CORRUPTION TENDENCIES AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN UGANDA.

A CASE OF WAKISO DISTRICT, CENTRAL REGION.

BY

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DECLARATION

I**, SSALI ISAAC KABUGO,** solemnly declare to the best of my knowledge that this Dissertation is my own original work and has not been published or presented to any other university or higher institution of learning for academic purposes.

Signature: ..... Date: 10th/10/2025.....

(Student)

APPROVAL

This Dissertation titled, **"*CORRUPTION TENDENCIES AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN UGANDA. A CASE STUDY WAKISO DISTRICT, CENTRAL REGION*** "has been developed under my supervision and is ready for examination to the academic board of Nkumba University

Signed: ..... Date: 01/10/2025

DR. BBOSA SULAIMAN

(Supervisor)

DEDICATION

I dedicated this piece of work to the Almighty God for his unfailing love, restore of hope and for enabling me financing and completing this program. Secondly, to my beloved wife and cherished children for the love, care and support she rendered to me throughout my education

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION i

APPROVAL ii

DEDICATION iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS v

LIST OF CONTENTS ix

LIST OF FIGURE x

ABSTRACT xi

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION. 1

1.0 Back ground. 1

1.1.1 Conceptual background 3

1.1.2 Theoretical background 6

1.1.3 Historical background 7

1.1.4 Contextual Background 10

1.2Problem statement. 11

1.3The purpose of the study 12

1.3.1Specific objectives: - 13

1.4Research questions. 13

1.5 Scope of the study 13

1.5.1Geographical scope. 13

1.5.2 Content scope/subject. 14

1.5.3Time scope. 14

1.6 Significance of the study. 14

1.7Justification of the study. 14

1.8Definition of Key words 15

1.9 Conceptual framework. 15

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 17

2.0 Introduction. 17

2.1Corruption. 17

2.2Dependent variable: Procurement. 19

2.3 Moderating factors. 21

2.4Empirical Review 22

2.4.1To examine the relationship between bribery on contract award in local government procurement. 22

2.4.2 To analyze the effects of favoritism on bid evaluation in public procurement in local government. 25

2.4.3 To assess the effects of embezzlement on procurement planning in local government 29

CHAPTER THREE. METHODOLOGY 31

3.0Introduction. 31

3.1Research Design. 31

3.2Study area 32

3.3Study population. 32

3.4Sample Size. 32

3.5 Sampling Techniques. 33

3.6Sources of Data 33

3.7 Research instruments 34

3.8Data quality control 35

3.9Data analysis and presentation. 35

3.10Ethical consideration 36

3.11Limitations to the Study 36

CHAPTER FOUR 38

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 38

4.0 Introduction 38

4.1Background information of Respondents 38

4.1.1The gender sex of the respondents 38

4.1.2Age of the respondents. 39

4.1.3Level of education of respondents 39

4.1.4. Length of time. 40

4.1.5Descriptive statistics: 41

4.1.6Examine the effects of bribery on contract award in public procurement 41

4.1.7Favoritism and Bid Evaluation in Public Procurement. 47

4.3.19: Each buyer is better informed about its own price for goods to be purchased. 51

4.2.3. Description on the Embezzlement and Procurement Planning. 53

CHAPTER FIVE 57

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 57

5.1Introduction 57

5.2Summary of findings 57

5.3Conclusion 59

5.4Recommendation 60

5.5Areas for further research 60

References. 61

APPENDICES 63

LIST OF CONTENTS

Table 3.1: Population and sample size 32

Table 4.1: Showing the Gender of respondents 38

Table 3Table 4.2: Showing the Age of the respondents (years*)* 39

Table 4Table 4.3: Showing respondent's level of Education..... 40

Table 4.4: Duration of working time of the Staff. 41

Table 4.5: Showing Public officials in charge of the purchase of goods and services tend to purchase from the best briber in Wakiso District. 42

Table 4.6: Showing Procurement rules are violated by limiting the call for bids due to bribery. 43

Table 4.9: Showing respondents weather bribery often represent a sizeable proportion of the total contract value. 47

Table 4.10: Showing respondents Favoritism emerges when each bidder is better informed about its own costs and the costs distribution of at least one bidder. 48

Table 4.11: Showing respondents response on Favoritism has made auctioneer to award the contract to the supplier offering a best bribe even though this supplier has not won the contract on the merits. 50

Table 4.12: Showing respondents' response on each buyer is better informed about its own price for goods to be purchased. 51

Table 4.13 Showing respondents' responses on Committee members loose or hide bidding documents of other competitors. 52

Table 4.15: mean and standard deviation embezzlement and procurement planning. 53

LIST OF FIGURE

Figure 1 Conceptual framework.....**Error! Bookmark not defined.**

Figure 4.2 Bar graph showing respondents responses whether most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money. 44

Figure 4.3: pie chart showing respondents responses on Government officials are bribed to approve a design which does not meet the necessary regulations. 45

Table 4.8: Showing respondents responses on Price fixing or collision is the daily activity in winning a contract. 46

Figure 4.6: Pie chart showing respondents responses on supplier bribes the government official in order to be improperly favored throughout the bidding process. 49

Figure 4.7: Bar graph showing respondents responses on Contracts are given to the members of the same family. 51

ABSTRACT

The study sought to establish The Effects of Corruption on Public Procurement in Uganda, Case Study Wakiso District in central region. The study was conducted using the following specific objectives; to investigate the effects of bribery on contract award in public procurement in Uganda, to find out the effects of favoritism on bid evaluation in public procurement in Uganda and to know the effects of embezzlement in procurement planning in public procurement in Uganda.

Furthermore, many scholars like Rood hoof and Abele (2006), manhood (2010), National Integrity survey (2006), Shah (2006), Kramer (2012), Amundsen (1999) and many others looked at the effects of corruption on public procurement in Uganda.

The researcher used methods like research design which was the overall strategy that one could choose to integrate the different components of the study. This consisted of the qualitative and quantitative approaches used for collecting the information from the field. He also used study population, sample size, sampling techniques when collecting data or information for the research. The researcher also used the questionnaires, interview methods when collecting data or information.

The data or information got from the field was presented, analyzed and interpreted using tables, pie charts, graphs and demographic characteristics of respondents which were age, sex, marital status for research.

The researcher recommended and concluded the research giving the recommendation as further research should be done and laws to be enforced strictly for better results.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION.

The study investigated the effects of corruption on public procurement in Uganda specifically in industrial division of Wakiso municipality found in the Eastern region. In this chapter, researcher looked at Introduction, objectives, research question, hypothesis, scope of the study, conceptual frame work and the justification of the study.

1.0 Back ground.

Corruption in government procurements is a perennial problem and, it is one of the greatest obstacles to successful contract management which to some scholars has been caused by the failure of the government to reward innovative practices Such unethical practices include kickbacks, bribery and embezzlement of government funds, lack of fairness, discrimination, lack of transparency, disregard of procurement procedures in contract awards, high procurement expenditure yet low service and misuse of public resources. Ahimbishibwe, A. (2015)**.** This inefficient use of public resources is generated from problems across the entire procurement process from the definition of the needs and preparation of solicitation bidding documents to a lack of transparency and competition at the invitation for bids, bidding, evaluation and award of contracts, to poor contract supervision and management. In the United States, the rules controlling the federal government allocation of $350 billion dollars have always been emphasized as a safeguard to procurement corruption, this strategy has not been exhaustive since federal officials make up the majority of government officials convicted of corruption. Asiimwe, E. N., Wakabi 2013**.** Corruption in the procurement process is also the biggest problem facing the African continent. In Africa, procurement-corruption nexus is a major challenge for accelerated growth and development in spite of abundant human and material resources; with most African states continually displaying capacity failures to cope up with the rising cases of graft through compromised procurement process

despite the presence of anti-corruption initiatives and coalitions Corrupt officials may start as early as the planning stage of a particular project and in some countries, a positive correlation usually exists between tunneling around elections and obtaining government contracts; where a huge chunk of money ends in corrupt activities. Consequently, corruption stifles development, leads to low incomes and poverty.

In South and Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption has been a major feature in government contracts and this has been worsened by post-apartheid politics and nepotism which sometimes prevents allegations and suspicion of corruption from being adequately prosecuted. Basheka, B. C., & Sabiiti (2019) Recent reports on public procurement in sub-Saharan Africa have estimated procurement corruption to be about 70% of public procurement contracts which fact inflates contractual costs by about 20% to 30%. Dza, M., Gapp, R., & Fisher, R (2015) In Uganda for example, the government enacted the Anti-corruption Act 2009 which broadened and defined corruption by its various manifestations to include; solicitation, offering, giving and accepting any goods of monetary value or other benefit for personal enrichment, embezzlement, bribery, nepotism, influence peddling, fraud, forgery, causing financial or property loss, false accounting, neglect of duty, corruptly procuring tenders, diversion of public resources, conflict of interest, impersonation and illicit enrichment, a definition earlier echoed at African Union Convention. These government efforts however, have been supplemented by Non-Government Organizations (NGOS) on a range of institutional, financial, technical and social interventions; yet attainment of a corrupt-free public procurement is still nonexistent (Okok & Ssentongo, 2020). This is not a new trend as Transparency international a not for- profit organization once ranked Uganda as one of the most corrupt countries in the World, particularly in 2001 when it was ranked as the third most corrupt country after Nigeria and Bangladesh. followed estimating an 18-20 billion dollars budgeted loss due to procurement fraud at local government level while the 2007 African Peer Review Mechanism report put

it at $286.5 million in procurement corruption for Uganda. Kansiime, D., Ntayi, J. M., & Ahimbisibwe, A (2017) By the late 1990s, such failures of the existing procurement system to cope with the expansion in government procurement requirements and deliver value for money had become generally accepted among government and donor partners with campaigns by politicians not enough to effect procurement reforms. This usually came with procurement reforms which would reflect a range of models from developed and developing countries

1.1.1 Conceptual background

According to Gould (1991), corruption is the act or effect of making somebody change from moral to immoral standards of behavior. An immoral and unethical phenomenon that contains a set of morals from moral standards of society causing loss of respect and confidence in dully constituted authority. Such corruption has attracted attention in the areas of academics, economics and management.

