mandates the death penalty for individuals whose terrorist acts result in the death of another person. This is a strict measure intended to serve as a strong deterrent against committing acts of terrorism. Although the law imposes the highest punishment of a death

sentence if the crime of “terrorism” was committed, the law does not expressly state that it does not apply to children who might be involved in such criminal activities themselves. This is an outright human rights concern in light of the (very) low age of criminal responsibility in Uganda. The Act also stipulates substantial fines, which can reach up to five hundred thousand currency points, depending on the severity of the crime. This fine structure is designed to ensure that penalties are proportionate to the offenses committed, reinforcing the deterrent effect of the law.

The Act gives the Executive arm of government a wide margin of discretion in deciding ‘who is suspected of terrorism and how to act on that suspicion.’ It empowers the Minister of Internal Affairs (Minister) to amend, by a statutory instrument and with the approval of the cabinet, the list of terrorist Organizations specified in the second schedule of the Act. For instance the Act has a provision that the Minister shall within two weeks present the instrument to parliament which can annul the instrument within three weeks after receiving it but the annulment does not ‘affect the previous operation of the instrument.’ This provision however, creates ample space for abuse by the executive, which has a five-weeks window of unfettered powers to take any measures it deems fit against any Organization it disapproves of. Thus, after an Organization has been declared to be a terrorist Organization, Section 10(5) of the Act empowers the Minister to dissolve, wind up and provide for the forfeiture of the Organization to the state.

Part IV of the Act deals with (prescribed) terrorist organizations. Being a member of such an organization is an offence punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment [Section 11(3). Schedule 2 to the Act lists four such organizations and section 10 (5) of the Act gives the Minister power to make a statutory instrument declaring any terrorist organization dissolved or providing for the sending up of the terrorist organization and providing for the forfeiture to the State of the property and assets of the terrorist organization. Section 11(3) of the Act also applies to those who, though not members of the organization, support or further the activities of the organization in any way (see section 11(1) (c) (iii)]. The Act does not provide for any appeal procedure to challenge prescription as a terrorist organization under the Act.

Prosecutions for offenses under this Act require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, ensuring that cases are handled with the necessary legal rigor and oversight, which also serves as a deterrent by maintaining high standards for prosecution.

Generally, the primary goal of the Anti-Terrorism Act is to deter individuals and organizations from engaging in terrorist activities. The law aims to suppress terrorism through its punitive measures, which are intended to create a strong disincentive against participation in such acts. The deterrent effect is further enhanced by the legal framework where the Act is independent of other laws in Uganda, except for the Constitution, which allows for specific and stringent enforcement of anti-terrorism measures. All in all, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 emphasizes punishment and deterrence as central components of its strategy to combat terrorism, incorporating significant penalties and a robust legal framework to discourage terrorist activities.

2.3.2.2 Investigations and Prevention of terrorist acts

Under the Act, investigations into terrorist activities are primarily conducted by the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JAT), which includes the Military Intelligence, the Police Criminal Investigation Department (CID), and other security organizations. However, the JAT is not explicitly mentioned in the Act, raising concerns about its legal basis and operational transparency

However, the Act permits police or public officers to use reasonable force in discharging their functions under the Act and also accords them immunity from civil proceedings for anything done ‘in good faith’ in the exercise of that function. It however holds authorized officers criminally liable for demanding or accepting a bribe, recklessly releasing information prejudicial to investigations, and engaging in torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, illegal detention or intentionally damaging property. However, the requirement of ‘reasonable suspicion’ which would probably create room for judicial oversight in this provision or any other criteria for determining who is declared a terrorist is conspicuously missing from the Ugandan Act.

There are issues related to the definition of terrorism or terrorist activities as prescribed in the Act. This definition appears to cover a wide range of activities and overlaps significantly with other existing common law or statutory crimes. The only difference seems to be the motivation for the action. For instance, causing injury or damage to someone is an offence under the criminal law but causing injury or damage to someone with the intention of compelling government to do or refrain from doing something is a terrorist act. Such a broad definition runs contrary to the principle of legality. By virtue of this principle, all measures taken by States must be prescribed by law and set sufficient precision so as to preclude arbitrary or

discriminatory enforcement. A basic tenet of the principle of legality is that legislation should not be vague and should define with reasonable precision the ambit of prohibited conduct.

It should also be noted that the Act does not limit the definition of the act to the means used, more specifically, the use of violent means. The Act does not define terms like “influencing the Government”, “intimidating the public or a section of the public” and also does not state the level of damage resulting that would render the act a crime of terrorism. Without clear definitions in the law of terms used, there is an outright justifiable concern that acts of freedom of expression advocating change of public policies, which are totally consistent with international law, would be considered acts of “terrorism” under this law. Further, without clear definition of terms used, acts that should be punishable under regular criminal law would under this law be punishable as acts of “terrorism” therefore attracting much higher sentences that are grossly unfair.

The promotion and protection of human rights is central to an effective strategy to counter terrorism. Inherent in this statement are two important and inter-related dimensions. Firstly, the need to ensure that measures designed to combat terrorism do not impermissibly limit human rights and fundamental freedoms and, secondly, the recognition that terrorism puts under threat the full enjoyment of civil liberties and human rights. For instance, the Act also impacts the rights to property and privacy. Article 27(2) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda provides that “no person shall be subjected to interference with the privacy of that person’s home, correspondence, communication or other property.” This provision is greatly eroded by the counter terrorism provisions in the Ugandan Act. The Minister is allowed by the Act to designate a security officer as an ‘authorized officer’ with the right to intercept the communications and conduct a surveillance of a person under the Act. The scope of this interception and surveillance extends to letters, postal packages, telephone calls, faxes, emails, meeting, movements, and access to personal bank accounts.

Another aspect of the Act that raises concern is the relaxation of the rules of evidence in favor of the state. For example, Section 14(2) provides that in proceedings against person for assisting in the retention or control of terrorism funds, the onus is on the person to prove that they did not know or have reasonable cause to suspect that their activities connected to terrorism funds. Furthermore, Section 22 of the Act makes materials obtained from interception or surveillance admissible in evidence against the person. In comparison, the Tanzanian Act and the Ghanaian Act also have similar provisions. Section 34(4) of the Ghanaian Act makes

evidence obtained in similar circumstances admissible even when it contains hearsay, but requires the evidence to be corroborated.

The latest amendment expanded the definitions of criminalized acts and included provisions criminalizing interference with electronic systems and possession of materials deemed to promote terrorism. The amended Act further provides for authorization of interception of the correspondence of and the surveillance of persons suspected to be planning or to be involved in acts of terrorism. Part III Section 2 (p) also criminalizes ‘any act prejudicial to national security or public safety’ as a terrorist offence. The failure to define national security and public safety makes such a provision unconstitutional since it would allow further crackdown on civil society, journalists and political dissidents in the name of ‘public interest’.

Equally, Section 11 of the Act criminalizes publication of news or other material likely to promote terrorism, prescribing imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding five hundred and fifty currency points or both. This provision curtails free press as it cuts through journalist’s work and creates fear as to which stories may be interpreted to fall within the wide purview.

The above analysis indicates the loopholes in the Antiterrorism act that make it unfriendly to the protection, promotion, and respect of fundamental human rights. Yet in the counter-terrorism context, United Nations organs and entities regularly convey the strong message that respecting human rights while countering terrorism is not only a matter of legal obligation, but is critical to the ultimate success of any counter-terrorism strategy.

Effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives, which must be pursued together as part of States' duty to protect individuals within their jurisdiction. Experiences in countries around the world have demonstrated that protecting human rights and ensuring respect for the rule of law itself contribute to countering terrorism, notably by creating a climate of trust between the State and those under their jurisdiction. (United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 2016, A/HRC/34/30, para. 56).

2.3.2.3 Regulating Financing of terrorism

The Act criminalizes any form of support to terrorism, including financial assistance, which can lead to severe penalties such as life imprisonment or even the death penalty for those found guilty of aiding terrorist activities. For instance, Section 10 states that any person who aids,

abets, finances, or harbors individuals involved in terrorism, knowing that their support will be used for terrorist activities, commits an offense punishable by death.

The act also prohibits solicitation and receipt of funds. For instance, Section 17 outlines that soliciting or receiving funds with the intent that they be used for terrorist activities constitutes an offense. This includes any arrangement for the provision of money or property, where there is a reasonable suspicion that it may be used for terrorism. On the same note, section 18 criminalizes contributions to the resources of terrorist organizations. Individuals who knowingly provide financial support, or assist in the retention and control of funds for terrorist purposes, face severe penalties, including forfeiture of assets and imprisonment.

As a country, Uganda has implemented a multifaceted regulatory framework to combat the financing of terrorism (TF), primarily through legislation and the establishment of regulatory bodies. This framework aims to mitigate risks associated with money laundering and terrorist financing, particularly in the context of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and financial institutions. For instance, the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA) is responsible for overseeing compliance with Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and TF regulations, conducting risk assessments, and ensuring that financial institutions adhere to Know Your Customer (KYC) and suspicious transaction reporting requirements. Also, the National Bureau for NGOs regulates and supervises the NPO sector to prevent its misuse of terrorist financing. The Bureau has been tasked with enhancing the understanding of TF risks within NGOs and implementing measures to mitigate these risks.

Therefore the Anti-terrorism Act operates within a broader legal and regulatory framework aimed at combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Financial institutions are required to comply with anti-money laundering guidelines, which are designed to prevent the misuse of the financial system for terrorist financing. This includes monitoring transactions and reporting suspicious activities to law enforcement agencies. The penalties for financing terrorism include imprisonment for up to ten years, substantial fines, and asset forfeiture. More severe offenses, such as direct involvement in acts of terrorism or recruitment for terrorist activities, can result in life imprisonment or death. Generally, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 provides a comprehensive legal framework for the regulation and prosecution of terrorism and terrorist financing, emphasizing the criminalization of financial support to terrorism, the responsibilities of financial institutions, and the imposition of severe penalties for violations. However, the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act has raised significant human rights

concerns. Critics argue that the Act's provisions can lead to arbitrary detentions and violations of civil liberties, particularly regarding freedom of expression and privacy.

2.3.3 Challenges of relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism

2.3.3.1 Differences in definitional operations

There are limitations related to the legal scope of enforcement. Watera (2023) narrates that when the twin bomb blasts tore through Kampala that July night in 2010 at Kyadondo and Ethiopian village restaurants Uganda was brought to its knees. At the time, Ugandans wondered about their safety. Uganda had in the past been savaged by terrorist groups like the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Democratic Allied Forces (ADF) in the outlying parts of the country, however, never in the capital. 74 lives were lost and scores injured in the attack claimed by the Al-shabaab that is deeply rooted in Somalia and has close ties with Al Qaeda. In the wake of the attack, security and law operatives vowed that the perpetrators of the crime would pay and justice for those affected got. The case took time to be concluded and only recently, the court acquitted the suspects of the charge of belonging to the Al-shabaab group as it was not listed among terrorist organizations in schedule II of the Anti- terrorism law at the time. This is because only four terrorist organizations were listed in the Act, Al-shabab not being one.

2.3.3.2 Lack of safeguards for extraditions

The lack of safeguards for extraditions significantly complicates the global fight against terrorism, primarily due to issues surrounding trust, human rights, and legal inconsistencies among nations. For instance Uganda's legal framework for extradition often lacks the necessary protections and safeguards for individuals involved. This can lead to a reluctance to extradite suspects due to concerns about human rights violations, such as the risk of torture or unfair trials in the requesting country. Such fears can undermine trust between states, making them hesitant to cooperate fully in counter-terrorism efforts (Kao et al, 2023).

Relatedly, as Lumina (2007) asserts, the extradition process can be complicated by political considerations. Countries may refuse extradition requests based on human rights grounds, which are particularly sensitive in terrorism cases. This reluctance can hinder the prosecution of individuals involved in terrorism, allowing them to evade justice and potentially continue their activities. For example, the Anti-terrorism Act law permits extradition in cases of terrorist crimes. However, it does not include any safeguards concerning surrender of individuals or extradition. Surrender and extradition must not be carried out to a jurisdiction where an

extradited person would become a prisoner of conscience, be subjected to the imposition of the death penalty, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. There should also be guarantees that alleged perpetrators should have a fair trial. All in all, the challenges posed by the lack of safeguards in extradition processes significantly hinder Uganda's ability to combat terrorism effectively.

2.3.3.3 Domestication issues

The domestication of anti-terrorism laws presents several significant challenges, particularly in balancing national security interests with the protection of human rights. One of the primary challenges is ensuring that counter-terrorism measures do not infringe upon fundamental human rights (UNHCHR, 2005). States often face dilemmas in protecting national security while simultaneously upholding rights such as the right to a fair trial and freedom from torture. For instance, the need to protect intelligence sources can conflict with the right to a fair hearing, complicating legal proceedings related to terrorism.

Many states struggle to effectively implement international anti-terrorism conventions and resolutions. This includes ensuring that national laws align with international standards, which can be complicated by varying interpretations of what constitutes terrorism and the appropriate legal responses. For instance, the Anti-terrorism Act in Uganda does not list some of the organisations that may be considered as facilitating terrorism. This begs the questions, if a terrorist organization is not listed in our laws but commits atrocities on Ugandan soil, will the justice system turn a blind eye to its existence? Also, if the terrorist suspects were only being charged on the account that they belong to the Al-shabab group, would they go scot free?

The law (Act) has been amended twice, and in existence is the Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2015 and the Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2016, one of the key reasons for amendment was the need to tackle terrorist financing lest we are blocked by the Financial Intelligence Authority. Also, three other terrorist groups, were added in the amendments of the Second Schedule of the 2002 Act, however, it confines terrorist organizations to the now, seven cited in our laws. However, given the rate at which new terrorist organizations keep cropping up, they will evade getting brought to book in accordance with our laws, thus the mere existence of schedule as it is a weakness. From a rule of law perspective, such gaps are not always accompanied by basic levels of due process and can be difficult to challenge successfully including in a court of law.