The word "Corruption" has a root in the Latin Corruption meaning to spoil or destroy. The concept is difficult to define precisely because of its dynamics. Corruption means different things to different people and manifest everywhere including in family, Church, Mosque, school, Civil Society Organisations(CSOs), government, private organisations and international agencies. Strand of literature demonstrate that corruption is a term of many meanings (Rose-Ackerman, 2004; Ogbeidi, 2012; Klitgaard, 2015; IMF,2016). Rose-Ackerman (2004) added that the meaning of corruption shifts with the speaker to cover a range of action that they find undesirable. It is the most discussed topic by the public; ahead of unemployment, poverty, politics and terrorism in both local and world news. The many meanings of the word are what Argandona (2006) explained (corruption) as polyvalent and changeable term.

According to World Bank (1995), public procurement refers to the acquisition of goods, services

and works by using public funds.

Rood Hooft and Abele (2006) informs us that public bodies have been always big purchasers in dealing with huge budgets. Mahmood (2010), estimates that public procurement represents 18.42% of the world GDP. In developing countries, it is recognized as essential in-service delivery and it accounts for high proportion of the total expenditure.

According to World Bank (2004), Public Procurement refers to the giving, receiving or soliciting directly /indirectly of anything of value to influence the action of public official in the procurement process or contract execution. Procurement corruption is committed once procurement laws and regulations are broken for the benefit of an individual or group involved (contractor, public officials and politicians) in procurement against the interest of the tax payers (users). Basheka & Tumutegyereize (2013) added that public procurement corruption is a deliberate failure to follow the expected minimum standard behavior in managing procurement process of pre-tendering, tendering and post-tendering phases. Since there are few studies in the topic in Uganda, some of the national studies showed that public procurement corruption is more prevalent at the procurement planning stage, bid evaluation, contract award and contract management stages

Shah (2006*)* mentioned some of the forms of corruption and these include the following;

Petty corruption. This is whereby corrupt acts are isolated and transactions made by individual public officials. State capture corruption. This is the collusion by private actors with public officials or politicians. Patronage/paternalism. This is the use of official position to provide assistance to clients having the same geographic, ethnic and cultural origin so that they receive

preferential treatment in their dealings.

Syndicate corruption. This involves networks of strategically placed public officials who collude to embezzle public funds without punishment.

Syndrome corruption. This is where public officials deliberately delay to plan in time in order to create a crisis and destroy procurement process.

Bribery. This is the form of corruption where an illegal payment is made to the government official in return for something.

Embezzlement. This is where public officials act alone to appropriate public funds. (Gould 1991)

According to the Hellman & Kaufmann (2000***),*** Corruption in public procurement takes place in each of its stage of the process and it is likely to be more at planning, bid evaluation, contract award and contract management stages. This may be a combination of both internal and external factors. Externally the bidders influence procurement personnel through offering bribes and internally the Specifications are drawn in a way that will make certain bidders have an unfair advantage over their competitors and made to favor certain suppliers. Internally those doing the bid evaluation, contract award and contract management may be involved in a syndicate arrangement to award and favor certain bidders who have given bribes to the internal stakeholders.

Regionally According to the National Integrity Survey (2006***),*** public sector corruption has failed governance. Governance is defined as the norms, traditions and institutions by which power and authority in a country is exercised. This includes institutions and accountability in governance mechanisms of citizen's voice. The constitutional legal framework and the nature of accountability relationships among citizens are selected. In addition, they are monitored and held

accountable to prove their legitimacy and credibility. Shah (2006).

1.1.2 Theoretical background

The broader theory informed this study, the theory that has dominated the analysis of diverse human behaviors (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982; E. Ostrom, 2005; & 2011; V. Ostrom, 1975). The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is used to understand how humans interact to achieve outcomes in diverse situations (Ostrom, 2005; 2010; 2011). The IAD framework has guided the understanding of corruption in Uganda, specifically, to understanding how public institutional structures in Uganda have not only failed to reduce corruption, but have promoted collaborative efforts between citizens and public officials to engage in corruption (Clarke, 2011; Lawson, 2009; Levy, 2008; Mishra, 2006; Persson et al., 2013; Rothstein & Eek, 2009; Truex, 2011). While the simplest meaning of corruption has been the abuse of public office by a public official to achieve individual interests (Dong et al., 2012; Persson et al., 2013), in a collective environment the citizen (i.e., family member, friend, spouse etc.) has changed the context of corruption to an act that benefits the rest of the community (Bukuluki, 2013). These acts of corruption are not detected by anti-corruption policies, or they are ignored, because they occur in the interest of citizens who collaborate with public officials to engage in corruption. Given this background, the IAD framework effectively explains outcomes when the action situations and interactions within the framework are created in conformity with certain conditions that sustain corrupt actions by citizens and public officials through collaboration (Ostrom, 2005; 2010; 2011; Persson et al., 2013). The first condition is that collaborative choice arrangements exist in Uganda to encourage corruption by citizens, who engage in corruption because they are motivated by the need for services, and public officials motivated by greed,

both of whom view their corrupt actions as mutually beneficial (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). The environment in which corruption takes place enables actors to modify the way they engage in corruption by normalizing corrupt practices as acceptable (Bukuluki, 2013; Ostrom, 2011; Persson et al., 2013). The second condition is that corrupt citizens or public officials have clear and locally acceptable boundaries to know when to engage in corruption (Ostrom, 2010; 2011). This condition is facilitated by the collective culture in Uganda, where individual corrupt actions by either citizens or public officials are bounded within acceptable parameters of benefit or loss to the actors (Bukuluki, 2013; Ostrom, 2011; Persson et al., 2013). Furthermore, the level of perception of corruption and the degree of each corruption form in a public institution by either a citizen or public official explains the extent to which a collective culture to engage in corruption has made corruption a complex issue to mitigate, mostly in the low-developing countries (Bukuluki, 2013; Dong et al., 2012; Persson et al., 2013). In addition, when citizens and public officials act as external variables in the IAD framework, they form action situations demonstrated by collaborations to encourage interactions that result in outcomes which are evaluated as shown in Figure 1 (Ostrom, 2005; Persson et al., 2013).

1.1.3 Historical background

Corruption is a global problem that is unrelated to culture and religion. According to the article written by Çoşgel et al. (2013), in Ottoman times, to prevent corruption, the personnel responsible for adjudicating criminals were not also responsible for punishing them, and periodically these public officials rotated between regions. Their compensation consisted of shares of criminal fines and local taxes. Insights from recent literature about law and economics reveal the details of how this system deployed fines to deter crime and how it served to control

corruption. However, by the late seventh and eighteenth centuries, the system changes over time, and the collapse of the system caused to peter out of an Empire.

Corruption is a challenging historical phenomenon to discuss. In the late 1980s and 1990s, after decades of relative neglect, it became an important subject in political science. In 1997, the guest editors of a special issue on corruption in the journal Crime, Law, and Social Change noted "the paradox of an inconclusive debate about definitions and a consensus on the severity of the phenomenon" a statement that is still valid. In recent decades, corruption has become a significant problem for a vast number of countries across the world. Corruption is one of the main concerns not only in developing economies and economies in transition but also in developed countries. In contemporary global development discourse, corruption has prominently emerged as one of the greatest obstacles to the development and progress of most states (Salvatti et al. 2018).

In Africa, the loot is mostly hidden in European and offshore banks (Uneke, 2010) in places such as Switzerland while other loot is used in the purchase of expensive fixed properties in places such as London, Paris, New York and Dubai (Sadiq and Abdullahi, 2013). It is easier to recognise the fact that corruption has become Sub-Saharan Africa's socio-economic challenge in chief which continues persistently haunting postliberation governments in the region (Sithole, 2013; Tamukamoyo, 2013). In Sub-Saharan Africa, anti-corruption regulatory laws are passed, law enforcement agencies intervene by arresting and prosecuting offenders, civil society protests and campaigns against corrupt individuals and governments at times to an extent of employing violent public disorders and the international communities pressurise governments to remove corruption but the achievements remain widely insignificant to removing corruption in the

region. Mbaku (1996) corroborated this assertion. However, this paper concedes that the region has had since independence some countries on the one hand with good anti-corruption records. For example, Botswana has been one of the least corrupt countries worldwide and in Sub-Saharan Africa, and for several decades. For decades Economic, Development, Political and Public Service and Administration disciplines have engaged in the investigation of political corruption worldwide especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where corruption has been rampant for almost six decades since the region's first independence in 1960 in Ghana to date. However, this paper does not opine that corruption is an African factor only neither does the paper imply that corruption was first discovered in the region. In fact, some (Camerer, 2009; van Rensburg, 2007) argue that corruption is alien to Sub-Saharan Africa as it could be traced as far back as the region's imperialism and colonization by some European countries which disrupted and corroded African public service values and norms which were mostly executed by traditional dynasties. Therefore, even before we could opine whether corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has been part of the political, public service and administration regimes the signs are already there that indeed corruption in this region might have been historical and subsequently embedded as an integral part of the political economy of the region for decades up to the current political systems, political economy; public governance; administration and service systems. Quick to point however is that this paper is not meant to convey “another dissident insinuation” (Outa, 2001) to African leadership and neither does the paper try to portray Sub-Saharan Africa in a bad light and above all inability of Africans to lead themselves.

In Uganda, Corruption, as highlighted by Transparency International (2020)1, transcends borders and impacts various sectors worldwide, with education being particularly vulnerable. In Uganda, corruption has entrenched itself as a significant impediment to the advancement of the education

sector, as underscored by the African Development Bank (2018) The detrimental effects of corruption reverberate across every aspect of the education system, from resource misallocation to compromised academic integrity. Scarce resources intended for educational development are often diverted through corrupt practices like embezzlement and bribery, leading to inadequate infrastructure, shortage of teaching materials, and understaffed schools. Consequently, these systemic deficiencies impede students' access to quality education, perpetuating socio-economic disparities and hindering Uganda's overall socio-economic development trajectory.

1.1.4 Contextual Background

According to Third National government Integrity Survey (2008), corruption has metamorphosed from being largely caused by low salaries in public service and is now caused by greed. Nuwagaba (2009), society values have degenerated to Institutionalizing corruption as a way of where the honest is radiated as naïve.

Broadly, according to Willesden (2000), Uganda is described as soft state with low or short-lived popular legitimacy, little authority and efficiency regarding the distribution of values and services in society. On the contrary soft states do not have the capacity to provide any general or specialized welfare benefits to the population. He adds that politics and administration in soft states are not about the delivery of services but rather about how to secure resources for those nearest to the leadership.

Ssepuya (2006) notes that corruption is high in the public procurement domain because of the great opportunities in the acquisition of government goods, services and works. It takes place at any stage of the procurement process and may involve both internal and external stakeholders making effective and efficient decision making.

According to Uganda Integrity Survey Report, demand for payment of bribes has changed from hidden to open actions where public officials are openly asking for bribes in exchange for services while the clients are openly paying without complaining. In this survey, it was revealed that in Uganda, there is now a shift in the middle age crisis from previous 40-45 years to 25-30 years. This has been due to peer pressure among the young generation who have succumbed to colorful lifestyles provided by the private sector which have encouraged them to live beyond their means hence engaging in acts of corruption.

According to Uganda Integrity Survey Report (2006), demand for payment of bribes has changed from covert to overt actions where public officials are openly asking for bribes in exchange for services while the clients are openly paying without complaining. In this survey, it was revealed that in Uganda, there is now a shift in the middle age crisis from previous 40-45 years to 25-30 years. This has been due to peer pressure among the young generation who have succumbed to loud lifestyles provided by the private sector which have encouraged them to live beyond their means hence engaging in acts of corruption.

The New Vision (2005) cites the Executive Director of the PPDA stating that the Government would save 330 billion Uganda shillings by eliminating losses incurred through corruption in public procurement. Due to the above statement, the researcher intends to investigate the effects of Corruption on Public Procurement in Uganda under the Case Study Wakiso District in Eastern region in Uganda which will help to fill the missing gap.

1.2 Problem statement.

Corruption in local governments is a pervasive problem that undermines democracy, erodes public trust, and impedes socio-economic development. According to the 2020 Corruption

Perceptions Index Report (Phionah et al., 2023), Uganda is ranked 151st out of 180countries globally. Cases of corruption are increasing despite the existence of state and non-state initiatives put inplace in the implementation of various domestic and internationally proven anti-corruption measures such as cancellation of contracts obtained through corrupt means, monetary fines for those involved in corruption, debarment/blacklisting of companies or individuals known to have been corrupt in the past, asset declarations byleaders and government officials to expose and minimize corrupt wealth accumulation (Alex et al., 2023),whistleblowing to expose corruption by those who know about it, criminalization of money laundering to stop the flow of illegally or corruptly obtained money and the confiscation of assets or proceeds obtained through corruption, all aimed, among other things, at curbing the endemic corruption in Wakiso. According to Duasa (2008), corruption in public procurement has contributed to unjust distribution of income, discouraged investment, distorted economic growth, social stability and taxpayers which have developed a negative perspective waste of expertise. Corruption in public procurement in local government has severe negative consequences, impacting economic development, social services, and public trust. It leads to inefficient resource allocation, reduced quality of public services, and increased costs. Notably, 40% of the roads in Wakiso District are insufficient, and the quality of the education provided there is subpar (Ministry of Local 4 Government Report, 2018). It also undermines fair competition, encourages illegal activities, and erodes public confidence in institutions This has made the researcher to investigate the effects of corruption on public procurement process especially Wakiso District.

1.3The purpose of the study

The major purpose of the study was to investigate the effects of corruption on public procurement in Uganda under a case study of Wakiso District

1.3.1 Specific objectives: -

The specific objectives were

1. To examine the relationship between bribery on contract award in local government procurement focusing on Wakiso District Local Government
2. To analyze the effects of favoritism on bid evaluation in public procurement in local government focusing on Wakiso District Local Government
3. To assess the effects of embezzlement on procurement planning in Wakiso District Local Government.

1.4 Research questions.

The study was guided by the following objectives: -

1) What is the relationship between bribery and contract award in local government procurement focusing on Wakiso District Local Government?
2) What is the effect of favoritism on bid evaluation in public procurement in local government focusing on Wakiso District Local Government?
3) What is the effect of embezzlement on procurement planning in Wakiso District Local Government?

1.5 Scope of the study

This specified the coverage of the study into three areas that is geographical area, content and the time scope.

1.5.1 Geographical scope.

The study was be carried out in Wakiso District is located in the Central Region of Uganda. It surrounds Kampala, the capital city, making it a critical peri-urban and rural interface. It borders Mukono District to the east, Nakaseke and Luweero Districts to the north, Mpigi District to the west, and Kampala to the south.

1.5.2 Content scope/subject.

The study aimed at finding out the effects of corruption on public procurement in local governments in Uganda which was done under three objectives. To investigate the effects of bribery in contract award on public procurement in Uganda, to find out the effects of favoritism in bid evaluation on public procurement in Uganda and to examine the effects of embezzlement in procurement planning on public procurement in Uganda. This helped to come up with different solutions to reduce corruption on public procurement in Uganda.

1.5.3 Time scope.

The research covered a period of three years (2021 to 2024) in order to capture most of the past and present information to ensure reliability and validity for the presented findings.

1.6 Significance of the study.

The study will stimulate further research in the area of procurement.

The study will add personal knowledge to the researcher and other people in the same field.

The study will enable the creation of new knowledge and awareness on the effects of corruption on procurement in all businesses in the community.

The study will also act as a basis for further research in the field of procurement management.

1.7 Justification of the study.

It is an academic requirement for the award of bachelor degree business administration and management.

According to (Clarke & Colin Xu, 2002), most of the studies focused on the economic and political determinants of public procurement corruption. Due to the negative consequences of corruption, academics from various social science disciplines have spent reasonable time and resources in exploring its determinants. Hence need to carry out the research on the effects of

corruption on public procurement in Uganda using the different forms of corruption.

1.8 Definition of Key words

Procurement planning – is the process used by the companies of public institutions to plan.

Purchases for a specific period of time.

Contract awards - Refer to situations in which a company seeks hiring a certain party to

Fulfill a certain project.

Bid Evaluation- Refer to the process of opening, examining and evaluating bids to determine the bidder's responsibility, responsiveness and other factors associated with the selection of the bid for the contract award.

1.9 Conceptual framework.

Figure 1: Showing Conceptual Framework



Source: ***Adapted from Field Data 2025***

From the above Conceptual framework, it is clear that Corruption was an independent variable as measured by the rate of favoritism, Embezzlement and bribery in Public Procurement as dependent variable measured by contract award, bid evaluation, procurement planning and also moderating factors like lack of transparency, political factors, rise for opportunities and internal factors.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction.

In this chapter, the researcher examined the existing literature on the effects of corruption on public procurement and used the independent variables which were the forms of corruption which affected public procurement and explained more on the areas that were affected by corruption on public procurement. This included the awarding of the contracts, bid evaluation, procurement planning and some of the intervening factors.

2.1 Corruption.

According to Kramer (2012), bribery refers to giving of something valuable to corruptly influence the actions of another. Most bribes in exchange for large contracts in international development projects are paid as kickbacks and usually 5%-20% of the contract value. In bribery, the buyer employs an auctioneer to receive the contract to purchase the products from one or two suppliers with the lowest bid at the price action. The contract would normally be awarded to the supplier with the lowest bid at the price equal to that bid and the auctioneer can be bribed by one of the suppliers called the dishonest supplier and in return for the bribe, the auctioneer awards the contract to the dishonest supplier.

According Eigen (2002), bribery at the contracting stage has resulted into absence of competition by price fixing or collusion of the projects that are uneconomical and necessary thereby preventing investments or expenditures that would be much more desirable.

Burguet (1999) defines favoritism as the mechanism or abuse implying privatization and highly biased distribution of the state resources which have been accumulated in the first place favoring friends, family and any close and trusted.

In Mcfee and Milan (1980), it is shown obviously that favoritism emerges when each bidder is better informed about his own cost distribution of at least one bidder. Local firms compare unfavorably to the distribution of others and if these costs are common knowledge, the buyer has an incentive to resort to a price preference policy of not always purchasing from the lowest bidder which forces non local firms to bid more aggressively allowing the buyer to minimize its expected procurement costs.

Favoritism has made auctioneers to award contracts for the production of goods to the suppliers offering bribe even though they have not won the contract on the merits. When the auctioneers cannot change the price, they can favor the suppliers by awarding the contract at the wining price there by allowing a bribing supplier to resubmit the bid.

According to Amundsen (1999), embezzlement is the theft of resources by people who are put in place to administer them.

Joseph (2012), says that the biggest problem facing Uganda is embezzlement of public funds where by public leaders have been cited in the continuous scandals of large sums of money causing failure of the country to recover.

There is abundant evidence of embezzlement of public funds embezzlement. In our country, it has been discovered that about 20% of the public funds is embezzled. The 2008 National Integrity survey reported that embezzlement of public money within their institutions was very common form of corruption affecting the public institutions. Existence of organized syndicates

composed of public officials strategically placed within different government institutions helps the embezzlement to go on without penalizing the corrupt officials. (*Inspectorate of Government, 2008*)

According to Kramer (2012), funds are embezzled or used improperly by the contractor employees whereby they submit false requests to the reimbursement of the expenses for personal use.