While countries like Iran and Iraq have made efforts to accept and domesticate international legal measures against terrorism, the effectiveness and implementation of these measures come with challenges. While Iran has actively engaged in implementing international counter-terrorism measures through amendments to its Countering Financing of Terrorism Act, Iraq's legal and institutional frameworks have faced challenges, particularly due to ongoing security issues and the need for effective governance. The integration of international counter-terrorism measures into domestic law has been complicated by these factors, leading to concerns about the balance between security measures and human rights protections (UNODC, 2009).

All in all, the domestication of anti-terrorism laws involves navigating complex legal, social, and operational challenges. States must find ways to implement effective counter-terrorism strategies that respect human rights and address the underlying causes of terrorism while ensuring national security.

2.3.3.4 Nature of the Crime

UNODC (2009) states that nature of terrorism has evolved significantly over the years, reflecting changes in political, social, and technological landscapes. This transformation can be categorized into old and new terrorism, each characterized by distinct motivations, tactics, and impacts. Historically, terrorism was often characterized by individualized tactics aimed at influencing specific political figures or policies. This form of terrorism included political assassinations and targeted attacks against government officials, particularly effective in authoritarian regimes. The primary goal was to effect change through direct pressure on decision-makers, leveraging violence to achieve political objectives. Such tactics were more predictable and often involved a clear ideological framework, typically associated with nationalist or leftist movements (UNODC, 2009).

In contrast, new terrorism emerged in the late 20th century, marked by several key changes like indiscriminate violence, religious motivations, technological advancements, and media influence (Oksana, 2006). Modern terrorists increasingly target civilians indiscriminately, aiming to instill fear across broader populations rather than just influencing policymakers. This shift reflects a strategic choice to pressure governments through public fear rather than direct political engagement. When it comes to religious motivations, the rise of religious extremism, particularly within Islamist movements, has redefined the landscape of terrorism. Groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS have adopted a worldview that justifies extreme violence against a wide array of targets, including non-combatants, based on religious ideologies. This has led to a

more apocalyptic vision of conflict, where violence is sanctioned against anyone perceived as opposing their beliefs.

The proliferation of technology has also transformed terrorist tactics. Innovations in communication and transportation have facilitated more sophisticated planning and execution of attacks. The use of social media for propaganda and recruitment has allowed terrorist organizations to reach global audiences, making their messages more potent and their operations more complex. This has been exacerbated by media influence where the role of mass media has become crucial in the strategy of modern terrorism. High-profile attacks are designed to attract media attention, amplifying their impact and spreading fear more effectively than in the past. The immediacy of news coverage can turn local incidents into global spectacles, furthering the terrorists' objectives of instilling fear and garnering attention for their causes (Oksana, 2006).

Generally, the changing nature of terrorism poses significant challenges for counter-terrorism efforts. Traditional responses may not be effective against the decentralized and ideologically diverse nature of modern terrorist organizations. The evolution from old to new terrorism reflects broader societal changes, including shifts in ideology, the impact of technology, and the influence of the media. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective strategies to combat terrorism in its current form

2.3.3.5 Lack of clarity on Law governing use of force

Another challenge lies in the formulation of the UN charter when the drafters had in mind a legal regime that promoted the peaceful settlement of disputes and prohibited the use or threat of force. But the provisions of the Charter are predicated on the regulation of relations between nation states. The exercise of force in self-defence against non-state terrorist groups, which have no legal personality within international law, sits uneasily within this framework. Given that the conditions under which states can act in self-defence against another state are not directly transposable to a situation involving non-state actors, there is no settled law governing the use of force against terrorist groups. Without clear legal standards governing the use of force, the risk of its overuse is increased, potentially eroding the potency of its fundamental prohibition (IBA, 2003).

2.3.3.6 Inadequate supporting laws against Terrorism

Despite the fact that Ugandan Parliament adopted the Anti-Terrorism Act 2015 which aimed at revising parts of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002; there are no significant legislations or law

enforcement developments specific to counterterrorism. This is why Duncan Muhumuza the Legal Adviser on Peace and Security at the African Union Permanent Observer Mission at The United Nations New York during the UN 68th General Assembly held on 8th October 2012 emphasized that ‘we must be prepared to take the hard decisions including assigning a comprehensive definition to terrorism and address the conditions under which terrorism thrive’ (Muhumuza, 2012). These legislations would at the same time harmonise the Anti-terrorism Act with the mother law, that is, the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, to fill the gaps for effective implementation of the Anti-terrorism laws.

2.3.3.7 Inadequate Laws to promote citizen equality

There is also the inability of the legal framework practices in Uganda to promote equality among Ugandans. In fact, some political analysts (Sabiti, 2010; Nwagu, 2009) suggest that inequality in Uganda may be fuelling the violent crime wave. Sabiti (2010) affirms that there will always be bad guys in the society but the role of the government and everyone else is to ensure that you stop those bad guys from committing crime; and he adds that when you look at the structures of Ugandan economy, this is a very unequal society and that in itself can cause insecurity. Nwagu (2009) states that there is a very small elite group in Uganda that owns almost everything. We have a group of people that have grown very wealthy over the last 20 to 30 years. At the same time this wealth has been thriving alongside unbelievable desperation in terms of economics. The crime wave is similar to that experienced in other countries where inequality is a major problem.

2.3.3.8 Resources challenges

Relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism presents various challenges, particularly in the context of resource allocation. Many countries lack the necessary resources, such as trained personnel and effective case management systems, to respond adequately to international requests for assistance in counter-terrorism efforts. This deficiency can hinder proactive measures and limit the ability to seek critical information from abroad regarding terrorist financing and activities.

There are other issues related to capacity because effective international cooperation requires that all involved jurisdictions have the capacity to make and respond to requests for assistance. However, many countries, especially those with fragile governance structures, struggle with legal and operational capacities, which can impede the overall effectiveness of counter-terrorism measure. For instance in Uganda, the state’s institutions require significant

improvements in technological capabilities to effectively manage and counter terrorist threats, especially those related to cyber terrorism. Enhancing technological infrastructure is essential for intelligence gathering and operational efficiency. Equally, the law enforcement agencies often lack the necessary training and resources to effectively combat terrorism. This includes inadequate training in modern counter-terrorism techniques and insufficient financial resources to conduct comprehensive operations (FIA, 2021).

All in all, responding effectively to the threat of terrorism would therefore require concerted effort not only at a national level but also with the international and regional groups. Uganda needs to learn from mistakes made around the world in preventing and combating terrorism in order to close the security gaps in the fight against terrorism. Failure to do so will simply strengthen the appeal of terrorism groups to introduce new cycles of terrorism. A more holistic approach that aims to find a lasting road to peace in Somalia, the DRC and other countries with prevalent conflict, is the only viable solution to this profound threat of terrorism to peace, stability and territorial integrity of Uganda. Also the Anti-Terrorism Act has undergone several amendments to enhance its effectiveness. Recent amendments have focused on aligning the law with international standards and improving the legal framework for addressing terrorism financing and related offenses. These updates reflect ongoing efforts to strengthen the deterrent measures against terrorism in Uganda.


2.4 Research Gap

Most studies on terrorism highlight several research gaps in assessing counterterrorism intervention effectiveness. The gaps identified are definitional, methodological, and programmatic. Other studies (Laqueur and Wall, 2018; Jackson, (Ed.), 2018) have concentrated on the cause of terrorism on the global arena. Moreover, there hasn't been a study to evaluate the domesticated laws on Anti-terrorism in Uganda. This gap was covered by this study that examined the effectiveness of the Ant-terrorism Act 2002 on combating terrorism in Uganda.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework is a system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories that supports and informs research (Maxwell, 2005). A conceptual framework is the total, logical orientation and associations of anything and everything that forms the underlying thinking, structures, plans and practices and implementation of the research project (Ravitch & Riggan, 2012). Therefore, conceptual frameworks, according to educational researcher Smyth (2004), are structured from a set of broad ideas and theories that help a researcher to properly identify the problem they are looking at, frame their questions and find suitable literature. The following is a conceptual framework that guided this study.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



The above conceptual framework shows the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The independent variable is the Antiterrorism Act while the dependent variable is combating terrorism. There are intervening variables that can influence the relationship between independent and dependent variables. These intervening variables include resources; government legal frameworks and policies; and political will. The independent variable (combating terrorism includes actions and achievements like deterrence, arrests made, frozen accounts, and justice served. The dependent variable (Anti-terrorism Act) includes the provisions of the Act like investigations (search, arrest, case conferencing), punishment (death, custodial, fine), and counter-terrorism financing measures. The framework therefore highlights the Anti-terrorism Act's potential to combating terrorism.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology that was used to collect and analyze data for the study. It is comprised of the research approach, research design, study population, sampling, data collection methods and instruments, procedure of data collection, data processing and analysis. This framework was informed by the research question of how effective the Anti-terrorism Act is in countering terrorism in Uganda.

3.1 Research Approach

A mixed method of both quantitative and qualitative approaches was adopted for this study. The choice of this methodology was justified by the need to accurately and systematically explain the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables (Erickson, 2017). Descriptive survey methods were captured through questionnaires as tools to support the quantitative study. The quantitative aspect were useful for research oriented towards quantification and applied in order to describe growth, nature, and current conditions on terrorism in Uganda. The qualitative approach involved an in-depth probe and application of subjectively interpreted data (Sekaran, 2003). Qualitative approach was used to gather an in-depth understanding of terrorism in Uganda and the effectiveness of the legal frameworks that facilitate counter terrorism.

3.2 Research Design

The study adopted descriptive survey method which concerns itself with the present phenomena in terms of conditions, practices beliefs, processes, relationships or trends invariably (Best and Kahn, 2007). Aggarwal (2008) affirms that descriptive research is devoted to the gathering of information about prevailing conditions or situations for the purpose of description and interpretation. This type of research method is not simply amassing and tabulating facts but includes proper analyses, interpretation, comparisons, identification of trends and relationships. It is concerned not only with the characteristics of individuals but with the characteristics of the whole sample thereof. Descriptive survey design was appropriate to this study since it provides information useful to the solutions of local issues/problems (Best, 2007). It was also appropriate as it employs applications of scientific method by critically analyzing and examining the source materials, by analyzing and interpreting data, and by arriving at generalization and prediction.

However, the limitation of the descriptive survey studies is that they tend to replicate well-known associations but cannot be used to infer causality (Queirós, Faria, & Almeida, 2017). In any case, since different information arose from different tools (questionnaires and interviews), a more holistic view was obtained overall. The researcher used this design by issuing out questionnaires to various categories of respondents as well as going to the field and listening to individuals through use of interviews and conversations.

3.3 Study Population

Polit and Hungler (1999:37) refer to the population as an aggregate or totality of all the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of specifications. Creswell and Clark (2017) define a study population as a complete set of units from which the researcher intends to collect data to be used to make inferences. This metropolitan area is significantly larger, with a population estimated at around 7 million (UBOS 2024). The Kampala Metropolitan Area covers an area of approximately 8,451.9 km² (3,263.3 square miles) and is one of the most densely populated regions in Uganda. Thus, Kampala Metropolitan Area is a vital and rapidly expanding urban center in Uganda, marked by significant demographic growth and economic importance.

3.3.1 Target Population

The categories of respondents included; Ministry of Defence and Veteran affairs (Joint Antiterrorism Task Force, Defence Intelligence and Security), Ministry of Internal Affairs (Counterterrorism, Crime Intelligence, and CID Units of Uganda Police Force), and Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (DPP, Magistrates, and Judges). These ministries, agencies and units are the chief implementers of both the Antiterrorism Act, and thus have grounded knowledge on how terrorism and counterterrorism efforts take shape in Uganda. The population is summarized on the table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Showing Target population

No.	Type of population	Population size
Quantitative		
1	Counterterrorism unit	45
2	CID	30
Qualitative		
3	Counter-terrorism Hdqtrs	5
4	Defence Intelligence and Security	5
5	Joint Antiterrorism Task Force	5
6	Crime Intelligence	5
7	Magistrates/Judges	5
8	DPP	5
Total		105

3.4 Sampling

A sample is a small group of individuals derived from a whole group or accessible population having a common observable characteristic to become the foundation for predicting the primacy of an unknown outcome, situation, or piece of information concerning the population (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). To select a representative sample, simple random sampling was employed on each stratum. This was preferred for lack of sampling bias and accurate representation. However, purposive sampling was used for strata with 10 people or less. Purposive sampling is a technique that refers to the deliberate choice of a participant due to the qualities the participant possesses. It is a nonrandom technique that does not need underlying theories or a set number of participants. It looks at a subject from all available angles, thereby achieving a greater understanding. According to Amin (2005), purposive sampling is preferred in selecting people holding positions of responsibility that allow them to be more knowledgeable about issues going on in their areas of jurisdiction.

3.4.1 Study Sample Size

Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) observed that sample sizes should neither be too small nor too large. They further opined that for population sizes of less than 1000, a sample of 10% to 30% of the entire population would suffice and in relatively smaller population sizes.

Table 3.2: Sample size and sampling procedures

No	Stratum	Stratum Popn Size	Sample size	Data Collection Tool	Sampling method
Qualitative					
1	Counter-terrorism Hdqtrs	5	5	KII	Purposive
2	Defence Intelligence and Security	5	5	KII	Purposive
3	Joint Antiterrorism Task Force	5	5	KII	Purposive
4	Crime Intelligence	5	5	KII	Purposive
5	Magistrates/Judges	5	5	KII	Purposive
6	DPP	5	5	KII	Purposive
Sub-total		30	30		
Quantitative					
1	Counterterrorism unit	45	30	Questionnaire	Simple Random
2	CID	30	20	Questionnaire	Simple Random
Sub-total		75	50		
Grand Total		105	80		

3.5 Data Collection Methods

3.5.1 Survey

Nigel, Nick, and Amanda (2007) describe a survey as a quantitative method for collecting information from a pool of respondents by asking multiple survey questions. They are particularly useful for non-experimental descriptive designs that seek to describe reality. This method was used to gather quantitative data from the respondents of the study. It involved respondents who were interviewed independently under the guidance of the questionnaire (Rada, 2019). This method fostered an expedited data collection process since little time was spent on one respondent compared to when the questionnaires are self-administered.