2.2Dependent variable: Procurement.

According to *Rivera (2004),* Contract award refers to situations where a company or the government seeks to hire a party fulfill a certain project and each of the competing party submits a bid to the hiring organization. A common example is when the government needs to find a contractor to construct a building or repair certain structures where only one contractor is awarded the contract.

According to Konstantin (2006), Corruption in public procurement has led to the abuse of public power for private gain. A public contract includes delivery of public works, goods and services, municipal enterprises, schools, hospitals, public private partnerships and other entities that spend public funds. Furthermore, public contractors are enterprises that operate in the utility sectors of energy, water, public transport and postal services.

Konstantin (2004), corruption has led to limited cases in public procurement where bidders pay bribe to contracts when they are qualified to win. In most cases even when bid is the most competitive one, they may pay bribes because they are not sure of the outcomes or defend their competitive advantage against the abuse to benefit other bribers.

The Market report (2016) indicates that bid evaluation is a process of opening, examining and

evaluating bids to determine the bidder's responsibility, responsiveness and other factors associated with the selection of the bid for the contract award.

An analyst combating corruption (2016), says that during a special audit of the utility procurement function, a losing bidder reported that a junior member of the bid evaluation committee and other members of the bid evaluation committee had removed the required documents from bid in order to award the contract to another firm which led to corruption.

In the National Integrity Survey Report (2006), it is revealed that a presence of bid rigging in procurement, a public procurement officer wrote certain requirement into technical specification to favor a bidder. Some of the companies are assisted with the staff handling procurement process to submit bids bearing low prices with the intention of revising the values once the contract is awarded.

According to Agaba and Shipman (2007), procurement planning is the process used by the companies in public institutions to plan purchasing activity for a specific period of time. This is commonly completed during the budgeting process. Each year departments are required to budget for the staff, expenses and purchase which is the first step in procurement process.

The PPDA Act and Regulations made it mandatory for procuring entities to prepare procurement plans and be approved by the accounting officer where applicable before engaging in procurement.

According to Kaufman *(2007),* Environment characterized by lack of transparency and high monitoring costs plays a critical role in determining which firms win public contracts. Bribery often represents a sizeable proportion of the total contract value and estimates by the OECD, suggest that bribes can represent 10-25% of total contract value which may be considerable in

defense or infrastructure projects.

2.3 Moderating factors.

Lack of transparency.

According to Thai (2008), Public procurement is a function of government that is most prone to corruption particularly in developing countries where there is insufficient transparency and competition. If it is not managed efficiently and effectively, serious downstream challenges are abounded. According to Kaufman (2007), procurement process characterized by lack of transparency makes it difficult in determining which firms win public contracts which can represent a sizeable proportion of the total contract value.

Political factors

According to Sheifer (1998), the biggest cause of corruption is undoubtedly political leadership at the helm of the affairs in the country. The country in which the government does not act their citizen's best interests, corrupt politicians are expected to spend more public resources on those items which are easier to levy large bribes and maintain them severally. (**Mausro 1990)**

Rise of the opportunities.

According to ***Collier (2000)***, one of the main factors which caused the fall into corruption is massive rise in opportunities which comes about four routes: over-regulation of private activity, expanded public sector employment, expanded public procurement and weakened study.

According Mbaku (1997), said that bureaucratic corruption in Africa is as result of the weaknesses of the state characterized by present regimes shaping their policies to cater for the needs of small business choice at the expense of the masses. It has become fashionable to assume that public procurement and corruption go hand in hand as if corrupt practices were the

inevitable consequence of the procurement function within government.

Internal factors.

According to the Hellman & Kaufmann (2000), corruption has been precipitated by a combination of internal factors where by the bidder influence procurement personnel in which the specifications are drawn in a way that will make certain bidder have an unfair advantage over their competitors. The specifications specifically are made restrictive to favor certain suppliers in bid evaluation, contract award and contract management which may involve syndicate arrangement to award certain bidders who have given favors and bribes to the internal stakeholders.

2.4Empirical Review

2.4.1To examine the relationship between bribery on contract award in local government procurement.

The Organization of Economic Corporation for Development of the United Nation report presents the details of how efforts to end bribery have been enforced. According to their research, the statistics retrieved on 25th April (2017) indicate that 53% of the world cases of bribery involved corporate management such as the Chief Executive Officer or Managing Director and 57% of the cases were experienced and registered during the process of public procurement contracts. Bribes were promised or offered most frequently to employees of public enterprises to seek favor in the process of procurement which has ended up compromising quality of work and only one in three cases came to the notice of responsible authority from the defendant during the court cases and investigation which in the long run compromises quality of the services provided to the public.

According to the journal of Health Economics (2010), rich patients are discovered to be more prone to bribe in public health services than the poor patients where double household expenditures increase the

probability of bribe by 1.2% compared to the national rate of 17%.This makes the health workers to be more expectant than the patients who come to access services from the health centers and considering the current state of the funding by the government and social economic factors, the health service delivery has been very poor due to this habit of the minor rich.

The blackmail dictionary defines corruption as the offering, giving, receiving, soliciting of any item person in charge of a public or legal duty implying that the payment of bribes to a public officer seeking to be offered a job is part and parcel of bribes as this would in the long run be treated as payment with dishonesty. In a law of blackmail and extortion, two topics have generated great debates, the paradox of blackmail and the bribery of extortion distinction where the paradox debate has so far been more theoretical than practical and historical than theoretical.

In 1621, Lord Chancellor Francis Becon, the highest officer in land by then was accused of having taken bribes from those appearing in court before him and he was later impeached, tried by parliament was revived after 150 years. Becon was later tried and found guilty, dismissed from his job, fined and imprisoned in the Tower. With the advent of the Bribery Act, employees need to be much more cognizant of the effect that this legislation can have up on its employees and business generally and from a practical perspective, the first thing should be to assess whether the business is exposed to bribery risk and identify those departments and personnel who are most likely to be exposed to such risks and deal closely with them in order to revitalize the illegal act or else they risk losing their jobs. In the long run, this may affect the employment market by forcing some people out of the game hence unemployment as a result of bribes. On the hand, some people have also may also join the job market by paying bribes to the public officer and this is leading to the illegal personal dishonest payment of bribes commonly experienced in Uganda and the word with Lira being part and parcel of the vice.

Previous scholarly works on corruption have mainly had a tendency to center attention on bribery

(Ameyaw & Mensah, 2020; Ameh & Odusami, 2017). Bribery compromises quality of procurement performance (Goldstock, 2017). For example, conspiring/conniving the construction project inspectors through inducements leads to disregard of the concept of surveillance/supervision. Such inducements to inspectors of construction project negatively affect procurement performance (Chiocha, 2019; Sangweni & Balia, 2019). Wraith and Simpkins (2017) stressed that bribery is essentially devastating (disastrous, ruinous, damaging) to public interest. In words of Boeckmann (2020), bribery has a corroding (damaging, weakening, or harmful) effect on the procurement business climate in general. This hinders investments in addition to distorting prices and weakening the justice systems. Thus, the suggestion is that all efforts available are required to combat this monster. People working in organizations engaged in business persuade government officials in makingdecisions that benefit them more than the general body of citizens (Ameyaw & Mensah, 2020).Such influences may be monetary in form of people working in organizations paying for theeducation of the children of government officers and/or directly providing money to government officials in order for the former to win public tenders, or non-monetary, such as political campaign contributions and trips abroad (Osei-Tutu, Badu & Owusu-Manu, 2019). The argument is also that greediness and the pursuit of wealth encourages those holding positions of power to become exploitive by engaging in bribery. The enthusiasm to win contracts at any cost inspires contractors, consultants and suppliers to engage in corrupt activities with procurement officials that negatively affect procurement performance (Osei-Tutu et al., 2019).

The direct outcome of bribery on procurement performance is realized through the price-demand mechanism for services. The cost of services provided by the public may vary among users due to bribery. Limited transparency and poor accountability systems can allow service servant officials to set prices that are different yet the public service offered is same. Basheka and Tumutegyereize (2017) explored the costs paid by Ugandan private organizations and found that organizations that gained more

profits paid more bribes. Hunt and Laszlo (2022) focused on the mechanisms of bribery among Peruvian citizens. They found that officials from the public sector were more likely to be "involved" in the bribery process and that bribery cases were positively linked to users' incomes.

2.4.2 To analyze the effects of favoritism on bid evaluation in public procurement in local government.

The procurement auctions literature is entrenched with extensive information highlighting that the possibilities of favoritism to occur in a procurement auction is dependent very much on what is purchased and the way the procurement is organized (Laffont & Tirole, 2020). In procurement auction models, it is generally assumed that i) the bidding objective is very complex, ii) that potentially large quality differences in the bids exists, iii) that these quality differences are in the first instance private information about tenderers and (iv) that delegation is unavoidable. The assumed attributes that are not related to price of bids can be a supplier choice variable, as in Che (2022) and Dastidar and Jain (2023), or external, and in this case they can (Armstrong, 2020), but not necessarily (Szucs, 2023; Vagstad 2021) remains the private information of suppliers. In the following paragraphs, the literature presented focuses on biased procurement auctions, and the discussion focuses on the types of favoritism to be considered and how they arise, including their effects in general. This literature explains to us, for example, the circumstances that facilitate favoritism. It highlights the likelihood that organizations' permanent characteristics, such as their probability of bankruptcy, may be the reason why the lowest bid always sometimes wins. The basic premise of this study is that Uganda's Public Procurement law has consequences that are peculiar that give districts/City a high degree of freedom in choosing the way they procure services and the tenderers to choose. According to Hyytinen, Lundberg and Toivanen (2021), favoritism can take several forms. A clear case of favoritism arises when each tenderer has more information than others about his/her own cost charges and the cost charges for at least one

tenderer compares unfavorably with that of the others. If these asymmetries in tenderers' costs are known to everyone, the buyer is encouraged to apply a price preference policy that consists of not always buying from the lowest tenderer. The policy forces organizations with lower costs to bid more assertively giving an opportunity to the buyer to lessen their expected costs of procurement. This form of favoritism can be effective if the effectiveness is measured from the end users' perspective. In this study, they will be residents of local governments. This view differs from that adopted by Eklöf (2021), who considers the effectiveness of first-price, sealed-bid procurement auctions of road paint from the point of view of the central government. Eklöf shows because the tenderers were asymmetric in these auctions in the 1990s, the social costs associated with inefficient award of contracts might have been significant. Another clear case of favoritism arises asymmetries of preference exist, that is, if the purchasing agent prefers one of the participating tenderers. According to Vagstad (2021), the granting of favor is external because the purchasing agent has a desire for particular tenderers, which arise because of the agent's interest in the tenderers' profits (and possibly other positive externalities from production such as employment and income taxes). The agent may discriminate against tenderers in the shadow of asymmetric information. The agent does so by (i) selecting tenderers less frequently and (ii) leaving them with lower profits when they are selected. In Laffont and Tirole (2020), the asymmetry of information by the purchasing agent is the result of collaboration between him/her and a tenderer. Preference asymmetry can also occur endogenously, as is the case in Celentani and Ganuza (2021) due to a demand for favoritism from the purchasing agent and in Dastidar and Jain (2023) due to a game of favoritism. According to Celentani and Ganuza (2021), the major curiosity is to know how the engagement in favoritism depends on the amount of competitiveness of the environment, while in Dastidar and Jain (2023) it is the opposite (how the engagement in favoritism affects competition). It should be noted that favoritism in Dastidar and Jain (2023) only benefits the buyer if an

underprivileged organization is motivated to bid more aggressively - in other words, if engagement in favoritism increases competition. An article by Compte, Lambert-Mogialiansky and Verdier (2021) is another study of how engagement in favoritism affects competition. In their model, the purchasing agent's preference over a particular tenderer also arises because of a game of favoritism. The favoritism game occurs after submission of the bids and one of the purchasing agents manipulates a bid in order to receive a bribe. This model fits in to the class of bidder-auctioneer collusion based on “magic number cheating” (Ingraham, 2021), where the auctioneer or his agent keeps the bid from the tenderer who wants to engage in favoratism until the deadline of bidding and manipulates a new bid for this tenderer are just below the lowest bid from other tenderers. Other models in this same category include Menezes and Monteiro (2021) and Dastidar and Jain (2023) where usually the lowest bids win. Whether favoritism may be efficient or desirable seems to be contingent on two mutually non-exclusive situations: On the other hand, favoritism can lessen expected costs of procurement if it strengthens competition by motivating the group of disadvantaged organizations bid more aggressively (Dastidar& Jain, 2023). However, this forecast is not consistent: in another example of procurement auctions that are biased, Rezende (2023) thinks about a situation where the buyer's preference over one of the tenderers is external. Although preferences may be the buyer's confidential information, Rezende opines that full disclosure of this preference is usually most favorable, and especially that it may be most favorable for the buyer to influence the auction rules for the preferred supplier. The incentive for introducing bias is that it ensures the supplier that is preferred more probable to win. Because of this, the lowest bid does not usually win. However, the increased bias reduces competition with Rezende's model, since it makes tenderers more asymmetrical. This has the effect of increasing profit margins and the cost of procuring. In Rezende's model, however, there is no room for favoritism in the traditional sense since the end-user runs the auction him/herself.

Public procurement constitutes a large and increasing part of economic activity both in developed and developing economies. Intrigued by this development, economists have turned to study procurement mechanisms with new fervor. This research has shown favoritism and even corruption can emerge as an equilibrium outcome in procurement auctions (e.g., McAfee and McMillan 1989, Laffont and Tirole 1991, and Vagstad 1995; Compte, Lambert and Verdier 2004, and Burguet and Che 2004). These insightful analyses are however backed only by anecdotal accounts and qualitative descriptions of a small number of alleged cases of favoritism. The existing empirical research on public procurement concentrates either on bidder (mis)behavior (e.g. Porter and Zona 1993) or the effects of procurement on production costs (e.g. Szymanski 1996), with few exceptions (Ingraham 2005 studies collusion between auctioneer and bidder). While recent research on corruption has provided evidence of the extent and mechanisms of graft in developing countries (e.g. Svensson 2003), systematic evidence on favoritism in public procurement in developed countries is scant. Equally little is known about whether favoritism, as it is practiced, is (in)efficient. The aim of this paper is deliver evidence that directly bears on these questions.

Nordic countries have traditionally excelled in international rankings on (lack of) corruption. As outright corruption is and ought to be less of a nuisance in developed than in developing countries (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1993), this should be no surprise. Yet, this paper is about favoritism in Sweden, a country that is one of the least corrupted countries in the world.1 Using detailed data on procurement of internal cleaning contracts in Swedish municipalities during 1991-1998 we i) document the existence and extent of favoritism, and ii) provide evidence on the political economy of favoritism. In our data, the lowest bid does not win 61% of the time, and municipalities pay on average 38% more than the lowest bid. We look at several individual procurements and find that these numbers are not in line with either efficient favoritism, or with the assumption of (ex-ante known) quality differences. Studying the

determinants of winning using a structural econometric model of municipal decision making we find that councils with largest majorities (right- or left-wing) put no weight on price. Our reduced form analysis of bids suggests that favoritism as practiced in our data may only be efficient in municipalities with "hung" councils.

In Swedish municipalities during 1991-1998 we i) document the existence and extent of favoritism, and ii) provide evidence on the political economy of favoritism. In our data, the lowest bid does not win 61% of the time, and municipalities pay on average 38% more than the lowest bid. We look at several individual procurements and find that these numbers are not in line with either efficient favoritism, or with the assumption of (ex-ante known) quality differences. Studying the determinants of winning using a structural econometric model of municipal decision making we find that councils with largest majorities (right- or left-wing) put no weight on price. Our reduced form analysis of bids suggests that favoritism as practiced in our data may only be efficient in municipalities with "hung" councils.

2.4.3 To assess the effects of embezzlement on procurement planning in local government

According to Kearns (1996) procurement planning refers to the process used by companies or institutions to plan purchasing activities for a specific period of time and this is commonly completed during the budgeting process. Usually during the procurement planning, departments at the local government level for this case are required to request budget for staff, expenses, and purchases and this is taken as the first step in the procurement planning process. The budgets for all the departments are then reviewed, and in an organization that is committed to procurement planning, the accountants spend the time to find common purchasing requirements. More still based on the budgets submitted, they may direct departments to work with central purchasing to combine their planned spending for specific commodities. This process works best in an organization or government that is committed to reducing costs. In this procurement planning process, issues surrounding delivery dates, contract compliance, and

customer service issues must be resolved internally before going out to contract (Behn, 2001). In most cases the primary concept of procurement is that advanced planning, scheduling, and group buying will result in cost savings, more efficient business operation, and therefore increased profitability. There are four steps that form the basis of procurement planning: group buying, just in time delivery, negotiated bulk pricing, and reduced administrative overhead (Rosener, 2002). Mawhood (1983) further adds that effective procurement planning is an important route towards securing the right service to be delivered to the public, and also maximizing the level of service provision which can be achieved within the local Supporting People. A procurement plan helps Procuring entities to achieve maximum value for expenditures on services to be delivered and enables the entities to identify and address all relevant issues pertaining to a particular procurement before they publicize their procurement notices to potential suppliers of goods, works and services.

The human right watch, (2013) an international organization that fights against corruption through their publications and broadcast reported that Uganda's case of corruption struggle is like fishing crocodile instead of fish because all most all the efforts had not seen any positive results. According to this report, justice, health services, safe water, food and education has been denied to many Ugandans. Notable cases of embezzlement were in 2005 where 127 million dollars, 4.5 million dollars and 800,000 dollars was stolen by the public officials and this partly explains the high prevalence rate of HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and the tropical neglected diseases because that money meant for prevention and treatment was all diverted for personal gains. In the same note, according to research carried out by Davies S. K, (2012), corruption is discovered to be a multifaceted issue that pervades all aspects of the public and private sectors, and cannot be addressed through legal reforms and enforcements without tackling the underlying incentives for corruption and reducing payoffs (increasing the cost of corruption) to the individual. This therefore means that the government needs to develop a comprehensive

anticorruption strategy, based on its own circumstances (corruption has largely a contextual history) before attempting to address the problem. Inevitably, the strategy will require reforms spanning from empowering civil society, reforming public sector management and finance, reforming the private sector to become more competitive, reforming the political environment to become more competitive and more transparent, and controlling the powers of the executive and making it more transparent and accountable.

CHAPTER THREE.

METHODOLOGY

3.0Introduction.

In this chapter, the researcher presented the methods, tools that were used to collect and analyze the data which included; the research design, study area, study variable, sampling procedure, methods of data collection, sources, data handling, data analysis method, reliability, validity of the instruments, study population and study limitation.

3.1Research Design.

According to Labaree (2013), research design refers to the overall strategy that you choose to integrate the different components of the study in the coherent and logical manner to ensure that the research problem is addressed.

The researcher adopted the survey design which consisted of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

According to Mason (2002) qualitative research design refers to approach and method which focus about the nature and the role of the researcher in the carrying out the study.

Qualitative approach included the use of interviews, questionnaires and observations which

provided detailed information that came from the direct quotations of the exert words used by the respondent. This helped to get suitable information to complete the study in the specified period of time. Quantitative research is the systematic empirical investigation to observe phenomena via statically and mathematical techniques.