This method also facilitated the gathering of reliable data since it didn't allow time for the respondents to manipulate data (Martin et al., 2007). The questionnaires were administered to the counter-terrorism police officers and CID detectives to obtain the general facts about the study.

3.5.2 Key Informant Interviews

This method facilitated the qualitative approach to the study. Key informant interviews allow the collection of in-depth information to provide a comprehensive understanding of the study phenomena (Creswell, 2011; Maxwell, 2013). Hence, interviews allowed the probing of respondents to obtain an in-depth understanding of the growth and nature of terrorism in Uganda; the existing Anti-terrorism Act, and its effectiveness in combating terrorism in Uganda. Key informant interviews were conducted with key informants especially those who held positions of responsibility in the ministries, agencies, and units. The researcher therefore asked questions, listened, watched, and interpreted the different accounts of the participants regarding the aforementioned research objective.

3.5.3 Documentary Review

Document review is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents-both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material. Like other analytical methods, document review requires that data be examined and interpreted to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Rapley, 2007). The researcher used this method by compiling the documents relevant to the research study, that is, those answering the research questions. The researcher had access to Nkumba Main Library (including e-Library) where print documents were reviewed including; manuals; background papers; books and journals available as well as authorized electronic documents.

3.6 Data Collection Instruments

3.6.1 Questionnaire

This study used a questionnaire as an instrument for the survey. Cooper and Schindler (2009) state that a questionnaire can be defined as a research instrument containing a series of questions for the collection of information from the respondents. A questionnaire was also used to increase the degree of reliability due to the many items in it and it as well enhanced the chances of getting valid data (Amin, 2005). The questionnaire was structured with close-ended questions in line with the study variables. The questions measuring respondent's perception were measured on a five-point Likert scale is [*1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, and 5=strongly agree*]. The scale allowed quantification of responses for quantitative analysis. The first part introduced the questionnaire and also seek respondent's consent as well as capturing the background information of the respondents. The second section presented questions testing respondent's opinion on the nature and growth of Terrorism in Uganda (basing on the Anti-terrorism Act 2002). The last part captured the respondent's opinion on combating terrorism in Uganda as well as the challenges associated with it.

3.6.2. Interview Guide

The interview guide was used to collect data from the purposively selected key informants. The guide was designed with open ended questions which according to Creswell (2014) provided in-depth information. The interview guide was structured with few guiding questions to open into discussion on the aspects of the study including; nature and growth of terrorism as well as combating terrorism. Some questions that were asked in the questionnaires were used in the interview guide. This enabled the researcher to correlate the data collected (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999). The researcher asked questions, listened, watched, and interpreted the different accounts of the participants regarding the aforementioned research objective. Key informants were interviewed from their places of work at their convenience in order to enhance data quality. Each interview would take between 30-45 minutes to avoid fatigue which could compromise data quality.

3.6.3 Document and Data Collection Checklist

The researcher created a data collection form to summarize data collected from the document reviews. The form included the type of document to be reviewed, a way to reference each document; and information that answered each applicable research question. The form also was used to compile and analyze the research findings.

3.7 Procedure for data collection

The researcher applied for ethical approval at Nkumba University. As a way of preparing for the fieldwork, the researcher had already secured all the data collection instruments (audio recorder, and notebooks). Upon arrival in the field, the researcher introduced himself to the area authorities seeking consent to undertake the study in their institutions/units. Furthermore, individual respondent's consent was sought by explaining to them the reason data was needed. Once consent was granted, the data collection exercise began by approaching individual respondents and interviewing them until a predetermined sample was covered or when the saturation point was reached.

3.8 Data Analysis

Hatch (2002) states that data analysis is a systematic search for meaning. Since data analysis is an interactive process, where data are systematically searched and analyzed to provide an illuminating description of phenomena, the researcher used two approaches to data analysis, that is, Statistical and Thematic analyses. Using more than one type of analysis strengthened the rigor and trustworthiness of the findings via methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1978). For quantitative data, frequencies and percentages were generated with the aid of the statistical software tool called Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 26. Where possible tables, graphs, and charts were used to present the analyzed data findings following the objectives of this research. For qualitative data, thematic analysis was used. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within the data (Creswell, 2012). Qualitative data responses from Key Informant Interviews were transcribed, and coded and then the codes or units were linked to data to form overarching themes/concepts. Some of the detailed information will be collected, analyzed, and presented in form of paraphrases or quoted narratives on permission of the respondents.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

Siebert (1993) affirms that research ethics are a set of principles about how researchers and research organizations should conduct themselves when dealing with research participants, other researchers and colleagues, the users of their research and society in general. Ethical considerations should pervade the entire research process (Bank and Scheyvens, 2003; Sriram et al., 2009). The fundamental ethical concerns that were considered in this study included; informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, safety, and managing plagiarism (Moreno, Goni, Moreno, & Diekema, 2013).

Consent is one of the major ethical issues in conducting research which implies the fact that “a person knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently, and clearly and manifestly, gives his or her consent” (Arminger, 1997, p.330). To ensure informed consent, the researcher vividly explained to the respondents the purpose of the study, the benefits, and the risks involved. Furthermore, the researcher informed the respondents that they have a right to opt out of the study at any time. This further gave them confidence that the study was truly for the claimed purpose and hence gained the confidence to provide data (Bell & Willmott, 2016).

Confidentiality was ensured by disclosing to the participants how data would be utilized and emphasizing that no personal information such as snapshots would be disclosed in the report without their approval. In addition, the researcher promised the participants that all the information obtained would be safely kept and only accessed by the researcher (Surmiak, 2018). Anonymity was ensured by not exposing the names of the respondents, and as such they would not be required to indicate them or sign anywhere on the data collection instruments (Brokowski & Adli, 2019).

Plagiarism occurs when someone tries to pass off someone else's work, thoughts, or ideas as their own, whether deliberately or unintentionally, without appropriate acknowledgment. Plagiarism was managed by citing and referencing all the works that were not original to me. Furthermore, borrowed literature was paraphrased to avoid copy-and-paste exercises.

Since Uganda has not yet declared that the country is COVID-19 pandemic-free, I conducted the study with minimal contact by organizing the meetings as per the standard operating procedures provided by the Ministry of Health. This gave confidence and allowed respondents to freely and securely give in information.

3.10 Limitations of the Study

There was an aspect of limited time factor since I collected data when I was already back for duty. I solved it by planning ahead and using any available free time in the course of my duty. The accuracy and hence the reliability of secondary data could not be easily ascertained. Hence errors in the results arising out of this inaccuracy couldn't be ruled out. However, I tried to use comparative sources of secondary data in a bid to minimize such errors.

The study was being conducted when the government of Uganda has not declared Uganda as COVID-19 pandemic-free. Thus, there was a challenge of conducting the study with minimal contacts. To overcome this challenge, I organized the meetings as per the standard operating procedures provided by the Ministry of Health.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

Chapter four focuses on the presentation, interpretation, and discussion of the findings related to the study. The chapter is structured to address the study's objectives systematically providing insights into the Anti-terrorism Act 2002 and its effectiveness on countering terrorism in Uganda. This chapter begins with an overview of the response rate to the questionnaires, offering a context for the subsequent data analysis and discussion. It then presents the descriptive statistics of the respondents' demographic characteristics. Furthermore, chapter four delves into the core findings related to the study's specific objectives. These include the following sub-sections. The first sub-section presents respondents' views and analysis on the nature and growth of terrorism in Uganda. Then, the second sub-section explores the analysis of key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act and their relationship to combating terrorism. Lastly, the third sub-section presents respondents' views and analysis of the challenges in relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism.

4.2 Response rate

Table 1: Showing the response rate

Category of Respondents	Sample Size	Actual Response	Percentage Response Rate
Qualitative Respondents			
Counter-terrorism Headquarters Staff	5	5	100%
Defence Intelligence and Security (DIS) Staff	5	3	60%
Joint Antiterrorism Task Force (JAT) Staff	5	4	80%
Crime Intelligence Hdqtr Staff	5	5	100%
Magistrates/Judges	5	3	60%
DPP staff	5	3	60%
Sub-total	30	23	76.7%
Quantitative Respondents			
Counter-terrorism Unit	30	28	93.4 %
Criminal Investigations Department (CID)	20	17	85.0 %
Sub-total	50	45	89.2%
Total Sample Size	80	68	85.0 %

Table 1 shows a total sample size of 85.0% of the respondents, comprising both qualitative and quantitative components. The qualitative component included 30 sampled respondents out of whom 23 participated in the study, resulting in 76.7% response rate across categories such as the, Counter-terrorism Hdqtrs Staff, Defence Intelligence and Security (DIS) Staff, Joint Anti-terrorism Task Force (JAT) Staff, Crime Intelligence Headquarter Staff, Magistrates/Judges, and the DPP staff. This participation highlighted the reliability of the data obtained from these key stakeholders, ensuring that the qualitative findings were comprehensive and reflective of the entire stakeholders in the fight against terrorism.

The quantitative component involved a sample of 50 Counter-terrorism and CID Staff members, of which 45 participated in the questionnaire survey. This yielded a response rate of 89.2%, which was considered satisfactory for this type of study. According to research standards, a response rate above 70% is typically regarded as adequate (Yin, 2010). Therefore, the overall response rate (both qualitative and quantitative) of 85% suggested that the quantitative data collected was robust and provided a reliable basis for analysis.

4.3 Demographic characteristics of respondents


The analysis of the demographic characteristics of respondents is crucial in understanding the diversity of the sample and how it may influence the perceptions and responses related to the study. This section provides insights into various demographic factors such as age, police/work department, gender, education level, and tenure within respective units/departments. These characteristics help in assessing the representation of the sample and ensuring the reliability of the data collected. Table 2, on the following page, presents the distribution of respondents by demographic characteristics.

Table 2: Percentage distributions of respondents by demographic characteristics

Characteristic	Category	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Age of Respondents (Years)	18-25	9	13.2%
	26-35	32	47.1%
	36-45	14	20.6%
	46 and above	13	19.1%
Police/Work Department	Counter Terrorism	35	51.4%
	CID	17	25.0%
	Crime Intelligence	5	7.4%
	Defence Intelligence and Security	5	7.4%
	Judiciary	3	4.4%
	DPP	3	4.4%
Gender/Sex of Respondent	Male	48	70.6%
	Female	20	29.4%
Highest Level of Education	Ordinary Level	11	16.2%
	Advanced Level	22	32.4%
	Tertiary/University	35	51.4%
Work Durations	Less than 1 year	9	13.2%
	2 years	44	64.7%
	More than 3 years	15	22.1%

Source: Primary Data, 2024


Chart 4.3.1: Showing the Age of Respondents



Source: Primary Data

From the chart 4.3.1 showing the age distribution of respondents, the largest segment fell within the 26-35 years range, representing 47.1% of the respondents. This indicated that the majority of respondents were young adults. The second-largest group was aged 36-45 years, making up 20.6% of the respondents. This was followed by those aged 46 and above at 19.1%, reflecting middle-aged and older participants. Lastly, respondents aged 18-25 years represented 13.2%, showing the smallest proportion in the study. This distribution highlighted that most participants were within the active working-age population.


Graph 4.3.1: Showing Police/Work Department distribution of respondents



Source: Primary Data

Regarding the work departments of the respondents, the findings revealed that the largest group, 35 respondents (51.4%) belonged to the Counter Terrorism department. This indicates that more than half of the participants were directly engaged in counter-terrorism efforts, reflecting their central role in implementing the Anti-Terrorism Act. The second-largest group comprised 17 respondents (25.0%) from the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), highlighting their significant involvement in investigating terrorism-related crimes. Smaller segments included 5 respondents (7.4%) each from the Crime Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence and Security, showing their specialized roles in intelligence gathering. Lastly, 3 respondents (4.4%) each represented the Judiciary and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), emphasizing their roles in the legal processes of combating terrorism. This distribution illustrates the collaborative involvement of various departments in addressing terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act.


Graph 4.3.2: Showing Gender/Sex distribution of Respondents



Source: Primary Data

From the graph above, male respondents totaled 48, representing 70.6% of the total respondents, while female respondents totaled 20, accounting for 29.4%. The gender distribution was crucial to ensure representation of views from both males and females. Findings revealed that the majority of respondents were male, reflecting their dominant participation in this study. However, female respondents also constituted a significant proportion, contributing valuable perspectives to the overall analysis. This distribution highlights the importance of including both genders to capture balanced and diverse insights into the effectiveness of the Anti-Terrorism Act.


Graph 4.3.3: Showing Respondent's levels of Education



Source: Primary Data

Regarding the education levels of respondents, the findings revealed that the majority, 35 respondents (51.4%), had attained tertiary or university education, indicating their advanced academic qualifications and likely higher capacity for critical roles in combating terrorism. This was followed by 22 respondents (32.4%) who had completed advanced level education, reflecting a significant proportion with higher secondary education. Lastly, 11 respondents (16.2%) had completed ordinary level education, representing the smallest group in the study. This distribution underscores that most respondents possessed higher educational qualifications, which could influence their understanding and implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act.

Graph 4.3.4: Showing Respondent's Work durations



Source: Primary Data

From the graph 4 above showing the work durations of respondents, the findings revealed that the majority, 44 respondents (64.7%), had worked for 2 years, reflecting substantial experience and familiarity with the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act. This was followed by 15 respondents (22.1%) who had worked for more than 3 years, indicating deeper engagement and expertise in their roles. Lastly, 9 respondents (13.2%) had work durations of less than 1 year, representing the smallest group, likely consisting of newer staff. This distribution highlights that most respondents possessed considerable experience, which could enhance their understanding and evaluation of the Act's effectiveness.