Quantitative research involved the use of descriptive statistics that were generated from the frequent tables which enabled the researcher to collect and analyze relevant information concerning people's opinion about the effects of corruption on public procurement in Uganda.

3.2Study area

The research study was conducted in Wakiso district found in the Eastern Region about the effects of corruption on public procurement in Uganda.

3.3Study population.

According to Webster (1985) study population involves studying a group of individuals who share common characteristics such as sex, age or health condition. The population of the study was 100 as indicated in Table 3.1 below.

3.4Sample Size.

Due to the large size of the population, expenses and time, the researcher was not able to test every individual in the population. Therefore, a sample size of 50 individuals was used in the study out of a total of 100 study populations.

Table 3.1: Population and sample size

Category of the Population.	**Population**	**Target Population**	**Sampling method**
Administrators	7	3	Census
Head of departments	12	6	Purposive sampling

Staff procurement department.	10	10	Purposive sampling
Political leaders.	35	11	Simple Random sampling
Contractors	36	20	Simple Random sampling
Total	100	50	

3.5 Sampling Techniques.

According to the Sekaran (2003), sampling is the process of choosing the research units of the target population which can be used in carrying out the research. The researcher used census sampling, purposive sampling and simple random sampling.

Purposive sampling involved selecting respondents from a population due to the knowledge and skills they possess about the subject matter at hand. Purposive sampling was used because it helped to ensure that only people with relevant information are considered in the sample size. The study therefore used this method to select respondents among the head of departments and staffs in procurement department since they were directly in contact with each other.

Simple random sampling is where respondents are selected from the population on the basis of chance. This method was used because it helped to eliminate biasness among the respondents.

3.6 Sources of Data

Primary Data.

According to Kothari, (2004) Primary data refers to data collected for the first time and happen to be original in character. It involves going to the field and collecting firsthand information from

the respondents.

Secondary Data.

According to Manukumars (2013), Secondary data is the data which has already been collected by someone else which has passed through the statistical process and consultation of documented literature such as reports, newspapers and journal articles to facilitate judgment of the researcher's findings.

3.7 Research instruments

Interview guide.

An interview is a conversation between two or more people where questions are asked by the interviewer to elicit facts or statements from the interviewee. (Kothari, 2004)

The study employed structured questions to interview Administrators and Head of Department since they were busy people which helped to supplement and obtain quality data from the questionnaires. The interviewing process was conducted by the researcher because interviews involved probing into unclear responses made by the interviewee.

Questionnaire guide.

According to Yin (2009), questionnaire guide refers to means of eliciting the feelings, beliefs, experiences, perceptions or attitudes of some sample group of individuals. As a data collection tool, the researcher employed both structured and unstructured questions which were designed both closed and open-ended questions and distributed to the politicians, staff and contractors by the researcher to enable the respondents answer the questions in a timely manner which generated lot of information within a short time.

3.8Data quality control

Reliability

According to Joppe (2000), reliability is the extent to which results are consistent over time and accurate representation of the total population or the degree to which an assessment tool produces stable and consistent results. To ensure reliability of data, the questionnaires were pre-tested within Uganda Martyrs University by the researcher in the Faculty of business Administration and management before being presented to the respondents for answering. This helped the researcher eliminate ambiguous questions that did not fit the analysis of the situation at hand.

Validity

Validity determines whether the research truly measures what was intended to measure or how truthful the research results will be (Joppe, 2000). The researcher then pre-tested the research instruments to ensure that validity was paramount before it was administered to the respondents after which report was established with the respondents to ensure that all the questions were duly answered and returned for analysis.

3.9 Data analysis and presentation.

According to Mugenda (2003), data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of information collected. After collecting data, the data was analyzed and presented in a more meaningful way.

All the data obtained from the observations, interviews and document reviews were brought together, sorted out which came up with consistent data. Then the data was coded to enable easy

manipulation and graphs were used to reflect the occurrences of different aspects of the research findings by use of statistical packages for quantitative data.

The data collected was processed and analyzed using statistical package for SPSS which helped order to come up with frequencies and percentages to find the relationship between the variables established and tested.

3.10Ethical consideration

Ethical issues were taken into consideration by first seeking approval of the top management of Wakiso District to conduct the study there. Questionnaires were structured in such a way that there was no mentioning of the interviewee's name.

Ethical considerations were taken care of by the researcher briefing the respondents as to the purpose of the research and their relevance in the research process.

3.11Limitations to the Study

The following factors hindered the flow of the research activity:

Limited time combining research with other responsibilities made it hard to smoothly run the research process since the researcher was a full time student. However, the researcher had to design a time table to enable the smooth flow of the research process.

Since most respondents mistook the researcher to be a news reporter, the researcher ensured that the confidentiality of their responses was given and also established a relationship with the respondents to minimize their deservedness.

Due to the fact that the researcher lacked enough experience in the research field, guidance from the supervisor and other research experts was vital to minimize doubt in the research exercise

Lack of Attitude from the respondents where by some of the respondents were not answering the questionnaires claiming that they were busy.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.0 Introduction

Chapter four presents the findings from the field as guided by the objectives of the study where data findings have been presented in numerical and tabular form. The background information about the respondents is presented first and thereafter the findings based on the objectives of the study.

4.1Background information of Respondents

4.1.1The gender sex of the respondents

The respondents were asked to state their gender and the responses are computed in table 4.1

Table 4.1: Showing the Gender of respondents

Category	Frequency	Percent
Female	23	46
Male	27	54
Total	50	100.0

Source: Primary Data 2025

The results from table above 4.1 shows that 23(46%) of the respondents involved in the study were female, whereas 54% were male. Majority 27(54%) of the respondents were male. However, this did not have any impact on the quality of the study findings.

4.1.2Age of the respondents.

The study asked the respondents to state their age group that they belonged to and the results are computed in the table 4.2

Table 4.2: Showing the Age of the respondents (years*)*

Age in years	**Frequency**	**Percent**
20-29	13	26
30-39	23	46
40-49	7	14
50+	7	14
Total	50	100.0

Source: Primary Data 2025

The findings in table 4.2 above show that 13(26%) of the respondents involved in the study were between 20-29 years of age, 23(46%) were between 30-39 years of age, 7(14%) were between 40-49 years and 7(14%) were above 50 years of age. This gives a good distribution of respondents by age and shows that all respondents were adults and had view over the questions asked and answered. However, majority of the respondents involved in the study were between 30-39 years of age. This implied that the responses given were from the informed respondents and adults in nature.

4.1.3Level of education of respondents

Respondents were asked about their highest level of education and the responses are contained in table 4.3

Table 4.3: Showing respondent's level of Education

Category (level of Education)	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Masters	2	04
Bachelor's Degree	10	20
Diploma	13	26
Certificate	20	40
Other	5	10
Total	**50**	**100**

Source: Primary Data 2025

The results from table 4.3 above indicate that of the respondents involved in the study, most of them had certificate, 2(04%) had master's degree, 10(20%) had bachelors' degree, 13(26%) were diploma holders, 20(40%) had certificates whereas 5(10%) had neither of the above qualifications but had accessed education to a certain level. However, most of the respondents involved in the study had an education background sufficient to give valid responses to the research questions.

4.1.4. Length of time.

The respondents were asked to state the length time spent in Wakiso District and they responses are computed in table 4.4

Table 4.4: Duration of working time of the Staff.

Duration in service	**Frequency**		**Total**	**Percent**
	Staff of Wakiso District	**Others**		
Up to 3 years	3	5	08	16
4-6	8	6	14	28
7-9	5	10	15	30
10-12	3	6	09	18
13+	0	4	04	08
Total	**19**	**31**	**50**	**100.**

Source: Primary data 2025

The results from table 4.4 above reflects that 08(16%) had been with Wakiso District of up to 3 years, 14(28%) had experience between 4 - 6 years, 15(30%) had between 7 - 9 years, 09(18%) had between 10 -12 years, and 04(08%) had over 13 years' experience. Most of the respondents 74.0% had between 3 - 9 years, these were experienced enough to give valid responses.

4.1.5Descriptive statistics:

4.1.6**Examine the effects of bribery on contract award in public procurement.**

The results were analysed using frequency tables, pie Charts and Bar graphs so as to draw conclusions from the survey. The results were discussed under the various headings of the statements tested. The results were discussed under the various headings of the statements tested.

Public officials in charge of the purchase of goods and services tend to purchase from the best

briber instead of choosing from the best price / quality products.

The researcher asked respondents whether public officials in charge of the purchase of goods and services tend to purchase from the best briber instead of purchasing from the best price or quality products in Wakiso District. The results were presented in table 4.5:

Table 4.5: Showing Public officials in charge of the purchase of goods and services tend to purchase from the best briber in Wakiso District.

Category	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Strongly disagree	04	08
Disagree	06	12
Not sure	00	00
Agree	15	30
Strongly agree	25	50
Total	50	100.0

Source: Primary Data 2025

From the results in table 4.5, 4(8%) strongly disagreed public officials in charge of the purchase of goods and services tend to purchase from the best briber in Wakiso District, 6(12%) disagreed, 15(30%) agreed and 25(50%) strongly agreed. The majority of the respondents 40(80%), generally agreed that the public officials in charge of the purchase of goods and services tend to purchase from the best briber instead of purchasing from the best price or quality products in Wakiso District. This is in line with Kramer (2012) who explains that when proper systems of evaluating bids are put in place and strictly followed no shadow work can be done and this can greatly improve on the quality of service offered by contractor. Wakiso District

is encouraged to continue using such ding to the researcher

Procurement roles are violated by limiting the call for bids due to bribery.

The researcher asked respondents whether Procurement rules are violated by limiting the call for bids due to bribery. In Wakiso District as an indicator to access to services, the results were presented in table 4.6

Table 4.6: Showing Procurement rules are violated by limiting the call for bids due to bribery.