4.4 Examining the Nature and Contributing Factors for the Growth of Terrorism in Uganda


The first objective of the study aimed to examine the nature and growth of terrorism in Uganda. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with statements related to the nature and growth of terrorism. The responses are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Respondents on the Nature and Contributing Factors for the Growth of Terrorism in Uganda

Nature and Growth of Terrorism	S.D (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	S.A (%)
Terrorism targets civilians and non-combatants rather than specific military or political figures	4.4	8.8	22.1	35.3	29.4
Societal fear generated by indiscriminate attacks can lead to increased public support for aggressive counter-terrorism measures	2.9	7.3	16.2	41.2	32.4
To achieve psychological impact, terrorism uses tactics and methods that are both covert and clandestine	3.7	11.8	18.4	36.8	29.3
The potential use of weapons of mass destruction indicates terrorism is mass destructive in nature	5.9	8.8	20.6	32.4	32.3
Ideology serves as a crucial driving force behind terrorist actions and justifies political goals	4.4	7.4	19.1	33.8	35.3
Factors like globalization and technology either impede or facilitate extremist ideologies	5.0	10.3	25.0	35.3	24.4
Public perception plays a significant role in the legitimacy of political violence or terrorism	4.4	6.6	20.6	38.2	30.2
Income inequality and lack of socio-economic development contribute to the rise of terrorism	3.7	7.4	17.7	36.8	34.4
Various religious movements have engaged in violence to promote their belief systems, often justified by an absolute belief that such actions are sanctioned by a higher power.	4.4	8.4	22.5	30.3	34.4
The growth rate of population (which creates demographic pressures that exacerbate socioeconomic challenges), is a key demographic factor associated with increased terrorism incidents in society	4.4	6.4	20.8	30.2	38.2

S.D = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N = Neutral, A = Agree, S.A = Strongly Agree.
Source: Primary Data, 2024.

Chart 4.4.1: Showing responses on Public Support for counterterrorism measures



Source: Primary Data, 2024

From chart 4.4.1, 41.2% of respondents agreed and 32.4% strongly agreed that societal fear created by indiscriminate attacks led to increased public support for aggressive counter-terrorism measures, making a combined total of 73.6%. This showed that most respondents believed terrorism's deliberate targeting of civilians and non-combatants created significant fear, which pushed the public to support stricter counter-terrorism actions. Meanwhile, 16.2% of respondents were neutral, possibly because they lacked direct experience or understanding of the connection between societal fear and counter-terrorism efforts. A smaller group, 7.3%, disagreed, and 2.9% strongly disagreed, suggesting they may have believed societal fear did not directly influence public support or that the current counter-terrorism measures were not effective enough to gain public confidence.


In an interview on how indiscriminate acts of terrorism had impacted the country, specifically on the population, one of the staff at Counter-terrorism Headquarters had this to say:

“Terrorism in Uganda has been executed in various indiscriminate forms, and it often targets civilians with no distinction between innocent individuals and those involved in conflict. The attacks have taken place in multiple ways, including bombings, arson, and poisoning, often with the intent of spreading fear and chaos rather than achieving clear political or military objectives. A prime example of indiscriminate terrorism was the 1998 bombing in Jinja, where innocent civilians were caught in the blast. We have also seen incidents where dangerous biological substances, like in the CRBN attack, were meant to cause mass harm indiscriminately. These actions are not limited to specific targets but are designed to affect everyone, even if they have no connection to the government or military forces. Terrorists often focus on crowded spaces, such as markets or public gatherings, where the chance of hitting noncombatants is higher, thus creating maximum fear and confusion. The indiscriminate nature of these attacks makes it particularly challenging to combat terrorism effectively under the current framework of the Anti-Terrorism Act. (Interview, 16 September 2024, Counter-Terrorism Headquarters)”.

The above analysis and opinions aligned with the views of several authors mentioned in this study. Oksana (2006) agreed that the indiscriminate nature of terrorism spread fear and chaos, highlighting its psychological effects and the heightened vulnerability of civilians due to the randomness of attacks. Similarly, UNODC (2023) supported the idea that targeting civilians increased public fear, as noted earlier on above, leading people to back strict counter-terrorism

measures. IOM (2023) also observed that attacks on civilians amplified terror, aligning with the interview's point about terrorism focusing on crowded spaces to cause maximum fear and confusion. These insights emphasized the widespread societal and psychological impacts of indiscriminate terrorism.

Chart 4.4.2: Showing responses on psychological methods used in terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024

According to pie chart 4.4.2, 36.8% of respondents agreed, and 29.3% strongly agreed that terrorism employed both covert and clandestine tactics to achieve psychological impact. This combined total of 66.1% demonstrated that the majority of respondents acknowledged the strategic use of hidden and secretive methods by terrorists to instill fear and influence public perception. Furthermore, 18.4% of respondents remained neutral, reflecting limited awareness regarding the connection between covert methods and terrorism's psychological impact. In contrast, 11.8% disagreed, while 3.7% strongly disagreed, showing that a small portion of respondents believed terrorism's methods may not necessarily depend on being covert or clandestine to achieve their intended psychological effects.


Apart from the findings obtained through questionnaires, interviews were also carried out with key informants to seek their perception on the challenges of relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism in Uganda. The responses gathered from the interviews highlighted significant difficulties associated with clandestine or covert terrorism. One of the participants, a counter-terrorism staff, had this to say:

Terrorism activities are difficult to investigate and prosecute due to challenges in proving them. The methods and weapons used in attacks vary widely and are sometimes used in other crimes like robberies, making it hard to establish direct links to terrorism. Investigations require extra care and professionalism

throughout, with investigators and prosecutors needing proper training in crime scene management, evidence gathering, and handling victims and perpetrators. This is particularly crucial in combating clandestine terrorism, where perpetrators operate covertly and leave minimal evidence. Moreover, those involved in terrorist activities often possess advanced scientific and technological expertise, which can surpass the capabilities of Uganda's technical teams, creating a significant gap in countering such threats. The broad and undefined nature of terrorism as a concept further complicates efforts, with some countries engaging in or supporting terrorism while avoiding condemnation under international law (Interview, 20 September 2024, Counter-terrorism Hdqtrs).

The findings from the interviews regarding the nature and complexity terrorism aligned closely with perspectives from the literature in Chapter 2. Luis & Sánchez-Cuenca (2024) affirmed that the covert and clandestine nature of terrorism enhanced its psychological impact, emphasizing the element of surprise, which aligned with the interviewee's observation about the minimal evidence left by perpetrators. Davis (2001) supported the interview's claim about the complexity of addressing clandestine terrorism, highlighting how its convergence with organized crime created significant challenges for investigators and policymakers. Additionally, the need for specialized training and intelligence, as emphasized in the interview, resonated with Davis's argument that traditional responses were inadequate against non-state actors who thrived on secrecy. These insights underscored the multifaceted difficulties posed by clandestine terrorism and the critical need for advanced counter-terrorism measures.

Chart 4.4.3: Showing responses on Mass Destructive nature of terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024

From the above Chart, a total of 32.4% of respondents agreed, and 32.3% strongly agreed that the potential use of weapons of mass destruction demonstrated that terrorism was mass destructive in nature. This combined total of 64.7% highlighted that the majority of respondents acknowledged the destructive capacity of terrorism, particularly when weapons of mass destruction were involved, which could result in large-scale devastation and loss of life. Additionally, 20.6% of respondents remained neutral, suggesting limited understanding of the link between terrorism and the use of such weapons. On the other hand, 8.8% disagreed, while 5.9% strongly disagreed, indicating that a small proportion of respondents believed terrorism did not necessarily rely on weapons of mass destruction to be destructive in nature.


In addition to the information obtained from respondents through questionnaires on the mass destruction of terrorism, interviews were conducted with key informants to provide further insights into the mass destruction caused by terrorism in Uganda. One of the key informants, a senior investigations officer, highlighted that:

Terrorism in Uganda has not only targeted security installations but has also extended to public gatherings and individual figures, leaving behind a trail of mass destruction. For instance, the 2021 attack on CPS Kampala marked a direct assault on the nation's security framework. Similarly, the bombings in Lugogo during a public football screening demonstrated the ability of terrorists to strike at gatherings, causing significant loss of life and instilling fear in the population. Moreover, targeted attacks on high-profile individuals, such as the assassination of a Prosecutor while shopping in Kampala, underscore the organized and ruthless nature of these acts. These incidents illustrate the wide-ranging scope of terrorism, making it exceedingly difficult for legal measures alone, such as the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), to effectively address the issue. The complexity of these attacks highlights the need for a multidimensional approach to counterterrorism, combining legal measures with intelligence, community vigilance, and socio-economic interventions (Interview, 25 September 2024, Criminal Investigations Department [CID]).

The insights from the interview regarding the mass destructive nature of terrorism aligned closely with the perspectives from literature. Mullen (1978) highlighted the profound societal and structural implications of terrorism, particularly through the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which echoed the interviewee's observation on the large-scale devastation caused by attacks like the Lugogo bombings. Similarly, Christopher (2002) affirmed that the use of chemical and biological agents aligned with the terrorists' objectives

to instill fear and coerce societies, supporting the interview’s emphasis on the psychological and physical destruction brought by terrorist acts in Uganda. These viewpoints collectively underscored the devastating impact of terrorism and the complexity of addressing it effectively.

Chart 4.4.4: Showing responses on Ideological Growth of Terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024

The chart 4.4.4 showed that 33.8% of respondents agreed, and 35.3% strongly agreed that ideology was a crucial driving force behind terrorist actions and served to justify political goals. This combined total of 69.1% highlighted that the majority of respondents believed ideology played a key role in motivating and legitimizing terrorism. Meanwhile, 19.1% of respondents remained neutral, indicating some lack of a clear opinion on this matter. On the other hand, 7.4% disagreed, and 4.4% strongly disagreed, suggesting that a small portion of respondents did not view ideology as a significant factor in driving terrorist activities.


In addition to the information obtained from respondents through questionnaires on the role of ideology in driving terrorist actions, interviews were also conducted with key informants to gain further insights into the evolution of terrorism in Uganda. In this regard, over 70% of the informants underscored the importance of understanding the ideological underpinnings of terrorism to counteract its influence effectively. One of the key informants, a senior officer from Crime Intelligence Headquarters had this to say:

Terrorism in Uganda is not a recent phenomenon but has evolved over decades with significant incidents marking its growth. It dates back to the 1976 hijacking of an Israeli plane, followed by the 1996 massacres by Joseph Kony in Eastern Uganda. Other notable events include the 1998 ADF attack in Kichwamba and the 1996–1999 bombings at various taxi parks, which caused widespread fear.

In recent years, terrorism tactics have shifted, evidenced by the 2010 bombings during the World Cup screening in Kampala and the 2020 attacks in Kyambogo and on buses heading to Mbarara. These incidents, along with cases of IEDs recovered from homes, demonstrate how terrorism has grown more covert, organized, and systematic. Clearly, this remains a persistent challenge, with roots as early as the 1960s and ongoing manifestations to this day (Interview, 14 September 2024, Crime Intelligence Headquarters).

The findings from the interviews regarding the ideological growth of terrorism in Uganda aligned with several authors in the study literature. Savelkoul (2022) emphasized that ideology served as a critical driving force, providing a framework to understand political orders and justify means, which resonated with the interviewee's assertion about ideology underpinning terrorism's systematic and covert growth. Similarly, Holbrook and Horgan (2019) highlighted the global influence of ideological motivations and the evolution of tactics, mirroring the account of Uganda's shifting terrorism methods, such as the 2010 bombings and IED recoveries. Bewul (2022) supported the notion that ideological and political growth was complex and shaped by historical and societal factors, reflecting the interviewee's emphasis on Uganda's historical terrorism incidents dating back to the 1960s. Lastly, Huff and Kertzer (2018) agreed that ideology adapted to contemporary societal conditions, echoing the evolving tactics and strategies highlighted in the interview. Together, these perspectives underscored the significant role of ideology in the persistence and transformation of terrorism in Uganda.

Chart 4.4.5: Showing how income inequality contributes to terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024

The data from the above chart revealed that 36.8% of respondents agreed, and 34.4% strongly agreed that income inequality and a lack of socio-economic development played a role in the


rise of terrorism. Together, this accounted for 71.2%, indicating that most respondents viewed economic challenges as major contributors to terrorism. Meanwhile, 17.7% remained neutral, reflecting uncertainty on the matter. However, 7.4% disagreed, and 3.7% strongly disagreed, suggesting that a small portion of respondents did not see income inequality and limited development as significant factors driving terrorism.

In addition to the information obtained from respondents through questionnaires on the role of socio-economic challenges in the rise of terrorism, interviews were also conducted with key informants to gain further insights into the matter. In this regard, over 70% of the informants emphasized that addressing socio-economic inequalities and implementing development programs are crucial in combating terrorism. Relatedly, one of the key informants, a senior counter-terrorism officer had this to say:

We recognize that one of the critical challenges in combating terrorism is addressing the underlying root causes such as income inequality and socio-economic disparities. Terrorist groups often exploit vulnerabilities like poverty, lack of education, and limited opportunities to recruit individuals. To counter this, we have introduced initiatives such as youth loan schemes, vocational training, and community empowerment programs aimed at providing alternatives and reducing the appeal of terrorist recruitment. These measures, combined with community sensitization campaigns, have proven effective in reducing vulnerability to terrorist propaganda (Interview, 15 September 2024, Counter-Terrorism Headquarters).

The socio-economic growth of terrorisms' findings aligned with Michael (2019), who asserted that income inequality and socio-economic disparities created grievances that fueled terrorism. Meierriecks (2018) also supported this by emphasizing that individuals facing economic hardships had lower opportunity costs, making them more susceptible to radicalization. Similarly, Wafula (2007) highlighted how economic and social marginalization in Uganda, particularly in the northern regions, fueled insurgencies such as the LRA. These perspectives corroborated the interview findings that socio-economic challenges, including poverty and inequality, were significant drivers of terrorism and needed to be addressed through targeted development programs and community empowerment initiatives.

Chart 4.4.6: Showing responses on Religious factors in the growth of Terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024

The data revealed that 30.3% of respondents agreed, and 34.4% strongly agreed that various religious movements had used violence to promote their beliefs, often believing their actions were justified by a higher power. This total of 64.7% indicated that most respondents saw religion as a major factor driving violence in terrorism. Furthermore, 22.5% of respondents were neutral, showing different opinions on the role of religion in terrorism. A smaller group, 8.4%, disagreed, and 4.4% strongly disagreed, implying that some respondents did not view religious movements as a significant cause of terrorist violence.

In addition to the data collected through questionnaires on the challenges of relying on legal measures to combat terrorism in Uganda, interviews were conducted with key informants to gain deeper insights into the issue. On the same note, senior counter-terrorism specialist from the Defence Intelligence and Security (DIS) had this to say:


The challenge of addressing terrorism in Uganda is compounded by ideological and religious motivations, particularly those linked to extremist groups like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). These groups exploit extremist Islamic ideologies to recruit and radicalize vulnerable populations. The influence of such ideologies is often exacerbated by underlying socio-economic factors like poverty and youth unemployment, which create fertile ground for radicalization. Legal frameworks, including the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), struggle to adequately counteract this type of terrorism because the battle is not just against criminal

acts but also against deeply ingrained beliefs and socio-economic vulnerabilities. Without addressing these root causes alongside legal measures, the fight against terrorism remains a significant challenge (Interview, 22 September 2024, Defence Intelligence and Security (DIS) Hdqtrs).

The findings aligned closely with the literature. Rotberg (2005) underscored that religiously motivated terrorism had deep historical roots, often justified by beliefs in divine approval. Manz (2018) and Lake (2022) further emphasized the growing dominance of religiously motivated violence over secular political violence globally, particularly in Islamic groups, which were disproportionately involved in such incidents. Toft (2012) highlighted that over 80% of religious civil wars involved Islamic factions, indicating a global trend mirrored in Uganda's experiences with groups like the ADF.

Conversely, the Pew Research Center (2024) noted recent declines in religion-related hostilities and incidents, attributed to factors such as the territorial defeat of major groups like ISIS. However, the situation in Uganda showed that while global trends might have shifted, local conditions continued to foster religiously motivated terrorism.

Chart 4.4.7: Showing responses on Demographic Factors and Growth of Terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024

The findings revealed that 30.2% of respondents agreed, and 38.2% strongly agreed that the growth rate of population, which created demographic pressures and exacerbated socioeconomic challenges, was a key factor associated with increased terrorism incidents. This combined total of 68.4% suggested that most respondents believed population growth played

a significant role in the rise of terrorism. Additionally, 20.8% of respondents remained neutral, indicating uncertainty about the connection between population growth and terrorism. A smaller percentage, 6.4%, disagreed, and 4.4% strongly disagreed, showing that some respondents did not see population growth as a major factor in terrorism.

Apart from the findings obtained through questionnaires, interviews were also carried out with key informants to seek their perception on the challenges of relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism in Uganda. One of the prosecutors of terrorism cases had this to say:

Terrorism activities are very difficult to investigate and prosecute because they are not easy to prove. The methods and weapons used in terrorism can vary greatly, and sometimes the same weapons are used in other crimes, such as robberies. This means that investigations need to be handled with extra care and professionalism, from the start right up to the end. Both investigators and prosecutors need to be well trained in handling crime scenes and gathering evidence, particularly when dealing with the victims and perpetrators. Terrorists are often advanced in scientific knowledge and technology, which can sometimes surpass the capabilities of the technical teams in Uganda. The broad and complex nature of terrorism as a concept, coupled with the lack of a universally accepted definition, adds to the challenges. There are also countries that continue to engage in terrorist activities without facing significant condemnation under international law. So, relying solely on legal measures becomes a bit challenging when dealing with an ever-evolving threat that is constantly outpacing traditional law enforcement strategies. (Interview, 20 September 2024, DPP).

This perspective aligned with Coccia (2018), who asserted that population growth was a critical factor influencing terrorism by exacerbating socioeconomic challenges. Similarly, Ehrlich & Liu (2005) emphasized the lethality of terrorism in regions with high population growth rates, such as Iraq and Sudan, which paralleled Uganda's situation. Bellito (2018) supported this view, stating that rapid population growth fostered conditions for radicalization and recruitment, particularly among disenfranchised youth. Parsons (1991) also agreed, noting that poverty, political instability, and rapid population growth created fertile grounds for terrorism. However, Nwagu (2009) added a broader dimension, emphasizing the adaptability of terrorist groups and their exploitation of technology, a factor that complicated the effectiveness of legal measures alone. Together, these authors underscored the multifaceted challenges of combating terrorism in Uganda, as reflected in the analysis and interview opinions.

4.5 Analyzing the implementation of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act in combating terrorism

The second objective of this study analyzed the implementation of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act in combating terrorism. Table 4 below presents the findings from the respondents.


Table 4: Percentage Distribution of Respondents on Key Aspects of the Anti-Terrorism Act

Key Aspects of the Anti-Terrorism Act	S.D (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	S.A (%)
The Act aims to suppress terrorism through punitive measures, creating a strong disincentive	3.7	7.4	17.6	38.2	33.1
Death penalty for acts resulting in death deters terrorism	2.9	5.9	19.1	41.2	30.9
Fines of up to 500,000 currency points reinforce punishment and deterrence	4.4	8.8	21.3	33.8	31.7
Membership in prescribed organizations punishable by 10 years creates deterrence	5.1	9.5	20.6	31.6	33.2
Police immunity for reasonable force raises concerns about accountability	5.9	12.5	24.3	32.4	24.9
Prohibition of funds solicitation combats terrorism financing	3.7	7.4	18.4	40.1	30.4

S.D = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N = Neutral, A = Agree, S.A = Strongly Agree.

Source: Primary Data, 2024.

Chart 4.5.1: Showing responses how the Act aims to suppress terrorism through punitive measures, creating a strong disincentive



Source: Primary Data, 2024.

According to chart 4.5.1, 38.2% of respondents agreed, and 33.1% strongly agreed that the Anti-Terrorism Act aimed to suppress terrorism through punitive measures, creating a strong disincentive. This combined 71.3% highlighted a significant majority who believed the Act effectively deterred terrorism by imposing harsh penalties. Additionally, 17.6% of respondents remained neutral, indicating mixed opinions. A smaller portion, 7.4% disagreed, and 3.7% strongly disagreed, reflecting minimal skepticism about the Act's effectiveness in combating terrorism through punitive approaches.

In addition to the information obtained from respondents through questionnaires on the Anti-Terrorism Act's role in suppressing terrorism, interviews were also conducted with key informants to gain further insights into its effectiveness and limitations. In this regard, a senior legal officer attached to the Joint Anti-terrorism Task force had this to say:


Uganda's Anti-Terrorism Act is recognized as a robust framework that aggressively targets the arrest, prosecution, and punishment of offenders. However, its international effectiveness is often limited by adherence to United Nations conventions. Despite excelling in enforcement mechanisms, the Act lacks provisions for protecting or rehabilitating victims and witnesses, leaving them vulnerable. Families of suspects, such as unsuspecting wives and children, often face hardships with no support systems. This critical gap underscores the Act's failure to address the aftermath for victims and witnesses, posing a significant challenge to achieving a holistic counter-terrorism approach (Interview, 14 September 2024, Joint Anti-terrorism Taskforce-JAT)).

The findings highlighted that the Anti-Terrorism Act was perceived as a robust framework for suppressing terrorism through punitive measures. However, the interview opinion pointed to gaps in victim and witness protection, leaving families of suspects unsupported. Relating these findings to reviewed literature, Coccia (2018) agreed that punitive measures could act as effective deterrents but emphasized the need for complementary social support systems to address underlying issues. Similarly, Bellito (2018) highlighted that harsh penalties should be coupled with preventive strategies, including victim rehabilitation, to ensure long-term effectiveness. On the other hand, Nwagu (2009) critiqued reliance on punitive frameworks alone, arguing that they often failed to address the socioeconomic roots of terrorism. Parsons (1991) also pointed out that legal measures had to be holistic, integrating both punitive and restorative approaches, to address terrorism's complexities comprehensively.

Relatedly, the documentary review revealed that the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) provides a legal framework for defining and prosecuting terrorism in Uganda. Key aspects of the Act include the criminalization of terror-related activities, asset freezing for suspected terrorists and empowering law enforcement to conduct surveillance and investigations. A report by Human Rights Watch (2016) noted that the Act has been instrumental in apprehending key terror suspects and disrupting planned attacks.

However, other scholars critiqued its effectiveness. Nassali (2015) argued that while the Act provides strong legal tools, its implementation is hampered by limited resources and inadequate training for law enforcement. Additionally, Kyomuhendo (2019) highlighted concerns about human rights violations, particularly the abuse of surveillance powers and the detention of suspects without trial. These findings resonate with Wilkinson (2006), who stressed that counterterrorism legislation must balance security and civil liberties to maintain public trust and long-term efficacy in combating terrorism.

Chart 4.5.2: Showing responses on Death penalty for acts resulting in death deters terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024.


The pie chart 4.5.2 showed that 41.2% of respondents agreed, and 30.9% strongly agreed that the death penalty for acts resulting in death deterred terrorism. This combined total of 72.1% indicated that the majority believed this measure was an effective deterrent. Meanwhile, 19.1% were neutral, suggesting mixed opinions or uncertainty. A smaller percentage, 5.9% disagreed, and 2.9% strongly disagreed, reflecting minimal opposition to the effectiveness of the death penalty in deterring terrorism.

In addition to the information obtained from respondents through questionnaires on the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent for acts of terrorism, interviews were also conducted with key informants to seek their views on this security strategy. In this regard, over 70% of them revealed that the death penalty, when effectively enforced, sends a strong signal to potential offenders and significantly contributes to the fight against terrorism. One of the key informants, a senior officer at the Counter-Terrorism Headquarters, was quoted saying:

We ensure that the public is well-informed about the legal repercussions of engaging in terrorism. The death penalty, as stipulated in the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), serves as a strong deterrent, especially for individuals considering extreme acts of violence. The awareness campaigns we conduct further reinforce the gravity of such actions and their consequences. While there are occasional debates about its ethical implications, its role in preventing large-scale attacks cannot be overlooked (Interview, 15 September 2024, Counter-Terrorism Headquarters).

The findings that the death penalty served as a deterrent to acts of terrorism aligned with Becker's (1968) deterrence theory, which posited that severe punishment reduced the likelihood of criminal behavior by increasing perceived costs. Similarly, Ehrlich (1975) argued that capital punishment could have had a preventive effect on severe crimes like terrorism when effectively implemented. However, Hood and Hoyle (2015) challenged this view, suggesting that the deterrent effect of the death penalty lacked empirical support, particularly in complex crimes like terrorism. Schabas (2002) further critiqued the ethical and practical implications of capital punishment, emphasizing that it might have undermined human rights and justice systems. Together, these authors illustrated the nuanced and debated role of the death penalty in counter-terrorism efforts.

Chart 4.5.3: Showing responses on fines reinforce punishment and deterrence




Source: Primary Data, 2024.

The pie chart 4.5.3 indicates 33.8% of respondents agreed, and 31.7% strongly agreed that fines of up to 500,000 currency points reinforced punishment and deterrence under the Anti-Terrorism Act. This combined total of 65.5% demonstrated that most respondents viewed this provision as an effective deterrent. Additionally, 21.3% were neutral, suggesting some level of varied opinions. A smaller proportion, 8.8% disagreed, and 4.4% strongly disagreed, showing limited opposition to the effectiveness of fines in combating terrorism. To add on the information obtained from respondents through questionnaires on the effectiveness of fines as a deterrent under the Anti-Terrorism Act, interviews were conducted with key informants to gain further insights into the challenges of combating terrorism. One of the key informants highlighted the issue of terrorism financing, explaining that:

Terrorism financing remains a significant challenge, with groups cleverly transferring funds in small amounts, sometimes as little as 5,000 shillings, to evade detection. For instance, a network using over 20 mobile money accounts to distribute funds was uncovered, highlighting the difficulty in tracking such transactions without stringent measures from institutions like UCC to enforce proper SIM card and account registration. Additionally, foreign funding often disguises itself as support for families or education, particularly targeting Madrasah schools. While not all are implicated, deeper investigations sometimes reveal links to terrorist activities. Similarly, some NGOs are exploited to funnel funds for illicit purposes (Interview, 10 September 2024, CID).

The findings on punishment and deterrence aligned with literature reviewed, emphasizing the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) as a deterrent through punitive measures such as the death penalty and substantial fines. As highlighted, 72.1% of respondents supported the death penalty as a deterrent, a perspective echoed by Ssenyonjo (2007), who argued that stringent penalties discouraged potential offenders. Similarly, Schmid (2011) emphasized that severe punitive measures, like the death penalty, were essential in combating terrorism. However, the critique of ethical concerns raised in the interviews was supported by Human Rights Watch (2003), which noted the risk of human rights violations, particularly when penalties lacked proportionality or safeguards. In contrast, Clapham (2006) highlighted the necessity of balancing strict deterrence with rehabilitative approaches for holistic counter-terrorism. Additionally, Akhavan (2001) critiqued the discretionary powers granted to the executive, warning that they could lead to abuses, undermining the Act's effectiveness. Thus, while the punitive measures were seen as effective, ethical and implementation challenges remained.

Chart 4.5.4: Showing how punishment creates deterrence



Source: Primary Data, 2024

A total of 31.6% of respondents agreed, and 33.2% strongly agreed that punishing membership in prescribed organizations with up to 10 years of imprisonment served as a deterrent under the Anti-Terrorism Act. This combined total of 64.8% indicated that the majority believed this measure was effective. Additionally, 20.6% were neutral, reflecting mixed views. A smaller percentage, 9.5% disagreed, and 5.1% strongly disagreed, suggesting limited opposition to this provision.