Category	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Strongly disagree	06	12
Disagree	07	14
Not sure	03	06
Agree	14	28
Strongly agree	20	40
Total	50	100.0

Source primary data 2025

From the results of the survey as reflected by Table 4.6, 06(12%) strongly disagreed, 07(14%) disagreed, 03(06%) were not sure 14(28%) agreed and 20(40%) strongly agreed that Procurement rules are violated by limiting the call for bids due to bribery in Wakiso District as an indicator to access to services. The majority of the respondents 34 (68%) strongly agreed which means that Procurement rules are violated by limiting the call for bids due to bribery in Wakiso researcher, it is not true because it does not affect the bid bribery.

Most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money.

The respondents were asked whether most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money and the results are contained in figure 4.2

Figure 4.2 Bar graph showing respondents responses whether most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money.



Source: Primary Data 2025

The results of the study on whether Most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money revealed that 00% of the respondents strongly disagreed, 00% Disagreed, 8.3% were not sure, 42.7%agreed and 49% strongly agreed. Results of the survey as reflected in figure suggest that Respondents agreed that most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money. This was revealed by 91.7%, in confirmation that most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money.

Government officials are bribed to approve a design which does not meet the necessary regulations.

The researcher asked the respondents on whether the Government officials are bribed to approve a design which does not meet the necessary regulations and the responses were computed in the figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: pie chart showing respondents responses on Government officials are bribed to approve a design which does not meet the necessary regulations.



Source: Primary Data 2025

The results from the study on the whether Government officials are bribed to approve a design which does not meet the necessary regulations revealed that 13.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed, 15% Disagreed, 8.3% were not sure, 30% agreed and 33.3% strongly agreed.

Price fixing or collision is the daily activity in winning a contract.

The researcher asked respondents whether Price fixing or collision is the daily activity in

winning a contract. The results are presented in table 4.8 below:

Table 4.8: Showing respondents responses on Price fixing or collision is the daily activity in winning a contract.

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly disagree	04	08
Disagree	06	12
Not sure	07	14
Agree	12	24
Strongly agree	21	42
Total	50	100.0

Source primary data 2025

From the results in table 4.8, 04(8%) strongly disagreed that Price fixing or collision is the daily activity in winning a contract., 06(12%) disagreed, 12(24%) agreed, 07(14%) and 21(42%) strongly agreed. it is clearly evident that respondents were almost in total agreement as to whether Price fixing or collision is the daily activity in winning a contract as reflected by 80 %(i.e. strongly agreeing). Virtually all the writers showed the existence of Price fixing or collision is the daily activity in winning a contract. Notable was Anton and Phelps (2012) and among others.

Bribery often represents a sizeable proportion of the total contract value.

The researcher asked respondents whether Bribery kickbacks often represent a sizeable proportion of the total contract value. The results are presented in table 4.9

Table 4.9: Showing respondents weather bribery often represent a sizeable proportion of the total contract value.

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly disagree	12	24
Disagree	07	14
Not sure	06	12
Agree	10	20
Strongly agree	15	30
Total	50	100.0

Source: Primary Data 2025

From the results of the survey as reflected by Table 4.9, 12(24%) of respondents seem to strongly disagree, 07(14%), 06(12%) not sure, 10(20%) agree, and 15(30%) strongly agree as to whether Bribery often represent a sizeable proportion of the total contract value, this means that the Bribery kickbacks often represent a sizeable proportion of the total contract value.as advocated by smith Denis (2011).

4.1.7Favoritism and Bid Evaluation in Public Procurement.

The results were analysed using frequency tables, pie Charts and Bar graphs so as to draw conclusions from the survey. The results were discussed under the various headings of the statements tested.

Favoritism emerges when each bidder is better informed about its own costs and the costs

distribution of at least one bidder.

The study asked respondents whether Favoritism emerges when each bidder is better informed about its own costs and the costs distribution of at least one bidder. The results are presented below:

Table 4.10: Showing respondents Favoritism emerges when each bidder is better informed about its own costs and the costs distribution of at least one bidder.

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly disagree	06	12
Disagree	12	24
Not sure	09	18
Agree	10	20
Strongly agree	13	26
Total	50	100.0

Source: Primary Data 2025

The results from table 4.10 above reflects that of the total number of respondents involved in the study, 06(12%) strongly disagreed, 12(24%) disagreed, 09(18%) were not sure, 10(20%) agreed and 13(26%) strongly agreed. Most of the respondents 46% therefore agreed that favouritism emerges when each bidders is better informed about its own costs and the costs distribution of at least one bidder. The lack of evidence is at odds with Burgent (1999)'s recommendation.

A supplier bribes the government official in order to be improperly favored throughout the bidding process

From the survey study about suppliers bribes the government official in order to be improperly favored throughout the bidding process., the following results were obtained, 23% of

respondents strongly disagreed, 17% disagreed, while 05% were not sure, 25% agreed and 30% strongly agreed. This is further illustrated in the pie chart below

Figure 4.6: Pie chart showing respondents responses on supplier bribes the government official in order to be improperly favored throughout the bidding process.



Source: Primary data 2025

The results from the figure above do shows that the respondents were strongly agreeing with Mc fee and McMillan (1980). Although one wonders if their thinking remains applicable completely in Wakiso District especially in procurement department.

Favoritism has made auctioneer to award the contract to the supplier offering a best bribe even though this supplier has not won the contract on the merits.

The survey reveals that respondent's response on whether Favoritism has made auctioneer to

award the contract to the supplier offering a best bribe even though this supplier has not won the contract on the merits and were summarised below in the frequency table.

Table 4.11: Showing respondents response on Favoritism has made auctioneer to award the contract to the supplier offering a best bribe even though this supplier has not won the contract on the merits.

Category	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Strongly disagree	10	20
Disagree	10	20
Not sure	5	10
Agree	10	20
Strongly agree	15	30
Total	50	100.0

Source: Primary Data 2025

From the table 4.11 10(20%) strongly disagreed, 10(20%) disareed.5 (10%) not sure, 10(20%) agree and 15(30%) strongly agreed. This was observed among varied responses from the respondents' answers under interviews. However, this is in line with NISR (2006) who argued that Favoritism has made auctioneer to award the contract to the supplier offering a best bribe even though this supplier has not won the contract on the merits.

Contracts are given to the members of the same family.

The study asked respondents whether Contracts are given to the members of the same family and the responses were captured in figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7: Bar graph showing respondents responses on Contracts are given to the members of the same family.



Source: Primary Data 2025

The results from the survey study their responses were 12.5% strongly disagreed, 20% disagreed, 42.5% agreed, 15% were not sure, and 10% strongly agreed. Most of the respondents were in line with Morgan (2008).

4.3.19: Each buyer is better informed about its own price for goods to be purchased.

From the interview, the study asked respondents whether each buyer is better informed about its own price for goods to be purchased. The results are presented below.

Table 4.12: Showing respondents' response on each buyer is better informed about its own price for goods to be purchased.

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly disagree	8	16
Disagree	13	26
Not sure	0	0
Agree	15	30
Strongly agree	14	28
Total	**50**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data 2025

Table 4.12 reveals that respondents agree that each buyer is better informed about its own price for goods to be purchased. However, this seemed too far from disagreement which implied that the respondents do seem to accept. Suggests from respondents as far as each buyer is better informed about, he's own price for goods to be purchased.

Committee members loose or hide bidding documents of other competitors.

The study asked respondents whether Committee members loose or hide bidding documents of other competitors. The results were presented below:

Table 4.13 Showing respondents' responses on Committee members loose or hide bidding documents of other competitors.

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly disagree	03	06
Disagree	07	14
Not sure	05	10
Agree	15	30
Strongly agree	20	40
Total	**50**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data 2025

The results from table 4.13 above reflects that of the total number of respondents involved in the study, 06% strongly disagreed, 14% disagreed,10% were not sure, 30% agreed and 40% strongly agreed. Most of the respondents 70% therefore agreed Committee members loose or hide bidding documents of other competitors.

4.2.3. Description on the Embezzlement and Procurement Planning.

Table 4.15: mean and standard deviation embezzlement and procurement planning.

	Statements	N	MIN	MAX	MEAN	SD
1	Accounting officers misallocate funds which are supposed to carry out certain activities.	50	1	5	1.97	1.213
2	Most of the funds given to the officials for development have been embezzled by government officials.	50	1	4	2.59	1.956
3	Most of the state officials steal from the public institutions that they are employed to work for.	50	1	5	2.64	1.046
4	Funds have been misallocated to different areas where they are not supposed to be by the officials.	50	1	5	1.97	1.213

5	There has been increased expenditure in public procurement where by the individuals charge high price for a given product because public funds have been embezzled.	50	1	5	2.97	1.142
6	Employees submit false requests in order to acquire funds for private use.	50	1	5	2.55	.921

Source: Primary data 2025

Accounting officers misallocate of funds which are supposed to carry out certain activities.

From the information revealed by table 4.15, respondents believe that accounting officers misallocate of funds which are supposed to carry out certain activities. This is shown by a mean value of 1.97 although the standard deviation of 1.213 under the same test revealed various responses from the respondents. This has implications on the accounting officers misallocate funds which are supposed to carry out certain activities as mentioned by Amundsen (1999).

Most of the funds given to the officials for development have been embezzled by government officials

From the information collected from respondents according to table 4.15, this is revealed by a mean value of 2.59. However, a standard deviation of .956 reveals varied responses from the respondents interviewed over the same test. The information revealed could be an explanation as to why Most of the funds given to the officials for development have been embezzled by government officials as revealed by the finding under 4.5.1.

Most of the state officials steal from the public institutions that they are employed to work for.

From the information collected from respondents according to table 4.15, it is clear that Most of the state officials steal from the public institutions that they are employed to work for. This is revealed by a mean value of 2.64. However, a standard deviation of 1.046 reveals varied responses from the respondents interviewed over the same test.