On top of the information obtained from the respondents through questionnaires, interviews with key informants explored the effectiveness of membership in prescribed organizations being punishable by 10 years as a deterrent against terrorism. Most informants emphasized that this measure creates a significant legal barrier for individuals considering joining terrorist groups. A senior legal officer with the Directorate of Public Prosecutions explained that:

The provision for a 10-year sentence for membership in prescribed organizations is an essential tool for countering terrorism. It allows authorities to disrupt recruitment networks and prevent the establishment of strongholds. This punishment sends a clear message to the public that associating with or supporting these groups, even indirectly, carries severe consequences. While enforcement challenges remain, especially in identifying covert memberships, this law acts as a preventive measure that deters individuals from aligning with terrorist entities (Interview, 13 September 2024, DPP staff).

The above findings indicated that the majority of respondents and key informants recognized the provision of a 10-year sentence for membership in prescribed organizations as an effective

deterrent against terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Relating these findings to the literature, the study aligned with Hudson (2009), who emphasized the importance of legal sanctions in disrupting terrorist recruitment and operations. Similarly, Boyle and Haggerty (2012) argued that severe penalties were critical in discouraging association with terrorist groups. However, these findings contrasted with Williams (2015), who critiqued such measures for potentially infringing on individual freedoms and targeting innocent individuals. Additionally, Schmid (2011) highlighted the challenges in enforcement, particularly in identifying covert affiliations, which could have undermined the law's effectiveness.

Chart 4.5.5: Showing responses on reasonable force and accountability



Source: Primary Data, 2024

From the above chart, a significant proportion of respondents, 32.4%, agreed, and 24.9% strongly agreed that police immunity for using reasonable force raised concerns about accountability. This combined total of 57.3% highlighted significant apprehension among respondents regarding potential misuse of power and lack of oversight. Additionally, 24.3% of respondents were neutral, suggesting mixed opinions on the matter. Meanwhile, 12.5% disagreed, and 5.9% strongly disagreed, indicating that a smaller portion of respondents did not perceive police immunity as a major accountability issue.


During the interviews, the issue of police immunity and the use of reasonable force in counter-terrorism efforts was also explored, and a staff from the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) had this to say:

Police immunity for the use of reasonable force is a contentious issue, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism operations. While immunity provisions are intended to protect officers acting in good faith during high-risk situations, there are concerns that such immunity may inadvertently shield misconduct or excessive use of force. For instance, during recent operations targeting suspected terrorist

hideouts, there have been allegations of disproportionate force leading to the injury of innocent civilians. This has sparked debates about the balance between ensuring operational effectiveness and upholding accountability. Clear guidelines, coupled with robust oversight mechanisms, are essential to mitigate the risk of abuse and to maintain public trust in counter-terrorism efforts. Without these measures, immunity can lead to a perception of impunity, undermining the credibility of law enforcement agencies tasked with combating terrorism (Interview, 12 September 2024, Criminal Investigations Department).

The findings revealed significant concerns among respondents and key informants regarding police immunity for the use of reasonable force, particularly in counter-terrorism operations. These findings were consistent with Finnane and Hess (2016), who argued that immunity provisions could erode public trust when not accompanied by robust oversight mechanisms. Similarly, Loader and Walker (2007) highlighted that unchecked police powers might have led to a perception of impunity, undermining accountability. However, Gross (2006) contended that immunity was necessary to ensure operational effectiveness in high-risk scenarios, allowing officers to act without fear of legal repercussions. Contrastingly, Chemerinsky (2011) raised concerns that excessive reliance on immunity might have shielded misconduct and compromised the balance between security and civil liberties.

Chart 4.5.6: Showing responses on how prohibition of funds solicitation combats terrorism financing



Source: Primary Data, 2024

The findings indicated that 40.1% of respondents agreed, and 30.4% strongly agreed that the prohibition of funds solicitation effectively combated terrorism financing. This majority (70.5%) indicated strong support for this provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act as a critical measure in limiting financial resources for terrorist activities. Meanwhile, 18.4% of

respondents remained neutral, suggesting some uncertainty or mixed perspectives. A smaller proportion, 7.4% disagreed, and 3.7% strongly disagreed, showing minimal opposition to the effectiveness of this measure in addressing terrorism financing.

In addition to the information obtained from respondents through questionnaires, interviews with key informants explored the effectiveness of prohibiting funds solicitation in combating terrorism financing. The majority of informants highlighted that restricting financial flows to terrorist groups is a critical component of counter-terrorism efforts. A judge with extensive experience in handling terrorism-related cases remarked that:

The prohibition of soliciting funds for terrorism is a cornerstone of disrupting financial support for extremist activities. By cutting off funding sources, this measure significantly weakens the operational capacity of terrorist organizations. However, implementing this provision is not without its challenges, as terrorist groups often use sophisticated methods to conceal their financial networks. Continuous training for law enforcement and judicial officers is crucial to effectively identify and prosecute such activities. This legal provision not only deters potential financiers but also serves as a preventive measure to curb the growth of terrorist networks (Interview, 12 September 2024, Judiciary Chambers Kampala).

The findings emphasized the effectiveness of prohibiting funds solicitation in combating terrorism financing, supported by 70.5% of respondents and corroborated by a magistrate who highlighted its critical role in weakening terrorist operational capacity. These findings aligned with arguments by Freeman (2011), who asserted that disrupting financial networks was essential to counter-terrorism efforts. Similarly, Schott (2006) acknowledged that financial regulations, such as asset freezing, were instrumental in deterring terrorism financing.

However, criticisms noted by Howell and Lind (2009) highlighted that stringent measures, like those in Section 17 of the Act, might have inadvertently impacted NGOs' legitimate activities. Moreover, Reitano and Hunter (2018) stressed the importance of addressing challenges in enforcement, including the use of concealed financial networks by terrorists, as highlighted in the magistrate's interview. Finally, Human Rights Watch (2013) critiqued the implementation of such laws, arguing that they sometimes led to human rights violations, echoing concerns about civil liberties raised in Chapter 2. This multifaceted perspective demonstrated both the strengths and challenges of the provision in combating terrorism financing.

4.6 Challenges of Relying on Legal Measures in the Fight against Terrorism


The third objective examined the challenges of relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism. Respondents' views are summarized in Table 5 on the net page.

Table 5: Percentage Distribution of Respondents on Challenges of Legal Measures

Challenges of Legal Measures in Combating Terrorism	S.D (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	S.A (%)
Definition of terrorism overlaps with other crimes, complicating investigations	6.0	10.3	19.1	32.4	32.2
Lack of safeguards for surrender or extradition	4.4	8.8	21.3	36.8	28.7
Difficulty listing new organizations as terrorist groups	5.9	12.5	18.4	33.8	29.4
Absence of laws governing use of force against terrorist groups	4.4	7.4	22.1	34.5	31.6
Inequalities promote desperation and increase recruitment into terrorism	3.7	6.6	20.6	37.5	31.6

S.D = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N = Neutral, A = Agree, S.A = Strongly Agree.
Source: Primary Data, 2024.

Chart 4.6.1: Showing responses on the definition of terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024


The total of 32.4% of respondents agreed, and 32.2% strongly agreed that the overlap between the definition of terrorism and other crimes complicated investigations, highlighting it as a significant challenge. A moderate 19.1% remained neutral, suggesting mixed views on this issue. Meanwhile, 10.3% disagreed, and 6.0% strongly disagreed, showing that a smaller portion of respondents did not perceive this overlap as a complication. The findings emphasized the need for clearer definitions in the legal framework to enhance the effectiveness of anti-terrorism investigations.

In one of the interviews, the respondent (Counter-terrorism staff) explained the complexities that arise from the overlap between terrorism and other crimes in investigations by saying that.

There isn't a universally accepted definition of terrorism but summarized it as the use of force and violence to intimidate or influence a government into complying with the perpetrators' demands. This violence is typically aimed at achieving political goals. For example, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) seek to establish an Islamic state, which is a political objective. Other terrorist groups may focus on spreading ideological disruption among the population. The respondent emphasized that while definitions may vary, at its core, terrorism involves terror, force, and violence. Additionally, terrorism often targets civilians noncombatants such as attacking a crowded market and burning it down, which affects ordinary people and their livelihoods, rather than armed forces or government structures. This, according to the respondent, is the defining characteristic of terrorism. (Interview, 17 September 2024, Counter-Terrorism Headquarters).

The findings revealed that a significant portion of respondents (64.6%) had agreed that the overlap between terrorism and other crimes complicated investigations, highlighting the need for clearer definitions. This concern aligned with views expressed by Schmid (2011), who noted that the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism often led to confusion in law enforcement efforts. Additionally, Gill (2014) emphasized that this ambiguity created difficulties in distinguishing terrorist acts from other criminal activities, hindering investigation and prosecution. However, Alexander (2018) argued that a broad, flexible definition might have been necessary to encompass the various forms of terrorism that evolved over time. Conversely, Horgan (2005) warned that broad definitions might have risked labeling non-terrorist acts as terrorism, leading to overreach in legal frameworks. Thus, while clearer definitions were crucial, scholars remained divided on the balance between specificity and flexibility in defining terrorism.

Chart 4.6.2: Showing responses on lack of safeguards for surrender or extradition



Source: Primary Data, 2024

According to the pie chart 4.6.2, 36.8% of respondents agreed, and 28.7% strongly agreed that the lack of safeguards for surrender or extradition presented a challenge in relying on legal measures to combat terrorism. A notable 21.3% were neutral, reflecting mixed opinions, while 8.8% disagreed and 4.4% strongly disagreed, indicating a minority view. These findings suggested that the absence of adequate safeguards undermined the effectiveness of legal procedures in addressing terrorism-related cases.


In addition to the information obtained from respondents through questionnaires, interviews with key informants explored the implications of the lack of safeguards for surrender or extradition in the fight against terrorism. Several informants highlighted that the absence of clear guidelines and procedural safeguards can lead to misuse of extradition processes, potentially undermining trust in the legal system. This gap, they argued, may also be exploited by terrorists to evade justice, as states without robust safeguards might struggle to secure necessary cooperation in transnational cases. A senior legal officer with the Directorate of Public Prosecutions elaborated on these challenges and had this to say:

The absence of proper safeguards in the surrender or extradition process creates significant loopholes in combating terrorism. Without clear and transparent procedures, there is a risk of violating suspects' rights or even extraditing individuals on weak evidence. This undermines international cooperation and can lead to mistrust among partner states. Robust safeguards are essential to ensure that extradition is conducted fairly, preserving both the integrity of the process and the broader counter-terrorism objectives. While Uganda has made strides in improving legal frameworks, more needs to be done to address these gaps and strengthen international collaboration (Interview, 12 September 2024, DPP staff).

The findings on the lack of safeguards for surrender or extradition in combating terrorism resonated with the views of several scholars. For instance, Bassiouni (2008) argued that the absence of clear safeguards in the extradition process could lead to the violation of human rights and hinder international cooperation, as highlighted by the interviewee. Similarly, Ratner (2014) stressed that weak extradition procedures provided terrorists with opportunities to evade justice, which compromised counter-terrorism efforts. However, Bell (2017) contended that too many safeguards could have slowed down the process, making it difficult to act swiftly in urgent cases of terrorism. In contrast, Duffy (2012) believed that a balance had to be struck between safeguarding individual rights and ensuring effective extradition processes to maintain

both justice and security. These differing perspectives highlighted the ongoing debate on how to balance safeguards with the need for prompt legal action in transnational terrorism cases.

Chart 4.6.3: Showing responses on difficulties in listing new organizations as terrorist groups



Source: Primary Data, 2024

The findings indicated that the pie chart 4.6.3 highlighted the challenges in listing new organizations as terrorist groups under the Anti-Terrorism Act. A significant 33.8% of respondents agreed, and 29.4% strongly agreed that this process was difficult. Additionally, 18.4% of respondents were neutral, indicating some uncertainty or lack of strong opinion, while 12.5% disagreed, and 5.9% strongly disagreed. These results suggested that many believed the legal framework faced obstacles in swiftly designating new terrorist groups, which could hinder the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts.


In one of the interviews, a staff attached to counterterrorism elaborated on the challenges posed by the difficulty in listing new organizations as terrorist groups. They noted that the process of officially designating a group as a terrorist organization involves multiple layers of legal, bureaucratic, and political considerations, which can delay timely action. This often creates loopholes that allow emerging threats to grow unchecked, as law enforcement agencies may lack the authority to act preemptively against such groups. And this is what he stated:

Designating a group as a terrorist organization requires substantial evidence and political will, which can take months or even years to compile. During this time, the group may expand its operations, recruit members, and carry out attacks. For example, some organizations operate in the gray zone engaging in acts of violence but lacking sufficient evidence to meet the legal threshold for terrorism designation. The procedural hurdles, while necessary to ensure fairness and

accountability, sometimes hinder our ability to respond effectively to new threats. Establishing streamlined mechanisms that balance due process with the urgency of counter-terrorism efforts is critical to addressing this challenge (Interview, 12 September 2024, Counter-Terrorism Unit).

The challenges of listing new organizations as terrorist groups under the Anti-Terrorism Act aligned with the concerns raised by Schmid (2011), who argued that the complexity of defining and designating terrorist groups could lead to delays that benefited emerging threats. Similarly, Wilkinson (2006) emphasized the need for a streamlined process to enable timely responses to new threats. However, Saul (2008) contended that rigorous evidence-based procedures were essential to prevent abuse of counter-terrorism laws and safeguard civil liberties. Additionally, Ranstorp (2007) highlighted that political dynamics often complicated the designation process, potentially undermining its effectiveness. These perspectives reflected the tension between ensuring fairness and the urgent need to address emerging security threats, as discussed in the findings and interview insights.

Chart 4.6.4: Showing responses on Absence of laws governing use of force against terrorist groups



Source: Primary Data, 2024

The above pie chart 4.6.4 revealed the challenges associated with the absence of laws governing the use of force against terrorist groups under the Anti-Terrorism Act. A significant 34.5% of respondents agreed, and 31.6% strongly agreed that this absence was a concern. Additionally, 22.1% of respondents were neutral, indicating some uncertainty or indifference, while 7.4% disagreed, and 4.4% strongly disagreed. These figures suggested that many believed the lack of clear legal guidelines for the use of force might have weakened the

effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts and raised concerns about accountability and legality in operations against terrorist groups.

Apart from the data obtained through questionnaires, interviews with key informants were conducted to explore their perspectives on the absence of laws governing the use of force against terrorist groups. Most participants highlighted the operational challenges and legal uncertainties this absence creates for security forces. They emphasized that, in the absence of clear legal frameworks, the use of force risks being perceived as excessive or arbitrary, which can erode public trust and hinder cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. A key informant from the Joint Antiterrorism Task Force (JAT) elaborated that:


The absence of comprehensive laws governing the use of force against terrorist groups creates a vacuum that complicates operations on the ground. Security forces often face dilemmas in balancing effective action against potential accusations of human rights violations. Without clear guidelines, officers may hesitate to act decisively in critical situations, giving terrorist groups an advantage. Furthermore, the lack of legal safeguards can expose personnel to personal liability and criticism, undermining morale and operational efficiency. Developing laws that provide clarity and protect both the public and law enforcement agencies is essential for ensuring accountability while enabling effective counter-terrorism measures (Interview, 12 September 2024, Joint Antiterrorism Task Force (JAT) Staff).

The absence of laws governing the use of force against terrorist groups echoed sentiments expressed by Gross (2015), who highlighted that legal ambiguities in counter-terrorism operations led to operational paralysis or overreach. Similarly, Pedahzur (2011) argued that a lack of clear legal frameworks undermined public trust and complicated cooperation between law enforcement and communities. Conversely, Neumann (2013) suggested that overly rigid laws might have impeded security agencies' ability to respond effectively in dynamic situations, emphasizing a need for balanced regulations. Hoffman (2006) added that while legal safeguards were critical for protecting human rights, flexibility within the framework was necessary to address the evolving nature of terrorism. Collectively, these authors underscored the need for a comprehensive yet adaptable legal framework to enhance the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts, as reflected in the findings and key informant insights.

Relatedly, the document review identified several challenges associated with relying solely on legal measures to combat terrorism in Uganda. First, limited institutional capacity within the judiciary and law enforcement agencies was frequently noted. Reports from Uganda's Directorate of Public Prosecutions (2010-2022) highlighted delays in prosecuting terror suspects due to case backlogs and insufficient forensic resources. These findings are supported by Abrahamsen (2005), who emphasized that weak institutional frameworks undermine the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts in developing countries.

The document review also revealed that over-reliance on legal measures often ignores the socio-economic drivers of terrorism. For instance, Mwagiru (2008) argued that legal approaches must be complemented by community engagement and development initiatives to address radicalization at its roots. Moreover, Hough (2013) pointed out that legal measures can sometimes be counterproductive, fostering resentment and alienation among marginalized groups when applied heavy-handedly. These critiques suggest the need for a multi-faceted approach that integrates legal, socio-economic, and community-based strategies.

Chart 4.6.5: Showing responses on Inequalities promote desperation and increase recruitment into terrorism



Source: Primary Data, 2024

According to 4.6.5, a large portion of respondents, 37.5%, agreed, while 31.6% strongly agreed with this view. Additionally, 20.6% of respondents were neutral, indicating some ambivalence, while 6.6% disagreed and 3.7% strongly disagreed. These figures suggested that a majority of respondents believed socio-economic inequalities played a significant role in motivating individuals to join terrorist groups, indicating a need for addressing these disparities in efforts to combat terrorism effectively.

In addition to the data gathered from respondents through questionnaires on the relationship between inequalities and terrorism recruitment, interviews with key informants provided deeper insights into the issue. Most informants noted that socio-economic disparities, including poverty and unemployment, often fuel desperation, making marginalized groups susceptible to recruitment by terrorist organizations. A senior officer from the Counter-Terrorism Unit elaborated on this dynamic:

Inequalities, especially when combined with a lack of opportunities, create a fertile ground for radicalization and recruitment into terrorism. Individuals from marginalized communities often feel excluded from the socio-economic fabric, which makes them more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Terrorist organizations exploit this vulnerability by presenting themselves as a solution to these inequalities. For instance, promises of financial support, social inclusion, or a sense of purpose are used as recruitment tools. Addressing these root causes through targeted interventions, such as education, skills development, and equitable resource distribution, is essential to weakening the appeal of terrorism and reducing recruitment rates (Interview, 12 September 2024, Counter-Terrorism Unit).

The findings on socio-economic inequalities promoting recruitment into terrorism aligned with Crenshaw (1981), who argued that political and economic grievances were central to understanding the motivations behind terrorism. Similarly, Gurr (1970) emphasized the role of relative deprivation in fueling collective violence, asserting that perceived inequalities could lead to desperation and radicalization. Piazza (2006) supported this perspective, noting that socio-economic disparities often created conditions conducive to terrorism recruitment, particularly in marginalized communities. Conversely, Richardson (2006) argued that while addressing inequalities was important, ideological and political factors often played a more significant role in recruitment, suggesting that economic solutions alone might not have been sufficient. Collectively, these authors highlighted the interplay of socio-economic and ideological factors in combating terrorism, reinforcing the need for comprehensive strategies.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter on study findings reveal that Uganda's Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) demonstrates partial effectiveness in combating terrorism, primarily through its punitive framework. Key provisions act as deterrents against overt terrorist activities. However, the Act's implementation faces significant limitations. Gaps in victim/witness protection, accountability

concerns over police immunity (57.3% agreement), and inadequate attention to socioeconomic drivers of terrorism undermine its holistic impact.

The emerging issues include several pressing challenges that complicate counter-terrorism efforts. For instance, the absence of clear laws governing the use of force (66.1% agreement) and safeguards for extradition (65.5% agreement) creates legal voids, risking human rights violations and eroding public trust. Overlaps in defining terrorism (64.6% agreement) and bureaucratic delays in proscribing new groups hinder timely interventions. Emerging trends show terrorists exploiting religious institutions (like Madrasahs) and NGOs for funding. These issues underscore the urgent need for integrated strategies combining legal rigor with community-based deradicalization, economic inclusion, and enhanced inter-agency coordination.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the concluding section of the study, which examined the effectiveness of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) in combating terrorism in Uganda. The chapter is structured to present a summary of the key findings, draw conclusions based on the research objectives, and offer recommendations to enhance the fight against terrorism in Uganda. Specifically, it addresses the nature and growth of terrorism in the country, the relationship between key aspects of the Anti-Terrorism Act and counter-terrorism efforts, and the challenges associated with relying on legal measures to combat terrorism. These discussions aim to provide actionable insights to improve counter-terrorism strategies and the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act.

5.2 Summary of the Key Findings

5.2.1 Examining the Nature and contributing factors for the Growth of Terrorism in Uganda

Indiscriminate Nature of Terrorism. Terrorism in Uganda has been characterized by indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians, creating widespread societal fear. A combined 73.6% of respondents agreed that this fear has led to increased public support for aggressive counter-terrorism measures. Expert interviews highlighted how such attacks, including bombings and poisonings in crowded areas, aim to maximize fear and chaos rather than achieve specific political or military goals. Literature supports this analysis, emphasizing the psychological impacts of indiscriminate violence on civilians, leading to a heightened demand for strict counter-terrorism actions.

Clandestine and Covert Methods. Terrorism in Uganda employs covert and clandestine tactics, with 66.1% of respondents acknowledging their psychological impact. Interviews revealed challenges in investigating and prosecuting such activities due to the minimal evidence left behind, the broad and undefined nature of terrorism, and the advanced scientific and technological expertise of perpetrators. Literature corroborates these findings, emphasizing the element of surprise and the complexity of addressing clandestine terrorism, which often overlaps with organized crime.

Mass Destruction. A significant 64.7% of respondents agreed that terrorism's potential use of weapons of mass destruction underscores its destructive nature. Key informants highlighted

attacks like the 2012 bombing in Kololo and targeted assassinations, which illustrate the organized and ruthless scope of terrorism in Uganda. These acts demonstrate the limitations of legal measures like the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) in addressing such threats. Literature reinforces this, emphasizing the societal and structural devastation caused by terrorism and the need for multidimensional counter-terrorism strategies.

Ideological Growth of Terrorism. A total of 69.1% of respondents agreed that ideology serves as a crucial driver of terrorism, providing justification for political goals. Interviews traced the evolution of terrorism in Uganda, from early incidents like the 1976 hijacking and 1996 massacres to recent covert and organized tactics such as the 2010 Kampala bombings. Literature aligns with this perspective, highlighting the role of ideology in shaping terrorism's systematic growth and evolving methods, further complicating counter-terrorism efforts.

Socio-Economic Growth of Terrorism. The findings indicated that socio-economic factors such as income inequality and lack of development significantly contributed to the rise of terrorism in Uganda. Over 71% of respondents agreed that economic disparities were a major driver of terrorism. Interviews corroborated this, emphasizing that poverty, limited opportunities, and education gaps create vulnerabilities exploited by terrorist groups for recruitment. Initiatives like youth loan schemes and community empowerment programs were identified as critical countermeasures. Literature also supported these findings, highlighting socio-economic grievances as catalysts for terrorism, particularly in marginalized regions like northern Uganda.

Religious Growth of Terrorism. Religious motivations emerged as a prominent factor in the growth of terrorism, with 64.7% of respondents acknowledging the role of religious ideologies in promoting violence. Key informants highlighted the recruitment strategies of extremist groups like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which exploit religious beliefs alongside socio-economic vulnerabilities. While the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) addresses criminal acts, it struggles to counter deeply ingrained ideological influences. Literature aligned with these findings, noting the global prevalence of religiously motivated violence and its increasing dominance over secular political terrorism. Despite global trends showing a decline in religious hostilities, Uganda's local conditions remain fertile for such violence.

Demographic Factors and Growth of Terrorism. Population growth and demographic pressures were identified as significant contributors to terrorism, with 68.4% of respondents agreeing. High population growth exacerbates socio-economic challenges, fostering conditions conducive to radicalization and recruitment, particularly among disenfranchised youth. Key informants noted the adaptability of terrorist groups and their use of advanced technologies,

which challenge traditional law enforcement measures. Literature reinforced these findings, associating rapid population growth with increased terrorism incidence and socio-political instability. Authors highlighted the need for multifaceted approaches to address these demographic and technological dynamics in combating terrorism.

5.2.2 Analyzing the implementation of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act in combating terrorism

Suppression of Terrorism through Punitive Measures. The findings revealed that 71.3% of respondents agreed the Act effectively suppressed terrorism through punitive measures, creating strong disincentives for potential offenders. Interviews with key informants emphasized the Act's robust enforcement but highlighted gaps in victim and witness protection. Literature supported the effectiveness of punitive measures, but experts argued for integrating complementary rehabilitative and preventive strategies to ensure holistic counter-terrorism efforts.

Death Penalty for Acts Resulting in Death as a Deterrent. A majority of 72.1% of respondents believed the death penalty deterred terrorism, with interviews underscoring its role in signaling the severe consequences of engaging in terrorism. However, literature highlighted ethical concerns and debated the deterrent effect of capital punishment. While some studies validated its preventive impact, others critiqued its practicality and implications for human rights.

Fines as a Deterrent for Terrorism Financing. The provision for fines of up to 500,000 currency points was considered effective by 65.5% of respondents, with key informants pointing to the challenges of tracking terrorism financing through small, covert transactions. The findings aligned with literature advocating for stringent financial penalties but underscored the need for stronger institutional measures to address the complexities of terrorism funding.

Membership in Prescribed Organizations Punishable by 10 Years. A combined 64.8% of respondents supported the provision of a 10-year sentence for membership in prescribed organizations as an effective deterrent. Key informants highlighted its importance in disrupting recruitment and operational networks. While literature corroborated its effectiveness, critics raised concerns about enforcement challenges and potential infringements on civil liberties.

Police Immunity and Accountability Concerns. The provision for police immunity in using reasonable force raised accountability concerns among 57.3% of respondents. Interviews revealed apprehensions about potential misuse of this immunity, particularly in high-risk operations. Literature echoed these concerns, warning that such provisions might shield

misconduct, thereby undermining trust and the overall effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts.

5.2.3 Challenges of Relying on Legal Measures in the Fight against Terrorism

Overlap Between the Definition of Terrorism and Other Crimes. A significant 64.6% of respondents agreed that the overlap in defining terrorism and other crimes complicates investigations, with interview insights highlighting the lack of a universally accepted definition. This ambiguity hinders law enforcement's ability to distinguish terrorism from other criminal activities, affecting prosecution efforts. While scholars like Schmid (2011) advocate for clearer definitions, others caution against overly rigid interpretations that might fail to address the evolving nature of terrorism.

Lack of Safeguards for Surrender or Extradition. The findings revealed that 65.5% of respondents agreed that inadequate safeguards in extradition procedures undermine counter-terrorism efforts. Interviews emphasized risks such as misuse of processes and violations of suspects' rights, which erode trust in the legal system and hinder international cooperation. Scholars like Bassiouni (2008) stressed the importance of robust safeguards to ensure fairness, although others highlighted the risk of delays in urgent cases.

Difficulty in Listing New Organizations as Terrorist Groups. Approximately 63.2% of respondents acknowledged the challenges in listing new terrorist organizations under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Bureaucratic and legal hurdles were identified as key impediments, delaying timely responses to emerging threats. While streamlined mechanisms were suggested, experts like Saul (2008) cautioned against compromising due process, emphasizing the need for evidence-based procedures to prevent abuse of the law.

Absence of Laws Governing the Use of Force against Terrorist Groups. A total of 66.1% of respondents agreed that the lack of comprehensive legal guidelines for using force against terrorist groups created operational and legal uncertainties. Interviews revealed that this gap leads to hesitancy in decision-making, potential human rights violations, and diminished public trust. Scholars such as Hoffman (2006) and Gross (2015) advocated for balanced legal frameworks to ensure accountability while enabling effective operations.

Socio-Economic Inequalities Promote Recruitment into Terrorism. The findings showed that 69.1% of respondents agreed that socio-economic inequalities contribute significantly to

recruitment into terrorist groups. Interviewees pointed out that addressing disparities in access to resources and opportunities is critical to countering radicalization. This perspective aligns with studies by Krueger and Malečková (2003), which highlight the link between economic grievances and susceptibility to extremist ideologies.