Funds have been misallocated to different areas where they are not supposed to be by the officials.

From the information revealed by table 4.15, respondents believe that the Funds have been misallocated to different areas where they are not supposed to be by the officials. This is revealed by a mean value of 1.97. However, a significant standard deviation value of 1.213 under the same test revealed various responses from the respondents interviewed. The variance in their responses is an indication that respondents were not sure of their answers as some withheld the actual truth.

There has been increased expenditure in public procurement where by the individuals charge high price for a given product because public funds have been embezzled.

From the information collected from respondents according to table 4.15, it is clear that there has been increased expenditure in public procurement where by the individuals charge high price for a given product because public funds have been embezzled. This is revealed by a mean value of 2.97. However, a standard deviation of 1.142 reveals various responses from the respondents interviewed over the same test. The information revealed could be an explanation as to why there has been increased expenditure in public procurement where by the individuals charge high price for a given product because public funds have been embezzled.

Employees submit false requests in order to acquire funds for private use.

From the results in table 4.15, it is clearly evident that respondent was almost in total

disagreement as to whether Employees submit false requests in order to acquire funds for private use as reflected by a mean value of 2.55 which is tending towards maximum value of 3 (i.e. strongly disagreeing). However, the standard deviation of 0.921 suggests variations in responses by the various respondents. Virtually all the writers (reviewed) underscore that the Employees submit false requests in order to acquire funds for private use. Notable among these are Kramer (2012) and IOG (2008) among others. Therefore the finding is in cycle with the reviewed literature.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations aimed at assessing the effect of corruption on public procurement in Uganda, Case of Wakiso District.

5.2 Summary of findings

This study focused on assessing the effect of corruption on public procurement in Uganda, Case study Wakiso District. A total of 50 respondents were used to fill and returned the self-administered questionnaires, interviewed. As a result, the following were observed from the study.

The five key issues under background information of the respondents emphasized this study are the respondents to ensure gender sensitivity, education level to ensure that responses were from an informed point of view, age to ensure that respondents were mature and independent and the nature of employment to ensure that the respondents were actual employees of Wakiso District.

Another issue was the time period; the respondents had spent with Wakiso District to ensure that the responses were from respondents who were well versed with the information provided.

The study used less female (46%) of the respondents and more male who were only 54%. This was because there were more male respondents than female. So there was no gender bias.

Pertaining to education level, as reflected in the table 4.3, the majority of the respondents (90%) had attained qualifications ranging from a master degree to certificate. This means that all the responses to the questionnaires were from an informed point of view since the respondents were educated to read, understand and interpret the questions.

All the respondents of the study were above 20 years of age and therefore their opinions were

from a mature point of view. In fact, the findings indicated that 14% above 50 years of age, 14% above 40 years of age, 46% above 30 years of age, 26% above 20yaers of age.

As regards length of service, 08% had worked with the Wakiso District for more than 12 years and 18% had worked with the Wakiso District for 9-12 years, 30.0% had worked with the Wakiso District for 6-9 years, 28% had worked with the Wakiso District for 3-6 years and only 06% had worked with Wakiso District for only 3 years. This means that the respondents had expert knowledge about the Wakiso District operations.

The effects of bribery in contract award in public procurement in Uganda.

The results of the statistical analysis showed that majority of the respondent knew how public officials in charge of the purchase of goods and services tend to purchase from the best briber. This was shown by 80% of the respondents agreeing. Also, the results showed that the Procurement rules are violated by limiting the call for bids due to bribery as confirmed by 68%. About most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money. This was clearly revealed by 91% which was worth noting since it was tending towards the midpoint. On Government officials are bribed to approve a design which does not meet the necessary were the majority of the respondents agreed which was shown by 60%.

The effects of favoritism in bid evaluation in public procurement in Uganda.

The study revealed that 56% agreed Favoritism emerges when each bidder is better informed about its own costs and the costs distribution of at least one bidder. The results of the survey although it reflected in difference whether the supplier bribes the government official in order to be improperly favored throughout the bidding process it revealed that 55% agreed.

About Favoritism has made auctioneer to award the contract to the supplier offering a best bribe

even though this supplier has not won the contract on the merits where by 50% agreed, and the Contracts are given to the members of the same family where this was shown by 52% of respondents agreeing. Each buyer is better informed about its own price for goods to be purchased 58% agreeing. Whether Committee members loose or hide bidding documents of other competitors where 70% fully agreed.

How does embezzlement affect public procurement in Uganda?

From the information revealed by table 4.16, respondents believe that accounting officers misallocate of funds which are supposed to carry out certain activities. This was revealed by a mean value of 1.97. It was clear that Most of the funds given to the officials for development have been embezzled by government officials. This is revealed by a mean value of 2.59. It was also clear that Most of the state officials steal from the public institutions that they are employed to work for. This was revealed by a mean value of 2.64. However, a standard deviation of 1.046 reveals varied responses from the respondents interviewed over the same test. From the information revealed that, respondents believe that the Funds have been misallocated to different areas where they are not supposed to be by the officials. This is revealed by a mean value of 1.97. From the information collected from respondents, it is clear that there has been increased expenditure in public procurement where by the individuals charge high price for a given product because public funds have been embezzled. This is revealed by a mean value of 2.97.

5.3 Conclusion

The results from the study indicate that Bribery has greatly affected the procurement process and led to shadow works in Wakiso District

The study revealed that the favoritism and Bid evaluation in public procurement is at high rate as many respondents agreed.

The results further indicated that embezzlement and procurement planning process has great impact on procurement process in Wakiso District.

The final conclusion of this study is that there is a significant positive relationship between Corruption and Public procurement process in Wakiso District

5.4Recommendation

The following recommendations can be made on the effect of corruption on public procurement

The study also recommends that the Wakiso District to have a systematic way of having all their bid evaluation process. there must be laws put in place to handle victims caught under corruption to reduce its rate community.

The study also recommends that Wakiso District establishes a bid internal control system through creating contact point.

Finally, the study recommends that there should be a deliberate attempt to conduct a study which establishes the relationship of Corruption and Public Procurement process objectives among the people in the community.

5.5Areas for further research

Given the findings and short comings of the study, it's very paramount for further research to be carried out to investigate the importance of reducing corruption in Wakiso District. The following areas are recommended for further research:

- **i.** The effects of Corruption and education Service delivery in Wakiso District
- **ii.** The implication of corruption tendence on infrastructure in local government in Uganda
- **iii.** The state of corruption on district service commission and performance of Local Government in Uganda.

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APPENDICES

UGANDA MARTYRS UNIVERSITY.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR WAKISO MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

I am **SSALI ISAAC KABUGO** a final year student of the school of social sciences, doing a Master's in Public Administration and Management writing my dissertation on the topic: "The effects of corruption in public procurement in Local Government Uganda. A case of Wakiso District Local Government. I request you to help me and answer these questions and promise that the information got shall be kept confidential.

SECTION A:

Please tick the appropriate box.

1. Gender

   Male ☐ Female ☐

2. Age group you belong to;

   20 – 29 ☐ 30 – 39 ☐ 40 – 49 ☐ 50+ ☐

3. Marital Status

   Single ☐ Married ☐ Devoiced ☐ Widow ☐

4. Level of Education

   Certificate ☐ Diploma ☐ Degree ☐

   Masters ☐ PhD ☐ Others ☐

5. Which position do you hold?

   ……..

6. How long have you served in that position?

   0 – 3 ☐ 4 – 6 ☐ 7 – 9 ☐ 10+ ☐

Please tick the appropriate box in the section below where **SD** = strongly disagree; **D=** Disagree**;** **NS =** Not sure; **A =** Agree and **SA =** strongly agree.

SECTION B: BRIBERY AND CONTRACT AWARD IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

Details	**SD**	**D**	**NS**	**A**	**SA**
Public officials in charge of the purchase of goods and services tend to purchase from the best briber					
Best Bidder with best price and quality products are always ignored					
Procurement rules are violated by limiting the call for bids due to bribery.					
Most individuals lose their contracts because the competitor bribes the official by giving him or her large sums of money.					
Contracts are awarded after bribery or kickbacks					
Government officials are bribed to approve a design which does not meet the necessary regulations.					
Price fixing or collision is the daily activity in winning a					

contract.					
Contractors give bribes because they are not sure of the outcome					
Bribery kickbacks often represent a sizeable proportion of the total contract value.					

SECTION C: FAVORISM AND BID EVALUATION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

Details	**SD**	**D**	**NS**	**A**	**SA**
Favoritism emerges when each bidder is better informed about its own costs and the costs distribution of at least one bidder.					
A supplier bribes the government official in order to be improperly favored throughout the bidding process.					
Favoritism has made auctioneer to award the contract to the supplier offering a best bribe even though this supplier has not won the contract on the merits.					
Contracts are given to the members of the same family.					
Each buyer is better informed about its own price for goods to be purchased.					

Committee members loose or hide bidding documents of other competitors.					
People lose contracts because of the bad relationship with the particular individual awarding the contracts.					
Staff handling the procurement process submits bids bearing low prices with the intention of revising the values once the contract is awarded.					
Most of the tender documents are drafted to favour certain suppliers in procurement.					
Favoritism in bid evaluation has led to the termination of the procedure.					

SECTION D: EMBEZZLEMENT AND PROCUREMENT PLANING.

Details	**SD**	**D**	**NS**	**A**	**SA**
Accounting officers misallocate funds which are supposed to carry out certain activities.					
Most of the funds given to the officials for development have been embezzled by government officials.					

Most of the state officials steal from the public institutions that they are employed to work for.					
Funds have been misallocated to different areas where they are not supposed to be by the officials.					
There has been increased expenditure in public procurement where by the individuals charge high price for a given product because public funds have been embezzled.					
Employees submit false requests in order to acquire funds for private use.					

THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS RESEARCH