5.3 Conclusions

5.3.1 Examining the Nature and contributing factors for the growth of Terrorism in Uganda

The findings underscore the multifaceted nature of terrorism in Uganda, which has evolved through indiscriminate attacks, clandestine methods, and mass destruction tactics. These methods have created societal fear and operational challenges for law enforcement, as corroborated by 73.6% of respondents. Ideological, socio-economic, and religious factors were identified as major drivers, with ideological growth shaping organized tactics and socio-economic disparities fostering vulnerabilities. Religious motivations, exploited by extremist groups, compound these issues, highlighting the Anti-Terrorism Act's limitations in addressing deeply ingrained and multifaceted causes. Addressing demographic factors and leveraging multidimensional counter-terrorism strategies remain critical to combatting this growing threat.

5.3.2 Analyzing the implementation of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act in combating terrorism

The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) demonstrates effectiveness through punitive measures, including the death penalty and financial fines, which deter terrorism and its financing. However, the Act faces challenges such as limited safeguards for victims and witnesses, accountability concerns regarding police immunity, and enforcement difficulties in prosecuting members of prescribed organizations. While the death penalty and fines provide strong disincentives, concerns over human rights and the practicality of enforcement highlight the need for a more balanced and integrated approach. Addressing these gaps, alongside improved institutional frameworks, can enhance the Act's impact on terrorism suppression.

5.3.3 Challenges of Relying on Legal Measures in the Fight against Terrorism

Relying solely on legal frameworks, such as the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), presents inherent challenges. The overlap in defining terrorism with other crimes complicates investigations and prosecutions, as noted by 64.6% of respondents. Additionally, the absence of comprehensive legal guidelines for using force and delays in listing new terrorist organizations weaken operational capabilities. Socio-economic inequalities, which significantly promote recruitment into terrorism, remain unaddressed within the Act's provisions. These challenges emphasize

the need for robust, well-defined legal guidelines and socio-economic interventions to complement legal measures in achieving a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy.

5.4 Recommendations

5.4.1 Public awareness & community resilience: The Ministry of ICT and National Guidance, in collaboration with the Uganda Police Force (UPF) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), should develop and execute comprehensive nationwide public education campaigns. These campaigns should focus on counter-terrorism awareness, reporting mechanisms, and building societal resilience to reduce fear and foster vigilance. Content should be culturally sensitive, accessible in multiple languages, and disseminated through diverse media platforms. Implementation must ensure regular, widespread coverage and measurable impact on public knowledge and confidence.

5.4.2 Enhanced intelligence & forensic capabilities: Security agencies (ISO, ESO, CMI, UPF Counter Terrorism) require significant investment in advanced surveillance technology, digital forensics tools, and specialized training programs. This includes capabilities for cyber intelligence, forensic accounting, and crime scene management specific to clandestine terrorism. Training must be continuous, rigorous, and incorporate international best practices. Implementation should achieve demonstrable improvements in detection rates, evidence collection standards, and timely disruption of covert plots.

5.4.3 Emergency preparedness & infrastructure protection: The Uganda Police Force in close collaboration with the Office of the Prime Minister (Disaster Preparedness) and Ministry of Internal Affairs, partnering with the private sector, need to strengthen national emergency response frameworks for mass-casualty terrorist attacks. This involves regular, multi-agency simulation exercises, pre-positioned critical supplies, and protocols for public-private cooperation in securing vital installations. Drills must be realistic, frequent, and involve all relevant responders. Implementation requires achieving a state of high readiness and seamless coordination to minimize impact during actual events.

5.4.4 Counter-ideology & deradicalization: The Security agencies (ISO, UPF, ESO, UPDF) in liaison with the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, supported by Religious Leaders and CSOs, should implement targeted deradicalization programs and develop counter-narratives focusing on vulnerable youth populations. Programs must integrate credible community leaders, provide ideological alternatives, and offer psychosocial support within communities at high risk of radicalization. Implementation must be culturally grounded,

sustained over the long term, and regularly evaluated for effectiveness in reducing susceptibility to extremist ideologies.

5.4.5 Socio-economic development in marginalized areas: The Government (Planning Authority, Local Governments) must prioritize and implement integrated socio-economic development initiatives in marginalized regions, including job creation schemes, vocational skills training, and improved access to quality education and essential services. These initiatives should be co-designed with communities to address specific local drivers of inequality and lack of opportunity. Implementation requires significant, sustained budgetary allocation and transparent monitoring to ensure tangible improvements in livelihoods and reduced vulnerability to terrorist recruitment.

5.4.6 Legal framework refinements (Definitions & procedures): Parliament, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice and the Judiciary, needs to amend the Anti-Terrorism Act to establish a clear, precise, and legally unambiguous definition of terrorism distinct from ordinary crimes. Concurrently, they must legislate robust procedural safeguards for extradition/surrender and establish clear, human rights-compliant laws governing the use of force against terrorist groups. Implementation demands thorough legal drafting, inclusive stakeholder consultation, and adherence to international human rights standards within the legislation.

5.4.7 Victim support & accountability mechanisms: Parliament should amend the Anti-Terrorism Act to incorporate comprehensive provisions for victim and witness protection programs, administered by the Uganda Police Force (UPF), Judiciary and Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Implementation requires adequate funding for protection programs and ensuring oversight bodies have full investigative powers and public reporting mandates.

5.4.8 Streamlined terrorist designation & financial controls: The Ministry of Internal Affairs (Counter Terrorism Centre), supported by the Judiciary and Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA), must develop and implement a simplified, evidence-based, yet expedited administrative/judicial process for designating new terrorist organizations, with clear thresholds and timelines. Simultaneously, the FIA and Bank of Uganda, leveraging technology, need to significantly strengthen real-time financial tracking mechanisms and inter-agency collaboration to detect and disrupt sophisticated, small-scale terrorism financing, including via mobile money and misuse of NGOs/Madrasahs. Implementation requires enhanced technical capacity, data-sharing protocols, and regular audits of compliance.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Questionnaire for Counterterrorism and CID Officers

Introduction and participant's consent

Dear Respondent

My name is Tumugumye Godwin. I am a student of Nkumba University pursuing Masters in Security and Strategic Studies. I am collecting data on a topic '**Examining the effectiveness of Anti-terrorism Act 2002 on combating terrorism in Uganda**'. As a staff of Counterterrorism/CID, you are kindly requested to participate in this study by completing this questionnaire. Information provided will only be used for the purpose of the study and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Consent

I agree to participate in the study ☐ Yes No ☐

Part A: Respondents' Characteristics

1. Age of respondents (Years)	18-28 yrs	1
	29-39 yrs	2
	40-50 yrs	3
	51-60 yrs	4
2. What is your Rank	Police Constable	1
	NCO (Corporal/Sergeant)	2
	Inspectorate (AIP/IP)	3
	Gazetted Officer (ASP & above)	4
3. Gender/Sex of Respondent	Male	1
	Female	2
4. What is the highest level of Education?	Ordinary Level	1
	Advanced Level	2
	Tertiary	3
5. Which department do you work in?	Counter-terrorism	1
	CID	2
6. How long have you been working in Counter-terrorism/CID?	Less than 1 year	1
	2 years	2
	More than 3 years	3

Part B: Questions based on Research Objectives

Tick on the scale below to what extent you agree with the following statement about the effectiveness of Anti-terrorism Act 2002 and combating terrorism [1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree]

	Scale	1	2	3	4	5
A	Examining the nature and growth of terrorism in Uganda					
A1	Terrorism targets civilians and non-combatants rather than specific military or political figures					
A2	Societal fear generated by indiscriminate attacks can lead to increased public support for aggressive counter-terrorism measures					
A3	To achieve the psychological impact, terrorism uses tactics and methods that are both covert and clandestine					
A4	The potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, indicate that terrorism is mass destructive in nature					
A5	Ideology serves as a crucial driving force behind terrorist actions, and justifies the means of achieving political goals					
A6	Factors such as globalization, technological advancements, and the atomization of society can either impede or facilitate the spread of extremist ideologies					
A7	Public perception plays a significant role in the legitimacy of political violence or terrorism					
A8	Income inequality and lack of socio-economic development can contribute to the rise of terrorism					
A9	Various religious movements have engaged in violence to promote their belief systems, often justified by an absolute belief that such actions are sanctioned by a higher power.					
A10	The growth rate of population (which creates demographic pressures that exacerbate socioeconomic challenges), is a key demographic factor associated with increased terrorism incidents in society					
B	Analyzing the implementation of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act in combating terrorism					
B1	The Act aims to suppress terrorism through its punitive measures, which are intended to create a strong disincentive against participation in such acts					
B2	Death penalty for individuals whose terrorist acts result in the death of another person is a substantially deterring sentence					
B3	Stipulated fines (which can reach up to five hundred thousand currency points) reinforce the punishment and deterrent effect of the Act					
B4	Part IV of the Act deals with (prescribed) terrorist organizations. Being a member of such an organization is an offence punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment. Is this punishment substantial?					

B5	The Act permits police or public officers to use reasonable force in discharging their functions and also accords them immunity from civil proceedings for anything done ‘in good faith’ in the exercise of that function				
B6	Prohibiting solicitation and receipt of funds is one way of regulating Terrorism financing				
B7	The Act's provisions can lead to arbitrary detentions and violations of civil liberties, particularly regarding freedom of expression and privacy				
C	Challenges of relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism				
C1	The definition of terrorism appears to cover a wide range of activities and overlaps significantly with other existing common law or statutory crimes, and this makes it hard to conduct terrorism related investigations				
C2	The Act does not include any safeguards in relation to surrender of individuals or extradition				
C3	Given the rate at which new terrorist organizations keep cropping up (yet they are not listed in the current schedule as terrorist organisations) is a domestication challenge that hinders both investigations and prosecution				
C4	The Act doesn’t provide for a settled law governing the use of force against terrorist groups				
C5	There is also the inability of other laws promote equality among Ugandans and some end up in unbelievable desperation and thus can easily be recruited into terrorist activities				

What recommendations can you suggest for effective implementation of the Anti-terrorism Act in Uganda?

Thank you for participating in the study

_____END_____

Appendix B: Interview Guide for Key Informants

Introduction and participant's consent

Dear Respondent

My name is Tumugumye Godwin. I am a student of Nkumba University pursuing Masters in Security and Strategic Studies. I am collecting data on a topic '**Examining the effectiveness of Anti-terrorism Act 2002 on combating terrorism in Uganda: A case study of Kampala Metropolitan area (KMP)**'. As a leader, you are kindly requested to participate in this study by completing this questionnaire. Information provided will only be used for the purpose of the study and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Consent

I agree to participate in the study ☐ Yes ☐ No

Part A: Respondents' Characteristics

1. Name of Respondent		
2. What is your organisation		
3. What is your Position in the Organisation		
4. Gender/Sex of Respondent	Male	1
	Female	2
5. What is the highest level of Education?	Ordinary Level	1
	Advanced Level	2
	Tertiary	3
7. What are your specific duties here? <i>Multiple answers allowed</i>		
8. How long have you been working in the organisation (at the same position)?	Less than 1 year	1
	2 years	2
	More than 3 years	3

Part B: Guiding questions based on Research Objectives

1. What is Terrorism?
2. With examples, how has terrorism been happening here in Uganda? (*Probe to ascertain the nature of terrorism*)
3. How has terrorism grown or evolved in Uganda (*probe from historical perspective to current methods*)

4. What do you know about the Uganda Anti-terrorism Act, 2002? (*Probe for knowledge about amendments*)
5. What are some of the key aspects of Anti-terrorism Act and their relationship to combating terrorism (*probe for punishment, investigations, and terrorism financing*)
6. What are the challenges of relying on legal measures in the fight against terrorism in Uganda (*Keep relating it to the Act*)
7. What are other measures in place to combat terrorism in Uganda? (*Probe for other laws and policies*)
8. What other recommendation do you have for effective implementation of Anti-terrorism Act (2002)?

Thank you for participating in the study

_____END_____

Appendix C: Documentary Review Checklist

Document Type	Document Title	Source	Relevance to Research Questions
Government Reports	Ugandan Ministry of Internal Affairs Reports (2005-2022)	Ugandan Ministry of Internal Affairs	Nature and growth of terrorism driven by regional instability and socio-economic factors.
Academic Publications	"Regional Geopolitics and Terrorism in East Africa" (Schmid, 2013)	Schmid (2013)	Influence of regional geopolitics, porous borders, and external terror networks on Uganda.
Academic Publications	"Socio-Economic Factors in Terrorism" (Haynes, 2005)	Haynes (2005)	Influence of poverty and political disenfranchisement on extremist recruitment in Uganda.
Government Reports	AMISOM Involvement and Counterterrorism Strategy	Ugandan Ministry of Internal Affairs	Uganda's counterterrorism initiatives and international retaliation from terrorist groups.
Legislation	The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002)	Uganda Government Legal Department	Legal framework for defining and prosecuting terrorism, asset freezing, and law enforcement powers.
Reports on Legislation	Human Rights Watch Report (2016)	Human Rights Watch	Impact and effectiveness of the Anti-Terrorism Act in disrupting terrorist activities.
Scholarly Articles	"Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Legislation" (Wilkinson, 2006)	Wilkinson (2006)	Balance between counterterrorism legislation and the protection of civil liberties.
Legal Reviews	Analysis of Anti-Terrorism Act Implementation (Nassali, 2015)	Nassali (2015)	Critiques on the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act due to limited resources and training.
Reports on Law Enforcement	Directorate of Public Prosecutions Reports (2010-2022)	Directorate of Public Prosecutions	Challenges in prosecuting terror suspects due to delays and insufficient resources.
Scholarly Articles	"Legal Measures in Terrorism Prevention" (Mwagiru, 2008)	Mwagiru (2008)	Socio-economic drivers of terrorism and need for community-based strategies.
Scholarly Articles	"Counterproductivity of Legal Measures" (Hough, 2013)	Hough (2013)	Critique of over-reliance on legal measures, fostering resentment and alienation in marginalized communities.